Wayne State University
Wayne State University Dissertations

1-1-2018

The“specialness” Of Religious Conscience: An
Egalitarian Response
Joseph Marsden Dunne
Wayne State University,

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations
Part of the Law Commons, Philosophy Commons, and the Religion Commons
Recommended Citation
Dunne, Joseph Marsden, "The“specialness” Of Religious Conscience: An Egalitarian Response" (2018). Wayne State University
Dissertations. 2021.
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/2021

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Wayne State University Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.

THE “SPECIALNESS” OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE: AN EGALITARIAN RESPONSE
by
JOSEPH MARSDEN DUNNE
DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Graduate School
of Wayne State University,
Detroit, Michigan
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
2018
MAJOR: PHILOSOPHY
Approved By:
Advisor

Date

© COPYRIGHT BY
JOSEPH MARSDEN DUNNE
2018
All Rights Reserved

DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to the family and friends who constitute the “great
cloud of witnesses” that have surrounded and supported me throughout my time in
graduate school. This work is dedicated to you because, without you, this work would have
been impossible.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I would like to thank my advisor Dr. John Corvino. His mentorship and
direction over the past several years have catalyzed my philosophical development and
helped me to accomplish what were, at one time, distant dreams. By his own example, he
has taught me how to be civil towards people with whom you disagree, how to be
charitable and consider your opponent’s best arguments, how to bridge gaps between
seemingly unbridgeable camps, and, perhaps most importantly, how philosophers can be
relevant to public discourse about significant issues. I would do well to mimic his virtues
within my own career as well – and lucky if I can channel his playful and snarky wit.
Second, I would like to thank the rest of my committee: Dr. Eun-Jung Katherine Kim,
Dr. Sean Stidd, and Professor Chris Lund. A lot of the ideas within this dissertation were
developed and honed through conversations both inside and outside of their classrooms.
Their ongoing input over the years has been crucial to this project.
Third, I would like to thank several other, key persons not mentioned above. In
particular, I would like to thank Jonathan A. Jones, Rev. David W. Jones, Dr. Lucas Lockard,
Dr. Bruce Russell, Dr. Kevin Vallier, Dr. Andrew Koppelman, Dr. Ryan T. Anderson, Dr.
Timothy McGrew, Dr. Paul Hedeen, and Dr. John Piippo. All of these individuals served
important and memorable roles at pivotal moments throughout the development of this
dissertation.
Fourth, I would like to thank the Graduate School at Wayne State for helping to fund
this research through their annual Summer Dissertation Fellowship in 2017. Moreover, I
would also like to thank Dr. Walter F. Edwards and Wayne State’s Humanities Center for

iii

helping to fund this research through their annual Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship in
2018 as well.
Last, I would like to thank my parents – Dr. Tim and Dr. Cindy – and my wife
Hannah. From an early age, my parents taught and modeled for me the value of education
and hard work. Much of what has been accomplished here is the fruit of what they sowed in
me years ago. Their ongoing support of me has been second only to my wife Hannah who
deserves more gratitude and recognition for the realization of this project than anyone else.
Her example and encouragement to me over the years is unrivaled and have upheld me in
moments when nothing else seemed to. Truly, “strength and dignity are her clothing.”

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication

ii

Acknowledgements

iii

Introduction

1

Chapter 1: The Specialness of Religion

11

Chapter 2: The Nature of Conscience

38

Chapter 3: Categoricity and Insulation from Evidence

72

Chapter 4: Further Features

113

Chapter 5: Objections to the Egalitarian Response

150

References

198

Abstract

203

Autobiographical Statement

205

v

1
INTRODUCTION
Religion is often singled out for special legal treatment in Western societies. This is
certainly true in the United States where religion enjoys a special place in the First
Amendment to the Constitution. Specifically, the guidelines for state interaction with
religion are expressed in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause: “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” 1
Through Free Exercise guarantees, for example, the Supreme Court held in Wisconsin v.
Yoder (1972) that Amish children were entitled to an exemption from compulsory school
attendance laws after the eighth grade, emphasizing that this was a uniquely “religious”
exemption that did not apply to everyone.2 Religion enjoys special legal treatment in other
ways too. Both the US federal government and 21 individual states have passed Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts3 that protect religious persons from having their sincere beliefs
substantially burdened, barring some compelling governmental interest that cannot be met
by less restrictive means. Nonreligious persons, to the contrary, fail to possess equal or
similar RFRA-like protections for their sincerely held beliefs. Consider also the example of
legal exemptions to otherwise mandatory vaccination laws. In the United States, 47 states
currently offer nonmedical exemptions to persons who object to these mandatory vaccine
1

The U.S. Constitution, Amendment I

2

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)

3

RFRAs contain a three-pronged exemption test for religious objectors. If the objector can answer “yes” to all

of the following conditions, then they can receive a legal accommodation: (a) Substantial Burden: Does the
individual have a sincere belief that is being substantially burdened? (b) Compelling Interest: Does the
government have a very good reason (e.g. health or safety) to interfere? (c) Least Restrictive Means: Is there a
reasonable alternative to serve the compelling interest?
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laws for religious reasons. 29 of these states offer legal exemptions to religious objectors
only while the other 18 states offer legal exemptions to nonreligious conscientious
objectors as well.4 So if both an Atheist and a Christian conscientiously object to some
mandatory vaccine law in New York, a legal exemption may be granted to the Christian but
not the Atheist under New York’s current legal framework.
The special treatment of religious beliefs is similarly at the heart of an important
thought-experiment raised by Brian Leiter.5 He asks us to imagine the following: a young
rural boy enters his school classroom on the first day of the year wearing – as usual – a
family knife that has been passed down to him from his father. This knife is a family
heirloom that designates the arrival of maturity for the males in his family such that, to be a
“man” is to receive that dagger from one’s father, just as he received it from his, and so on.
The boy’s identity as a man in his familial community turns on his carrying the family knife,
both marking his maturity and bond with the past. Now, consider a young Sikh boy
entering his school classroom on the first day of the year wearing – as usual – his kirpan.
The kirpan is a small dagger or knife given to young men in the Sikh religion as a symbol of
their religious devotion. As was the case with the rural boy, carrying these small knives
similarly demarcates the Sikh boy’s maturity, strengthens his bond with the past, and
constitutes at least part of his communal, familial, or religious identity. This thought-

4

For a more detailed analysis of these vaccine exemptions, see Mark Navin (2018).

5

Brian Leiter (2013), 1-3
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experiment raises an interesting question: why might it be permissible for the Sikh boy to
carry his dagger in school but impermissible for the rural boy?6
In fact, all of the above cases, both real and imagined, raise an important question:
what, if anything, is “special” about religious conscience beliefs that justifies their special legal
treatment? That is the central question this dissertation seeks to answer. Overall, I’m not
interested in answering the broad version of the specialness question – that is, whether or
not conscience beliefs more broadly, like religious beliefs, should receive a defeasible
special status before the law. The broad version of the specialness question asks us to
broadly compare and contrast religious beliefs with conscience beliefs in order to see
whether one set of beliefs deserves special legal solicitude over the other set of beliefs.
Instead, I am interested in answering the narrow version of the specialness question – that
is, whether or not religious conscience beliefs in particular should receive comparatively
special legal treatment over and above nonreligious conscience beliefs. The narrow version
of the specialness question asks us to narrowly compare and contrast religious conscience
beliefs with nonreligious conscience beliefs in order to see whether one kind of conscience
belief deserves special legal solicitude over the other kind of conscience belief.
Additionally, I am not necessarily interested in whether the state should grant legal
exemptions – for I assume that it is morally permissible to grant at least some
conscientious objections. Nor is my focus centrally on how the state decides which requests
for accommodation should be granted either. Just how the state should decide whether or
not to grant conscientious exemptions is a related though separate question that varies in
6

Brian Leiter (2013): “There is no Western democracy, at present, in which the [rural] boy … has prevailed or

would prevail in a challenge to a general prohibition on the carrying of weapons in the school.” (3)
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answer. For example, some approaches deemphasize the particular content of the
conscientious objection and may grant equal protections to religious and nonreligious
conscientious objectors as a result. Approaches in this vein emphasize relevant extrinsic
features (e.g., the infringement of rights or harm caused to third-parties) over relevant
intrinsic features (e.g., the uniquely religious content of the objector’s conscience) when
determining whether granting a legal exemption is justified. Other approaches consider the
particular content of a conscientious objection as significant and, in some way,
determinative of whether or not a legal exemption is justified. Approaches in this vein may
consider the religiosity of the objector’s conscience as a relevant and good reason for
permitting a legal exemption. Conversely, approaches in this vein may also consider the
religiosity of the objector’s conscience as a relevant and good reason for withholding a legal
exemption.7
In this dissertation, I offer an Egalitarian Response to the narrow question about
religion’s “specialness” before the law. My central claim is that, because religious and
nonreligious conscience beliefs are sufficiently similar in nature, there is no good reason to
treat them differently before the law. Put another way, I contend that there are no salient
features of the religious conscience that justifies affording it special legal treatment. As
noted above, this central claim is separate from the question of whether a state should
grant legal exemptions to conscientious objectors and separate from the question of how a
state should determine whether to grant exemptions if permitted.

7

See Yossi Nehushtan (2011a) for a more detailed analysis of the varying approaches to answering the

question concerning how the state should decide which requests for accommodation should be granted.
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Of course, it’s possible to address these further questions by combining the central,
egalitarian claim with further premises. If the state has good reasons to grant a defeasible
positive special legal status to all conscience beliefs, for example, and we believe that there
is good reason to adopt the Egalitarian Response, then the state would thus have good
reasons to grant a defeasible positive special legal status to both religious and secular
conscience beliefs. The same is true if the state has good reasons to grant a defeasible
negative special legal status to all conscience beliefs as well. Though my considered view is
that the state has good reasons to grant a defeasible positive special legal status to
conscience beliefs, the aim of my dissertation is to defend an Egalitarian Response to the
narrow question about religion’s “specialness” before the law – leaving these further
questions open for further research. Surely the arguments and claims within this
dissertation may be useful in support of further arguments for one of these positions.
Nevertheless, my aim is to establish the narrower egalitarian conclusion. As I understand it,
even this narrow conclusion may be attractive to the religious and secular alike – for
granting equal protections to both kinds of conscience beliefs under the broader umbrella
of conscience rights could make “religionists and secularists into partners in developing a
workable theory of the limited state.”8
In the first chapter, my aim is to highlight a few historical discussions concerning
religion’s specialness. I begin by detailing the account of how we ended up with
Constitutional protections for religion but not explicitly for conscience in the US – only to
show that the historical account is inconclusive at best. I then explain that once religion
was afforded special legal protections, it only made sense that we ended up with Court
8

Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle (2014), 180
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cases like Seeger and Welsh – where conscientious objectors to military service were
granted religious exemptions even after denying that their objections were religious in the
traditional sense. While these cases would try to reverse the trend of legally privileging
religious conscientious objectors by extending equal protections to nonreligious
conscientious objectors, the Yoder case – which came after Seeger and Welsh – would
incidentally end up defending the opposite position. These seemingly inconsistent verdicts
only serve to bring our primary question back to center stage. I end the chapter by giving
an overview of Brain Leiter’s contemporary analysis of this question in order to set up an
evaluation of his claims in a later chapter.
My goal in the second chapter is to develop and defend an account of conscience
against competing notions in order to better navigate the narrow version of the specialness
question in subsequent chapters. My account of ‘conscience’ is historically informed,
predicated upon the work of Richard Sorabji – a key historian of philosophy working
within the history of ethics. The account that I defend is not an attempt to define a neat and
tidy set of necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘conscience,’ but is instead an attempt to
capture the more historically central or core aspects of the concept. Once I formulate an
account of ‘conscience,’ I then compare, contrast, and defend this account of conscience
against common, competing notions of conscience present in the contemporary discussion
of the concept. I end the chapter by comparing and contrasting this historically grounded
account of conscience with a more conservative Christian account of conscience given that
the majority of religious individuals in the United States engaging with these pertinent
questions are Christian.

7
In chapters three and four, I provide support for my central claim by analyzing
several possibly demarcating features of religious conscience beliefs taken to be legally
relevant by theorists in the field. Overall, I contend that there are no features held by either
kind of conscience that give us good grounds to adopt an Inegalitarian Response to the
original specialness question. Instead, I argue that a comparative analysis between the two
kinds of conscience actually gives us good reason to adopt an Egalitarian Response to the
specialness question since they are sufficiently similar in nature.
In the third chapter in particular, I narrow in on two of Brian Leiter’s main features
of the religious conscience: categoricity and insulation from evidence respectively. After
initially interacting with Leiter’s categoricity feature, I turn my attention to Leiter’s
arguments that religious beliefs are insulated from evidence, and as a result, are not
worthy of special legal treatment. I argue that he fails to show that religious conscience
beliefs are both in principle responsive to empirical evidence and in practice typically more
insulated from this evidence than secular conscience beliefs. If I am right about this, then
Leiter fails to sufficiently distinguish the religious conscience from the secular conscience
and fails to answer the “central puzzle” of his book Why Tolerate Religion? Second, I look at
whether or not it is plausible to understand the religious conscience as insulated from
other forms of evidence. Following the research of social-psychologist Jonathan Haidt, I
argue that, typically, both forms of conscience seem to be similarly insulated from a
relevant kind of evidence – namely, moral argumentation. I also show that, while it seems
as though the religious conscience usually draws from a larger set of moral values when
compared to the secular conscience, this should make no legal difference overall. Lastly, I
consider whether religious conscience beliefs uniquely appeal either directly or indirectly
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to private evidence. In response, I conclude the chapter by offering a few cursory
arguments why we might prefer content-neutral approaches without making a complete
case – hopefully curtailing any lingering questions about comparative evidence.
In the fourth chapter, I narrow in on three further, possibly delineating features of
the religious conscience that theorists take to be legally relevant. First, I investigate
whether religious conscience beliefs are more central to our identity – and relatedly,
whether they are more central to our moral integrity. Ultimately, I argue that both religious
and nonreligious conscience beliefs are sufficiently central to our identity and moral
integrity such that there is no obvious reason to grant preferential legal treatment to one
over the other. Second, I investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are more
primordial, unchosen, or non-voluntary. I contend that granting legal exemptions on the
grounds that the belief or practice in question is primordial or non-voluntary is
problematic for at least three reasons. First, I argue that non-voluntariness should not be
classified as a necessary condition for obtaining a legal exemption. Second, I argue that
non-voluntariness should not be understood as a sufficient condition for obtaining a legal
exemption either. And third, I argue that, even if we grant non-voluntariness as a sufficient
condition, it should not be understood as the only sufficient condition for obtaining a legal
exemption.
As I end chapter four, I investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are uniquely
linked to unjustified intolerance and prejudice so that differential treatment before the law
is warranted. I argue that, because both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs have
similar propensities for unjustified prejudice and intolerance, their differential treatment
before the law is plausibly unwarranted. First, I argue that unjustified prejudice and

9
intolerance are similarly correlated to religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs insofar
as the driving force behind the prejudice and intolerance is, at least in principle, shared by
both kinds of conscience. Second, I argue that we should be skeptical that religious
conscience beliefs enjoy a uniquely strong in-practice-link to unjustified prejudice and
intolerance. If these claims are right, then it seems like we should accept an antiintolerance approach over an exclusively anti-religious approach. And if the antiintolerance approach is adopted, then we have no reason to treat religious conscientious
objectors with special, negative treatment. Nevertheless, I conclude by highlighting a
further problem for both the anti-religious approach and the anti-intolerance approach:
just how relevant or how weighty should content-based reasons be in the exemption
calculus if we discover unjustifiably intolerant content in a person’s conscience belief,
practice, or ideology?
Having argued for the Egalitarian Response, in the last chapter I address several
lurking objections to this position. In the first section, I address the multifaceted critique of
the Egalitarian Response advanced by Kathleen Brady. In particular, I address her claims
that: religious conscience beliefs should enjoy special legal treatment because they enjoy a
distinct relationship with the divine; that accepting the Egalitarian Response results in
weaker protections for both religious and secular conscience beliefs; and that accepting the
Egalitarian Response limits liberty more broadly and religious liberty in particular. In the
second section, I address the Feasibility Objection which worries that the implications of
accepting this response may be pragmatically or legally unworkable – possibly leading to
something like legal anarchy. There, I discuss responses to this objection raised by Douglas
Laycock and Nadia Sawicki. In the final section, I offer two responses to the

10
Underinclusiveness Objection as raised by Simon May – which just claims that there is no
principled moral reason to grant legal accommodations to conscience beliefs that are not
equally good reason to grant legal accommodations to non-moral projects.
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CHAPTER 1: THE SPECIALNESS OF RELIGION
Religion is unlike other human activities, or at least the founders thought so. The proper
relation between religion and government was a subject of great debate in the founding
generation, and the Constitution includes two clauses that apply to religion and do not apply
to anything else. This debate and these clauses presuppose that religion is in some way a
special human activity, requiring special rules applicable only to it.
– Douglas Laycock, “The Remnants of Free Exercise,” p. 16
I. Introduction
In this chapter, my aim is to highlight a few historical discussions concerning
religion’s specialness. I begin by detailing the account of how we ended up with
Constitutional protections for religion but not explicitly for conscience in the US – only to
show that the historical account is inconclusive at best. I then explain that once religion
was afforded special legal protections, it only made sense that we ended up with Court
cases like Seeger and Welsh – where conscientious objectors to military service were
granted religious exemptions even after denying that their objections were religious in the
traditional sense. While these cases would try to reverse the trend of legally privileging
religious conscientious objectors by extending equal protections to nonreligious
conscientious objectors, the Yoder case – which came after Seeger and Welsh – would
incidentally end up defending the opposite position. These seemingly inconsistent verdicts
only serve to bring our primary question back to center stage. I end the chapter by giving
an overview of Brain Leiter’s contemporary analysis of this question in order to set up an
evaluation of his claims in a later chapter.
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II. Religion’s Specialness in the Framing Era
In the United States, the “specialness” of religion dates back to its very founding –
and as we will see later – sets the stage for cases like Seeger, Welsh, and Yoder that affect us
even in our contemporary era. When New Hampshire became the ninth and last necessary
state to ratify the Constitution on June 21, 1788, that document officially became the law of
the land. Somewhat surprisingly, that original Constitution contained “no provision
protecting the general freedom of religion.”9 The absence of such a protection became one
of the major points of contention and debate not only during the ratification process, but
after the ratification process as well. The Baptist General Committee, for example, opposed
the proposed Constitution solely on the grounds that it had not “made sufficient provision
for the secure enjoyment of religious liberty.”10 Thus, part of the intention of adding a Bill
of Rights thereafter was to ameliorate this problem.
Seven states ended up drafting proposals for amendments to the Constitution, and
five of them contained religious freedom guarantees.11 Some also contained protections for
general conscience. For example, New Hampshire proposed that “Congress shall make no
laws touching religion, or to infringe on the rights of conscience.”12 Virginia’s proposal,
modeled after its own Declaration of Rights, also included protections for “religion” and
“the dictates of conscience” – though, given its language, it is not clear how they differ:

9

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58

10

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58

11

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58

12

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58

13
That religion, or the duty to which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence: and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.13
In the First Congress, James Madison was the primary draftsman of a Bill of Rights. 14
Among his several proposals were two amendments relevant to religious liberty and the
rights of conscience in particular:
Art. I, § 9: The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the
full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext,
infringed.
Art, I, § 10: No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.15
Madison’s proposals were first sent to a select committee, and then, on August 15, 1789,
the House of Representatives met as a Committee of the Whole to consider the select
committee’s original proposal.16 Five days later, the House adopted a motion to alter the
wording of Madison’s above amendment (Art. I, § 9) as follows:

13

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58

14

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58

15

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 60
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Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 60
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Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free
exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.17
Once in the Senate, Madison’s proposal was amended once again. Unlike the House
debates, Senate debates were, unfortunately, not recorded at that time. 18 This means that
the particular reasons as to why certain motions passed or failed are unknown; we only
know whether they were passed or not. On September 3, 1789, a first motion was made to
amend Madison’s proposal to read: “Congress shall not make any law infringing the rights
of conscience, or establishing any religious sect of society.”19 This proposed amendment
passed in the negative and was rejected. A second motion was given that same day to
amend the proposal to read: “Congress shall make no law establishing any particular
denomination of religion in preference to another, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed.”20 This second motion was likewise rejected
– and like the previous defeated motion, for unknown reasons.
On September 9, 1789, after an unsuccessful session on September 3, the Senate
finally amended Madison’s proposal to read:
Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of
worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom

17

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62

18

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62

19

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62

20

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62

15
of speech, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
petition to the government for the redress of grievances.21
Notice that the original language concerning “the rights of conscience” was excluded
in Senate debates, but that the passed motion included protections for speech, press,
assembly, and petition. Unfortunately, Senate journal records for September 9 only indicate
that the above amendment was passed in the affirmative, and fails to give any sort of
detailed account of the debate and conversations surrounding the motion. Shortly
thereafter, the proposal was sent back to the House where it was further amended to read
as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition the government for a redress
of grievances.22
On September 25, 1789, the Senate agreed with the House’s proposal, and the amendment
was approved for transmission to the States for ratification.23 Following ratification by the
state of Virginia on December 15, 1791, the first 10 amendments to the Constitution –
which included the final amendment detailed above – were added to the law of the land.
This historical account raises an important question: why did the Senate exclude the
rights of conscience to the proposed amendment? And why did the House agree with the
Senate if its original proposal included protections for conscience? One possible
21

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62-3

22

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 63

23

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 63
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explanation is that, while the rights of conscience may have been seen as altogether
separate from the other rights, they were nevertheless unnecessary to protect
constitutionally. Another possible explanation is that perhaps it was believed that
protecting all these other rights – and the freedom of religion in particular – was sufficient
for protecting the rights of conscience, thus making an additional protection for the rights
of conscience superfluous.
The first explanation seems comparably less plausible than the second for the
simple reason that the “rights of conscience” were not likely seen as unnecessary to
protect. In a House debate over Madison’s second proposal (Art, I, § 10), Madison himself
argued that this amendment was “the most valuable amendment in the whole list.”24 Not
only so, but contrary to the claims made by his debate interlocutors in the House, Madison
thought that “if there were any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from
infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured
against the State Governments.”25 Thus, these statements give us good reason to believe
that the rights of conscience were seen both as “essential” and necessary to protect from
both Federal and State Governments.
Perhaps Congress excluded the rights of conscience because they believed that
protecting religious freedom was sufficient for protecting the rights of conscience. That is,
perhaps conscience was understood to be limited to religious beliefs or convictions, so
protecting religious freedom was sufficient for protecting the rights of conscience. The
Virginia Declaration of Rights might serve as a good example of this view making its way
24

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 63

25
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into legislation. While this second explanation seems comparably more plausible than the
first, it nevertheless falls short important ways. First, if protecting religious freedom was
sufficient for protecting the rights of conscience, then why did states like New Hampshire
propose that “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe on the rights of
conscience” separately? Likewise, why did so many of the drafts of what would become the
First Amendment explicitly and often differentiate between the “free exercise of religion”
and the “rights of conscience” if they were just going to protect the same sorts of things?
Why, for example, would Madison originally propose an amendment (Art. I, § 9) protecting
the rights of “religious belief or worship” in addition to protecting “the full and equal rights
of conscience?” Using language that separates religion and conscience strongly suggests
that these two concepts were understood to be different and to apply to different things,
and that one could not simply be subsumed under the other.
Perhaps there was no official view during the framing era about the relationship
between religion and conscience. Clearly, some people (e.g., George Mason in Virginia
Declaration of Rights) seemed to have more of an encompassing view in that they seemed to
think that ‘conscience’ was encompassed by ‘religion’ – conceptually, legally, and so on.
Other people (e.g., Roger Williams or even James Madison in Art. I, § 9) seemed to have
more of an overlapping view in that they seemed to think that ‘religion’ and ‘conscience’
were not completely encompassed by each other, but rather that they shared conceptual
overlap. The best explanation might just be that, as a historical fact, we happened to get
protections for religion but not for conscience because something like the encompassing
view was adopted after the conceptual waters had been waded in Congress.

18
It’s worth noting, however, that if the explanation for why we ended up with
protections for religion but not for conscience is that the encompassing view was
ultimately adopted in Congress, then Madison seems to be an enigma. Remember that
Madison proposed rights of conscience as separate from religious freedoms in his
amendment proposals and had the opportunity to re-amend his proposals when the Senate
sent what was to become the First Amendment back to the House. Nevertheless, he didn’t
seem to fight the Senate’s exclusion of conscience rights when he had the opportunity to.
Why didn’t he fight their exclusion? As noted above, he seems to be an example of someone
who held an overlapping view given the language of his amendments and the recorded
arguments he made for the essentiality of conscience rights and the necessity of protecting
them. So why did he concede to the Senate’s exclusion of conscience? Madison’s lack of
action is an enigma if he, in fact, held something like the overlapping view. Madison’s lack
of action might make sense if he instead held something like the encompassing view, but
the evidence that suggests he held this latter view seems comparatively weaker than the
evidence that suggests he held the overlapping view.26
Whatever views Madison might have held, the reasons why Congress would include
the “free exercise of religion” and exclude the “rights of conscience” are simply unclear. In
the end, the surprising omission of religious freedom in the original Constitution had been
26

There may be other evidences pointing to the fact that Madison may have actually held a more

encompassing view – e.g., his co-authorship on the Virginia Declaration of Rights, and the fact that he began
the argument in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments by quoting the definition of
‘religion’ found in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. But George Mason – not Madison – was the primary
author of the Virginia Declaration of rights, and the amendments that Madison himself crafted suggest that he
held something like the overlapping view instead.
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corrected. Yet, the omission of the rights of conscience in the Constitution remains to this
day.27 We should not be surprised, then, when we see religion afforded special protections
over and above their nonreligious counterparts in other legal spaces even to this day. After
all, when religion is considered special constitutionally, it only makes sense that religion
would be considered special in other legal ways. But just as it was important to question
why religion was afforded special constitutional protections, it will be important to
question why religion is afforded special treatment in other legal spaces as well.
III. Religion’s Specialness in Conscription Cases
As noted above, the “specialness of religion” question would continue to come up in
other legal spaces – such as statutory jurisprudence – as well. For example, in United States
v. Seeger (1965), the US Supreme Court attempted to navigate through some of these tough
questions concerning the comparative protections for religion and conscience. In this case
in particular, Mr. Seeger claimed an exemption from the armed forces as a conscientious
objector, declaring that he was conscientiously opposed to participating in war in any form
by reason of his “religious belief” even though he preferred to leave the question as to his
belief in a Supreme Being open, “rather than answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.”28 Seeger claimed that his
“skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God [did] not necessarily mean lack of faith in
anything whatsoever” and that his was a “belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for
their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.”29 He cited such persons as
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Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral
integrity “without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.”30
Seeger’s exemption claim was initially denied solely because it was not based upon a
“belief in a relation to a Supreme Being” as required by § 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §456(j).31 The phrase “belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being” was understood to involve “duties superior to those arising from any
human relation,” but did not include “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views or a merely personal moral code.”32 Additionally, between 1940 and 1948, two
courts of appeals upheld the view that the phrase “religious training and belief” as written
in the statute did not include political, social, or philosophical beliefs.33 The original statue
and the two subsequent court cases upheld the view that the only sorts of objections or
beliefs that are eligible for legal exemptions are those that clearly possess religious content.
The court ended up overturning Seeger’s initial denial, claiming that “a sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory
definition.”34 In short, the exemption was found not to cover those who oppose war from a
merely “personal moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of
essentially political, sociological or economic considerations, rather than religious belief”
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but would cover those who had a “sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the
exemption.” Overturning the view that the only sorts of beliefs that are eligible for legal
exemptions are those that are religious in content, the ruling in Seeger instead supported
the view that beliefs that function like traditional religious beliefs in the life of their
possessor are eligible for legal exemptions as well.
Five years later, in Welsh v. United States (1970), Elliott Ashton Welsh II was
convicted by a United States District Judge for refusing to submit to induction into the
Armed Forces in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. §462(a).35 Like Seeger, Mr. Welsh was unable to
sign the statement printed within the Selective Service form that stated “I am, by reason of
my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.”36 Whereas Seeger could only sign after striking the words ‘training and’ and putting
quotation marks around the term ‘religious,’ Welsh could only sign after striking the words
‘my religious training and.’37 Neither definitively affirmed nor denied that they believed in
a “Supreme Being,” yet both affirmed on their applications that they harbored deep moral
scruples and conscientious objections against war, believing that killing in war was wrong,
immoral, and unethical.38 As in Seeger, the exemption claim made by Welsh was initially
denied because his belief was in some sense insufficiently “religious” to qualify for
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conscientious objector exemptions under the terms of § 6(j) – though Welsh was far more
insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that his views were uniquely religious.39
Moreover, Welsh was further distinguished from Seeger in that Welsh’s views were
more easily identified as “political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code.”40 Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the initial denial because of the
“broad scope of the word ‘religious’ as used in § 6(j)” and because they did not think that §
6(j)’s “exclusion of those persons with ‘essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views or a merely personal moral code’ should be read to exclude those who hold strong
beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection
to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public
policy.”41 On the basis of these claims and the conclusion from the Court of Appeals that
Welsh held his beliefs “with the strength of more traditional religious convictions,” the
Court ended up granting Welsh the conscientious objector exemption that he originally
sought.42 Thus, Welsh also supported the view that beliefs that function like traditional
religious beliefs in the life of their possessor are eligible for legal exemptions as well.43
The verdicts of Seeger and Welsh are admittedly confusing in their own right. So,
when the Yoder v. Wisconsin (1972) decision came down only two years later, the confusion
was only amplified. In this case, the Court held that Amish children were entitled to an
39

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 777-78

40

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 778

41

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 778

42

Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 778-79

43

For a good overview of cases in the U.S. involving exemptions from military service, see Kent Greenawalt

(2016), Chapter 2: “Exemptions for Military Service,” 23-46.

23
exemption from compulsory school attendance laws after the eighth grade, emphasizing it
as a uniquely “religious” exemption that did not apply to everyone.44 The Court wrote:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely
secular considerations…Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of
their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values
accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his
time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a
religious basis. Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than
religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religious
Clauses.45
Given the Court’s words here, how different, really, were Thoreau’s beliefs
from Welsh’s? Ironically, Thoreau is being used as a contrast to the Amish in Yoder
as a paradigmatic example of what isn’t “religious.” Yet it seems obvious that his
“philosophical and personal” beliefs are functionally equivalent to those held by the
conscientious objector in Welsh whose beliefs were found by the Court two years
earlier to be religious enough to fall under the exemption statute. In Yoder, then, we
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see a return back to the view that the only sorts of beliefs that are eligible for legal
exemptions are those that are religious in content.
In Seeger, the Court decided to exempt those who had a sincere and meaningful
belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualified for the exemption. In Welsh, the Court decided to further exempt those
who opposed war from a merely personal moral code, or those who decide that war is
wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological, philosophical, or economic
considerations, rather than just religious belief. And in Yoder, the Court decided that the
beliefs and values that motivated Thoreau’s choice to live at Walden Pond were too
philosophical and personal to be considered sufficiently religious like the claims made by
the Amish even though his claims mirror those made by the objectors in Seeger and Welsh.
If there was some sort of principled precedent that the courts were trying to set
here, it is altogether unclear. Nevertheless, a few points are clear. First, these cases and
their seemingly inconsistent verdicts highlight just how difficult it is to determine what
exactly it might mean for some conscientious claim to be uniquely ‘religious.’ In order to be
‘religious,’ must a belief have religious content or is religious functionality enough? Not
only so, but even when some conscientious claim is categorized as ‘religious,’ the further
issue of whether or not it is sufficiently religious is also nearby. This elusive line of religious
demarcation is in question in all these cases, and one’s eligibility for these exemptions is
always determined by where these lines end up being drawn. Second, these cases all seem
to be operating under the same general assumption that we saw in the framing era: that
religion and religious objections deserve special legal protections above their nonreligious
counterparts. The central question in Seeger and Welsh was not whether or not their
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conscientious objections deserved legal accommodations in their own right, but whether or
not they were sufficiently “religious” – either in content or function – in order to qualify for
a statutory exemption that was only allotted to religious objectors. The important question
concerning religion’s specialness raised in the framing era is present in these cases too.
IV. Religion’s Specialness in Contemporary Scholarship
On today’s scene, one of the best examples of a contemporary author aiming to bring
clarity to the sticky problem of religion’s specialness is Brian Leiter. In his book Why
Tolerate Religion? Leiter contends – alongside other notable voices in the contemporary
scholarship46 – that there are no good reasons to treat religious beliefs with special legal
solicitude. His argument for this conclusion is that “[i]f there is a special reason to tolerate
religion it has to be because there are features of religion that warrant toleration…that all
or only religious beliefs have… [or] that other beliefs have…but [whose] possession…would
not warrant principled toleration.”47 His argument can be summarized as follows:
(1) If we should treat religious beliefs with comparatively special legal
treatment, then it is because there are features of religious beliefs that
distinguish them from other kinds of belief that warrant such treatment.
(2) But there are no features of religious beliefs that distinguish them from
other kinds of belief that warrant such treatment.
(3) Therefore, we should not treat religious beliefs with comparatively
special legal treatment.
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As other contemporary writers have done,48 Leiter advances his own account of
‘religion’ and discusses at length what he takes to be the three most distinctive features of
religion that “single out ‘religious’ states of mind from others.”49 The first distinctive
feature of religion is what he calls the categoricity of religious commands, meaning that
demands on action “must be satisfied no matter what an individual’s antecedent desires
and no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up.”50 The second
distinctive feature of religion, which he calls the insulation from evidence feature, is that
religious beliefs generally “do not answer ultimately to evidence and reasons.”51 He calls
the last feature of religion the existential consolation feature, which refers to the fact that
there are some beliefs in religion that “render intelligible and tolerable basic existential
facts about human life, such as suffering and death.”52
With these three features of religion in place, Leiter spends the rest of his time
looking at whether there are principled arguments, either moral or epistemic, for tolerating
or respecting religion as such. By tolerance, Leiter doesn’t mean the practice of one group
simply being indifferent to another group, but rather the practice of one group putting up
with the perceivably wrong, mistaken, or undesirable beliefs, actions, etc. of another
group.53 Moreover, his concern is with the principled grounds of state toleration as
opposed to just interpersonal or group toleration. As noted above, Leiter concludes that
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there are no principled arguments, either moral or epistemic for specially tolerating or for
specially respecting religious beliefs as he understands them.54
How does he reach such a conclusion? He begins by noting that moral arguments for
toleration usually either claim that there’s a right to the liberty to believe and practice that
which must be tolerated, or that toleration of those beliefs and practices is “important to
the realization of morally important goods.”55 As is the case with other moral arguments,
these predictably divide up into Kantian and utilitarian forms. Standing in as the
representative for the Kantian position, John Rawls explains that “toleration…follows from
the principle of equal liberty,” which is one of the two fundamental principles of justice that
rational persons would choose in the “original position.”56 As Leiter points out, nothing in
Rawls’ argument, however, seems to be specific to religion such that religious beliefs would
receive any special protection over other beliefs more generally. In fact, Leiter shows that
Rawls’ argument is about securing the “liberty of conscience,” which would actually include
protecting both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs.57
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Leiter argues further that utilitarian arguments don’t obviously single out religious
beliefs for special protection either. These kinds of arguments all share “in one form or the
other, the core idea that it maximizes human well-being – however exactly that is to be
understood – to protect liberty of conscience against infringement by the state.”58 As was
the case with the Kantian argument, the liberty given to conscience would here include
both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs.
On the other hand, epistemic arguments for toleration emphasize the contribution
that tolerance makes to knowledge.59 Leiter here draws from J.S. Mill, who argues that
toleration is necessary because (a) truth-discovery (or believing what is true in the right
kind of way) contributes to overall utility [moral premise]; and (b) truth discovery is only
possible when differing beliefs and practices are permitted to flourish [epistemic
premise].60 The justification Mill provides for (b) is: (i) we are fallible when it comes to
truth-discovery; (ii) if our beliefs are partially true, then exposure to differing beliefs will
help us to discover other parts of the whole; and (iii) if our beliefs are completely true, then
exposure to differing beliefs will help us hold them for the right kinds of reasons and better
confront false beliefs too.61 Via Mill, Leiter argues that tolerating this wide of a range of
beliefs and practices as a means to truth discovery would likely not be limited to just
religious beliefs.
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In light of his particular account of religion, Leiter wonders whether there is really
any reason to think that the expression of beliefs that are insulated from epistemically
relevant considerations like evidence and reasons will actually promote knowledge of the
truth. After all, religious belief, on his account “is marked by its insulation from the only
epistemically relevant considerations.”62 He notes that even if there was a viable epistemic
argument for tolerating beliefs that are insulated from the “familiar standards of evidence
reasons,” it would nonetheless fail to “help single out religious belief for special
protection.”63
He later becomes concerned about how potentially harmful and liberty-infringing
these insulated categorical moral demands of religion could be to society if we continue not
only to tolerate them, but to treat them with legal privilege as well. On this point, he writes:
If what distinguishes religious beliefs from other important and meaningful
beliefs held by individuals is that religious beliefs are both insulated from
evidence and issue in categorical demands on action, then isn’t there reason
to worry that religious beliefs, as against other matters of conscience, are far
more likely to cause harms and infringe on liberty? And might that not even
form the basis of an argument for why there are special reasons not to
tolerate religion?64
If it is true that beliefs that support categorical demands that are insulated from evidence
have potential (perhaps even a special potential) for harms to well-being, then that would
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be reason to doubt whether any utilitarian argument for tolerating religion qua religion
will succeed.65
As Leiter sees it, the only possible utilitarian rationale for tolerating religion as such
would come if we’d be willing to bite what he calls the “speculative bullet.”66 Biting this
bullet would entail asserting both the claim that the “existential consolation functions” of
religion would ultimately produce more utility than the harm produced by the insulated
categorical moral demands of religion and the claim that the “preceding net gain in utility”
would be greater than some other possible alternative way of producing existential
consolation that doesn’t involve the “conjunction of categoricity and insulation from
evidence.”67 “It’s not obvious,” Leiter writes “why one would bite the speculative bullet,
absent an antecedent bias in favor of religion.”68
Interestingly, the above points made by Leiter actually seem to lean him toward the
conclusion that we should treat religion with special legal treatment – but in this case, with
negative legal treatment, not positive legal treatment. Leiter stops just short of actually
claiming that we should treat religion with some sort of special scrutiny, but it’s clear that
he leans this direction. Remember that he accepts the antecedent to the above conditional,
namely, that what “distinguishes religious beliefs from other important and meaningful
beliefs held by individuals is that religious beliefs are both insulated from evidence and
issue in categorical demands on action.” As such, he thinks that there is, in fact, at least
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some reason to “worry that religious beliefs, as against other matters of conscience, are far
more likely to cause harms and infringe on liberty,” and that this might “form the basis of an
argument for why there are special reasons not to tolerate religion” barring one’s
willingness to bit his “speculative bullet.” Leiter stops just short of the conclusion that we
should treat religion with special scrutiny because he never takes a position on biting the
speculative bullet – though his view is nevertheless implied.
Regardless, if there’s no reason to tolerate religion as such, then perhaps there is
reason to respect it. As Leiter points out,69 the term ‘respect’ can have two different senses:
a more affirmative notion of respect70 and a more minimalistic notion of respect.71 The
minimalistic notion of respect is satisfied when, roughly, one person gives the minimally
appropriate consideration that is contextually required to another person. Understood in
this way, this notion doesn’t seem to help morally differentiate religious and nonreligious
claims of conscience any better than tolerance did. On the other hand, the affirmative
notion of respect is satisfied when, roughly, one person admires, esteems, praises, or highly
regards another person, their work, etc. Given these definitions, Leiter then asks whether
there is any reason to uniquely respect religious beliefs in the affirmative sense.
The difficulty with respect as such is that there are conceivable cases where
someone’s religious beliefs are morally praiseworthy72 as well as cases where someone’s
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nonreligious beliefs are morally praiseworthy.73 Moreover, there are conceivable cases
where both are morally blameworthy.74 In other words, there are times when the reasons
for respecting religious beliefs will apply equally to nonreligious beliefs and times when
the reasons for disrespecting religious beliefs will apply equally to nonreligious beliefs.
Accordingly, there does not seem to be an obvious reason why we should respect one and
not the other.
Leiter concludes his project by considering what we should legally do if there is no
“principled argument that picks out distinctively religious conscience as an object of special
moral and legal solicitude.”75 “One obvious solution,” he writes, “would be to extend the
breadth of exemptions from generally applicable laws to all claims of conscience, religious
or not.”76 According to this commonly proposed solution – what Leiter calls the Universal
Exemptions View – both the Sikh and rural boy from Leiter’s fictitious story could file for a
legal exemption. Likewise, under such a legal regime, both the Christian and the Atheist in
New York could file for an exemption from mandatory vaccine laws as well.
Ultimately, Leiter rejects the Universal Exemptions View in favor of what he calls the
No Exemptions View for three reasons. First, he offers a practical objection, arguing that
instantiating a legal regime with universal exemptions for any claim of conscience –
religious or otherwise – would “be tantamount to constitutionalizing a right to civil
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disobedience, a posture it is hard to imagine any legal system adopting.”77 He says that
from a principled point of view, “there may be no difference among all the preceding claims
of conscience, but it seems unlikely that any legal system will embrace this capacious
approach to liberty of conscience that would involve according all these claims of
conscience equal legal standing.”78
Second, Leiter thinks that the Universal Exemptions View suffers from an epistemic
problem as well. Specifically, “the specter that haunts any legal regime governing liberty of
conscience,” Leiter thinks, is that “courts must adjudicate whether a claim of conscience is
really a claim of conscience.”79 Whereas religions “typically have texts, doctrines, and
commands, either written or passed down orally among many adherents” that help serve
as a proxy for authenticity, claims of conscience usually fail to be in an analogous epistemic
and evidential position.80 Leiter suggests that, given the unequal epistemic and evidential
position of religious and nonreligious claims of conscience, “we should simply extend legal
protection for liberty of conscience only to claims of conscience that are rooted in
communal or group traditions and practices that mimic, from an evidential point of view,
those of religious groups.”81 The objection then becomes that, under a legal regime with
universal exemptions for all claims of conscience, we might suffer from the unacceptable
77
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consequence of “treating genuine claims of conscience unequally before the law, simply
based on how practicable it is for courts to adjudicate their genuineness, and nothing
else.”82
Lastly, Leiter offers a sort of third-party harm objection to the Universal Exemptions
View, calling it the “Rousseauian worry about exemptions.”83 He explains that “exemptions
from generally applicable laws often impose burdens on those who have no claim of
exemptions,” and that “if general compliance with laws is necessary to promote the ‘general
welfare’ or the ‘common good,’ then selective exemptions from those laws is a morally
objectionable injury to the general welfare.”84 In particular, Leiter is not so much
concerned with those exemptions that would fail to shift any sort of burden onto a thirdparty, but rather on burden-shifting exemptions like those found in the conscription cases
above. In those sorts of cases, “if those with claims of conscience against military duty are
exempted from service, then the burden (and all the very serious risks) will fall upon those
who either have no conscientious objection or cannot successfully establish their
conscientious claim.”85
Given these objections to the Universal Exemptions View, Leiter asks the following
question:
If there is no good moral reason to treat religious conscience as special –
indeed, no reason (except practical and evidential) to treat communally
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sanctioned claims of conscience as special – and if there are Rousseauian
reasons pertaining to the general welfare for the state to enact and enforce
its laws, then perhaps we should simply abandon the idea that there should
be exemptions from generally applicable laws, except when no burdenshifting is involved?86
So, the force of the above objections, in conjunction with his slightly amended claim that
there is no good moral reason to treat “community sanctioned claims of conscience” as
special, leads Leiter to believe that the best legal response is to abandon the idea that there
should be exemptions at all from generally applicable laws – expect in cases where no
burden is shifted to some third party. Of course, this No Exemptions position doesn’t
necessarily imply that states could therefore pass laws silencing claims of conscience, and
its conclusion is consistent with states pursuing neutral objectives like the safety, health,
and well-being of its people through legislation. While it may be true that a No Exemptions
legal regime might impose an unfortunate and unfair burden on matters of minority
conscience, Leiter thinks that the legal alternative of Universal Exemptions is still worse. He
remarks: “At least generally applicable laws unintentionally burden minority claims of
conscience, whereas a regime of exemptions intentionally privileges religious claims of
conscience, to the exclusion of others, even though there is no moral reason to do so.”87
Lastly, Leiter considers one more passing worry about the No Exemptions View. He
asks, “[A]re not religious claims of conscience especially resilient and fierce, especially
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likely to provoke backlash, disobedience, and the proverbial ‘blood in the streets?’”88 In
essence, this last worry just cites as the possible reason for uniquely tolerating religious
claims of conscience the likeliness that they are the very ones “least likely to accede to a No
Exemptions regime.”89 Leiter responds by simply noting that the categoricity of conscience
beliefs are not unique to religious claimants, so anyone caught in the snares of a strong
conscience – religious or otherwise – is likely to be the kind of person who doesn’t accede
to this regime. That there might be some especially conscientious individuals within a
society “constitutes no argument against the No Exemptions approach,” especially when we
“can as little justify exemptions from generally applicable laws to ‘those most likely to
make trouble’ as we can justify exemptions from those laws to ‘those who have religious
claims of conscience.’”90
V. Conclusion
In this chapter, I highlighted a few historical discussions concerning religion’s
specialness. I began by detailing the account of how we ended up with Constitutional
protections for religion but not explicitly for conscience in the US – only to show that the
historical account is inconclusive at best. I then explained that once religion was afforded
special legal protections, it made sense that we ended up with Court cases like Seeger and
Welsh. While these cases would try to reverse the trend of legally privileging religious
conscientious objectors by extending equal protections to nonreligious conscientious
objectors, the Yoder case would incidentally end up defending the opposite position. These
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seemingly inconsistent verdicts only served to bring our primary question back to center
stage. I ended the chapter by giving an overview of Brain Leiter’s contemporary analysis of
this question in order to set up an evaluation of his claims in a later chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE
I know I’ve got a face in me / Points out all my mistakes to me / You’ve got a face on the inside
too / Your paranoia is probably worse / I don’t know what set me off first but I know what I
can’t stand / Everybody acts like the fact of the matter is I can’t add up to what you can / But
everybody has a face that they hold inside / A face that awakes when I close my eyes / A face
that watches every time they lie / A face that laughs every time they fall / It watches
everything / So you know that when it’s time to sink or swim / That the face inside is
watching you too / Right inside your skin / It’s like I’m paranoid lookin’ over my back / It’s
like a whirlwind inside of my head / It’s like I can’t stop what I’m hearing within / It’s like the
face inside is right beneath my skin.
– Lyrics from “Papercut” by Linkin Park
I. Introduction
My goal in this chapter is to develop and defend an account of conscience against
competing notions in order to better navigate the narrow version of the specialness
question in subsequent chapters. My account of ‘conscience’ is historically informed,
predicated upon the work of Richard Sorabji – a key historian of philosophy working
within the history of ethics. The account that I defend is not an attempt to define a neat and
tidy set of necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘conscience,’ but is instead an attempt to
capture the more historically central or core aspects of the concept. Once I formulate an
account of ‘conscience,’ I then compare, contrast, and defend this account of conscience
against common, competing notions of conscience present in the contemporary discussion
of the concept. I end the chapter by comparing and contrasting this historically grounded
account of conscience with a more conservative Christian account of conscience given that
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the majority of religious individuals in the United States engaging with these pertinent
questions are Christian.
II. The Birth of Conscience: The First 600 Years
Accounts detailing the historicity of the concept of conscience within the Western
tradition have often begun with the Hebrew Old Testament, citing stories involving wellknown figures such as King David.91 Though the Ancient Hebrews lacked a specific word
for conscience, it is nevertheless evident that they had the concept.92 In Psalm 51, for
example, we see David caught up in the snares of a guilty conscience, lamenting his sinful
decision to both commit adultery with Bathsheba and order the wrongful death of her
husband Uriah:
Be gracious to me, O God, according to Your lovingkindness; according to the
greatness of Your compassion blot out my transgressions. Wash me
thoroughly from my iniquity and cleanse me from my sin. For I know my
transgressions, and my sin is ever before me. Against You, You only, I have
sinned and done what is evil in Your sight, so that You are justified when You
speak and blameless when You judge. Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity,
and in sin my mother conceived me. Behold, You desire truth in

the innermost being, and in the hidden part You will make me know wisdom.
Purify me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter
than snow. Make me to hear joy and gladness, let the bones which You have
broken rejoice. Hide Your face from my sins and blot out all my iniquities.
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Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a steadfast spirit within me. Do
not cast me away from Your presence and do not take Your Holy Spirit from
me. Restore to me the joy of Your salvation and sustain me with a willing
spirit.

Then I

will teach

transgressors

Your

ways,

and

sinners

will be converted to You. Deliver me from bloodguiltiness, O God, the God of
my salvation; then my tongue will joyfully sing of Your righteousness. O
Lord, open my lips, that my mouth may declare Your praise. For You do not
delight in sacrifice, otherwise I would give it; You are not pleased with burnt
offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite
heart, O God, You will not despise.93
As historian of philosophy Richard Sorabji points out, most of the examples highlighted
from the Hebrew Old Testament, including Psalm 51, “used for conscience only the general
word for heart, the seat of many different emotions.”94
John Cottingham argues that three key features of conscience can be readily gleaned
from a reading Psalm 51. “First,” he claims that conscience involves “a directing inwards by
the subject of the kind of disapproval characteristically felt at the untoward behavior of
another.”95 As the language of the Psalm demonstrates, David is directing a disapproving
attitude toward his own self once he reflects upon the behaviors done to both Bathsheba
and Uriah. “Second, it is linked to remorse and repentance, which is in turn made possible
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by a deepening both of self-awareness and empath.”96 Cottingham notes that, once David is
confronted for his by the prophet Nathan, his “previously shallow grasp of the significance
of his actions was altered under the imaginative stimulus of being presented with a vivid
analogue of his own conduct, which made him start to appreciate how being treated in such
a way would feel for the victim.”97 Lastly, Cottingham notes that “the required response is
not simply implanted from the outside by the prophet’s condemnation but is partly elicited
from within.”98 Once the prophet Nathan lifts some of David’s “emotional and cognitive
barriers” by having him identify with the characters of a parable, “it is David’s own
conscience that convicts him.”99
Just like the Ancient Hebrews, the Early Greeks likewise failed to have a specific
term for conscience, but this did not mean that they lacked the concept. In fact, Sorabji
contends that early Greeks “equally have supplied examples of moral conscience without
[invoking] the word.”100 The basic conceptual expression that eventually came to be the
standard term for conscience began to appear earliest in the Greek playwrights of the fifth
century BC.101 This basic expression involved the metaphor of one sharing knowledge with
oneself, usually of a moral defect, as though one were split into two. The metaphor explains
that when we possess knowledge of a moral defect, or possess a guilty conscience, it feels
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like we’re split in two and composed of two people: “one of them knows of the defect but is
keeping it a secret; the other shares the secret – in cases of moral conscience, a guilty
one.”102 Another common expression similarly detailing the nature of a guilty conscience is
found in the phrase “I could not live with myself.”103 Over time, who or what it is that the
guilty knowledge was shared with would predictably vary. Despite this, Sorabji argues that
the meaning of the conscience metaphor “is at first unambiguous” and standardly “involves
one’s own knowledge of one’s own fault.”104
By contrast, possessing a clear conscience implies not sharing knowledge with
oneself of a moral defect, or simply failing to possess guilty knowledge altogether. This,
however, shouldn’t be confused with the idea of sharing knowledge with oneself of a moral
merit, or “sharing knowledge with ourselves of being practitioners of noble and good
works.”105 So, we might say that there are three basic states of conscience: sharing
knowledge with oneself of a moral defect (the guilty conscience), failing to share
knowledge with oneself of a moral defect (the clear conscience), and sharing knowledge
with oneself of a moral merit (the joyful conscience).106
As noted above, this basic metaphor was eventually expressed terminologically –
“by a particular form of the [Greek] verb for knowing, suneidenai, to share (sun-)
knowledge (eidenai), coupled with the reflexive pronoun in the dative (e.g., heautoi
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[oneself]).”107 This Greek idiom concerning conscience would fortunately translate
seamlessly into Latin. The con- in the Latin noun conscientia is a simple translation of the
Greek sun- and the scientia is a simple translation of the Greek eidesis. Thus, in Latin: con +
scientia = conscientia (sharing knowledge with oneself). As Sorabji points out, it was “[b]y
strange good fortune [that] a literal translation, not a paraphrase, of the Greek term was
used.”108 And with such a seamless translation, Latin thus “avoided importing its own
presuppositions into the very choice of word.”109
As with most concepts, conscience would develop, mature, and be pruned through
time. For example, though the concept of conscience started off as merely sharing
knowledge with oneself of a past moral defect, it would later include knowledge of what
would put one at fault in the future as well. Some like St. Paul argued that the conscience
was intimately tied, though not identical to, a general moral law existing in our hearts. The
conscience would draw from this moral law in order to accuse or excuse our behaviors in
the present and would also act as the agency responsible for witnessing to God concerning
our fidelity to this law after death.110 Moreover, the conscience was normally understood,
especially in Christian circles, as fallible in its endeavors. Thus, in being open to error,
conscience is best understood as a belief that may or may not amount to genuine
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knowledge.111 In time conscience became “a belief about what it was, or would be, wrong
or not wrong for one to do or not to do” – and this applied to one’s past or future attitudes
as well.112 Additionally, the conscience came to be ascribed with motivating force even
though it was admittedly a belief, and thus cognitive in nature. Sorabji explains that we can
understand this marriage of affection and cognition in the beliefs of conscience if we
understand how “rational knowledge of evaluative propositions about what is or is not
wrong can itself be motivating, for example, if I know that some action to which I am
tempted or which I have performed is wrong.”113
In summary, Sorabji thinks that the “first six hundred years of the development of
the idea of moral conscience identified some attributes which remained comparatively
stable features over the next two thousand years.”114 These eight, core features – some of
which clearly overlap with the features of Cottingham’s analysis of Psalm 51 – are as
follows:115
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(1) Conscience is a form of personal self-awareness that is not invariably an
awareness of others.
(2) Conscience draws on values not necessarily shared by others.
(3) Conscience originally involved the idea of a person split into two, with one
self-hiding a guilty secret, and the other self-sharing it. The idea of conscience
as involving a split person was to recur in different forms and with different
rationales in Adam Smith, in Kant, and in Freud, and is found in the
expression “I could not live with myself.”
(4) The original function of the conscience was retrospective, but very soon
prospective functions developed and all of these were retained.
(5) Although conscience drew on general values, it was very much concerned
with what was or would be wrong for the particular individual in a particular
context.
(6) The concept of conscience started off secular, originating in the Greek
playwrights of the fifth century BCE, and remains capable of being secular.
(7) Conscience was traditionally viewed in Christianity as fallible.
(8) Though a belief and hence cognitive in character, conscience nonetheless
had motivating force.
III. Two Major Deviations
Sorabji contends that, even though the concept of conscience has been subject to
various interpretations since its genesis – including “the recent secularization of
conscience,” – it nevertheless does “not necessarily require all that many revisions” from
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the original picture.116 Though the history of the concept of conscience reveals two
“prolonged deviations” from its basic structure in the first 600 years, these deviations
fortunately “did not last indefinitely.”117
A. Conscience and Synderesis
The first deviation was “the need to accommodate synderesis alongside conscience,
which made one difference if synderesis took over the motivational role from conscience, or
another difference if it relegated conscience to the act of drawing a conclusion rather than
holding a belief.”118 The second deviation “was the idea that conscience was a sentiment of
approval or disapproval, or even a sensation of pain, rather than a belief or capacity for
belief about what conduct or attitude was or would be wrong for one, a belief that might
cause sentiments or pain.”119
The first deviation was most prominent in the Middle Ages and arguably stemmed
from Origen’s interpretation of Ezekiel’s vision of the four-faced creatures in Ezekiel
1:10.120 The creatures in this passage are described as having the face of a human, lion, ox,
and eagle – and Origen interpreted the first three faces as corresponding to the three parts
of Plato’s tripartite soul (rational, spirited, and appetitive parts). 121 Whereas Origen
interpreted the fourth part as “the human’s spirit (spiritus) presiding over the other
116
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three,”122 Jerome would later “refer the eagle to a fourth part, for which the Greeks have a
name, and which is the ‘spark of conscience’ by which we recognize that we are sinning.”123
So Jerome, likely drawing upon Origen and his followers, mistakenly distinguished between
conscience (conscientia) and the spark of conscience (synderesis).
Bonaventure would later distinguish between conscientia and synderesis as well,
where the basis of his distinction was that conscience played a more cognitive role and
synderesis played a more affective role. Similarly, Aquinas would distinguish between
conscience and synderesis, but would give them different functions. For Aquinas,
synderesis supplied universal premises from the natural law and was “never mistaken, but
in effect infallible.”124 Conscience, on the other hand, was simply the “act of applying the
universal premise to a particular situation.” 125 As opposed to Bonavanture, Aquinas would
grant conscience “no less than synderesis motivational force,” believing that synderesis
“warns, inclines, incites, and deters” and that conscience “can prospectively prod, urge, or
bind, and retrospectively accuse or cause remorse.”126 Ultimately, William of Ockham
would later dispense of synderesis on the basis of his famous Ockham’s Razor – a trend that
was upheld by the Protestant reformers Luther (at least beyond 1519) and Calvin.127
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Sorabji thinks that “the division of labor” between synderesis and conscience is
simply “not needed for the purpose of explaining motivation.”128 He writes:
For knowledge or belief is itself motivating, provided it is the knowledge or
belief that some action would, or would not, be wrong for one to perform in
an expected situation calling for decision. Bonaventure has found a task for
synderesis to perform, but if I am right, the task could have been performed
without it.129
For this reason, Sorabji thinks that St. Paul’s simpler distinction between “the law in our
hearts with its general knowledge of right and wrong [and] the conscience that accused or
excused us as individuals” had supplied all that was needed.130 Additionally, Sorabji objects
to Aquinas’ account insofar as it is just not true that “we have a disposition to recognize the
law infallibly.”131 St. Paul, Origen, nor Augustine “thought that conscience made us
infallible,” and Sorabji agrees alongside them that “humans are not infallible.”132
Unfortunately, Aquinas’ account implies this, though narrowly.
B. Conscience as Sentiment
The second deviation was “the idea that conscience was a sentiment of approval or
disapproval, or even a sensation of pain, rather than a belief or capacity for belief about
what conduct or attitude was or would be wrong for one, a belief that might cause
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sentiments or pain.”133 This deviation can trace its roots back to the views of seventeenth
and eighteenth century moral sentimentalists like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume – in
addition to the later English philosopher Mill. Shaftesbury, for example, argued that we
have “a natural sense of right and wrong,” emphasizing that “our sense of right and wrong
is a sense.”134 Hutcheson would agree with Shaftesbury, commonly speaking of “moral
sentiment, and of the moral sense, which is pleased or displeased by good or evil.”135
Likewise, Hume also spoke of a “moral sense and connected conscience with passion instead
of reason.”136 Mill would end up defining “the essence of conscience” as a “feeling in our own
mind; a pain more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty,” implying that Mill also
thought about conscience as a sensation.137
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Contrary to the sentimentalists and Mill, Sorabji sees this position – that conscience
is essentially a sentiment or sensation, not a belief or capacity for beliefs – as not only a
derivation from the original concept, but a misguided view in its own right. Sorabji argues
that a “sensation can indeed motivate, but if conscience is only a sensation, it will
presumably be produced by value judgments about wrong, which are now no longer
incorporated within conscience itself.”138 From Antiquity through the Middle Ages, the
“bites of conscience” were understood as a mere “effect of bad conscience, with bad
conscience itself being a belief about one’s wrongdoing.”139 Thus, relegating conscience to a
mere sensation would amount to equating it with what was once understood as an effect
that it produced. Even if one believes that conscience gives rise to sentiments and
sensations of approval or disapproval (as Sorabji does) “such a sentiment will presumably
be an effect of value judgments about wrong or not wrong which caused the sentiments.”140
It’s worth noting that in the eighteenth century, especially through Shaftesbury and
Hutcheson, our moral sense was understood as independent of our knowledge of God.141 In
this way, the concept of conscience started to become, as it was with the early Greeks, an
areligious, secular concept once again. Shaftesbury argued, for example, that our moral
sense is “not due to knowledge of God, but is in us before we acquire any knowledge of God,
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or of his rewards and punishments.”142 Hutcheson followed suit, arguing that our moral
sense senses moral good and evil, and responds to it “independently of any self-interest,
including self-interest in God’s reward or punishment, and independently of any desire to
follow his will.”143 Sorabji notes that these were some of the earliest steps toward the
resecularization of the concept of conscience – though Hutcheson “allowed that religious
reading and belief can confirm our moral sense.”144 While Joseph Butler and Adam Smith
utilized arguments in the rehabilitation of conscience that secularists could adopt, they
were themselves not secularists.145 “By the end of the [eighteenth] century,” Sorbaji notes,
the resecularization was basically complete insofar as “Kant was able to describe
conscience independently of God’s objective existence.”146
IV. The Core Concept of Conscience
“The core conception of conscience,” Sorabji writes, “which I have found to be most
influential contains the following ideas:”
(1) It is a person’s belief about what actions or attitudes had been in the past,
or would be in the future, wrong or not wrong for him to adopt or not adopt
in a particular situation. It could also be the capacity for such beliefs. The
beliefs may be the things believed or the believing of them.
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(2) The beliefs require personal self-awareness and are in the first instance
beliefs about what would be wrong for oneself.
(3) Conscience is motivating because it is a value belief about what was or
would be wrong for oneself. It can therefore cause both sentiments of
approval or disapproval and painful or comforting sensations.
(4) This connection with being in the wrong accounts for the force of, and
respect for, conscience of others, for no one wants to be in the wrong. We do
not have to look for something contingently and variably connected, such as
its sometimes being central to people’s identity, or causing intensity of
feeling, or contributing to self-direction.
(5) Conscience is acquired, not innate, not present from birth.
(6) It draws on values which need not take the form of laws, but which are in
danger of reflecting merely local convention, and therefore require constant
reflection and awareness of other values.
(7) It is not the voice of God, and its value does not depend on whether the
values derive from God.
(8) It is not infallible.
(9) Conscience creates an obligation, but not always an overriding obligation,
since there can be counter-obligations, so that one is in a double bind, wrong
if one does follow conscience and wrong if one does not.
(10) Freedom of conscience is the absence, within limits, of forcible
constraint by authority not only on one’s value beliefs, but also on the actions
which those value beliefs forbid or require.
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(11) Freedom of conscience is a narrower term than toleration. Toleration
can be recommended on many grounds besides the desirability of freedom of
conscience, such as the need for peace.
(12) Freedom of religion is not the same as freedom of conscience, but the
two overlap and many of the same arguments can be given for both.
Conscience, however, can be secular, and there are some advantages in its
being so.
(13) Freedom of conscience has different meanings.147
Other chapters will focus more on the above features that relate to conscience’s
value and legal status. In what follows, I will focus on the features that have more to
do with conscience’s particular nature, focusing on the legal implications of its
nature in later chapters.
First, Sorabji argues that we should understand conscience not as the supplier of our
values, but instead as the applier of our values.148 In this way, conscience is actually a valueneutral capacity insofar as it applies our values – whatever they might be and however we
came to hold them – to our actions or attitudes to produce beliefs about how they measure
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up to those values.149 If this is true, then perhaps a differentiating feature of the religious
conscience is that is applies different or else additional values typically emphasized in or
derived from religious texts, institutions, or traditions in order to produce beliefs about our
actions or attitudes. In short, a religious conscience may be demarcated by its application of
uniquely religious values to produce uniquely religious conscience beliefs. An example of a
uniquely religious value might be maintaining a positive relationship with the divine. The
corresponding religious conscience beliefs would therefore reference the rightness of
corresponding actions and attitudes. Thus, a basic account of the religious conscience likely
involves a conscience applying uniquely religious values to our actions and attitudes in
order to produce beliefs about how our actions and attitudes measure up to the standards
that the values seemingly imply.
You might suspect that the values emphasized in religious texts, institutions, or
traditions are not necessarily that different from those emphasized in nonreligious texts,
institutions, or traditions. That is, you might think that religious and nonreligious values
are not altogether that dissimilar. For example, both a Quaker and a Pacifist would be
objecting to the draft on conscientious grounds if they did so because they believed that
being drafted would force them to participate in violence and that participating in violence
would be wrong for them to do. However, though their norms are evidently the same – i.e.,
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that one shouldn’t participate in or facilitate violent actions – the equivalence of their
underlying values remains open. Where their values may differ could be in how they are
conceived: the Quaker would likely understand the value underlying their actions as having
its origin in some religious source, narrative, or worldview whereas the Pacifist might
understand the value underlying their actions as having its origin in some altogether
different source, narrative, or worldview. Functionally, these values might produce the
same sort of actions and behaviors from different people, and this may lead us to
understand the values as more or less the same. But I think this would be mistaken: while
the norms of the Quaker and Pacifist might be indistinguishable, the values are simply not
in virtue of the fact that each person conceives of their value differently. The separate
question of whether or not this difference, if true, should amount to differential treatment
before the law will be addressed in a later chapter.
Second, the values that conscience applies need not “take the form of laws” – in the
way that they do with St. Paul, for example150 – but are nevertheless “in danger of reflecting
local convention, and therefore require constant reflection and awareness of other values.”
Incidentally, Sorabji thinks that this is the greatest criticism against conscience: that the
values it applies to our actions are derived from custom or superstition.151 In response to
this proposed criticism, we can say two things. First, we can highlight the fact that the value
of conscience – especially its legal value – need not be tied to the truthfulness of the beliefs
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it produces. Instead, the value of conscience could just lie in merely possessing the capacity.
The content-independent value of conscience is supported when we stop to consider not
whether conscience reliably produces the right beliefs, but rather when we stop and think
about someone who altoghether fails to possess the capacity to form any such beliefs.152
Second, we can recommend education and cultural exposure to help us reflect upon – and
hopefully correct – our accustomed and superstitious values. Without free discussion, even
our true opinions remain accustomed or superstitious, and even when we retain our views
after education and exposure, our understanding of them will transform.153 In this way,
then, “it is up to us” whether or not our moral values depend on custom or superstition.154
Third, Sorabji argues that “freedom of religion is not the same as freedom of
conscience, but the two overlap and many of the same arguments can be given for both.”
This means that Sorabji straightforwardly adopts something like the overlapping view – and
given the historical account of conscience articulated above – perhaps for good reason. We
should consider, then, that a general freedom of conscience would only protect conscience
beliefs – religious or otherwise – but would fail to likewise protect non-conscience beliefs.
Crucially, this means that a separate freedom of religion would also be necessary if we
wanted to protect the other kinds of religious beliefs; after all, not all religious beliefs are
religious conscience beliefs. Of course, there are religious beliefs that are not conscience
beliefs, but instead something like ontological beliefs concerning the sorts of things that are
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real,155 epistemological beliefs concerning the sorts of things we can know,156 and so on.
Therefore, given their difference in scope, “freedom of conscience should therefore be
recognized as a claim independent of freedom of religion.”157
Because conscience is a secular concept whose scope includes both religious and
nonreligious beliefs, it is right to understand religion and conscience as two separate
concepts that can sometimes overlap. Accordingly, it is plausible to adopt the overlapping
view, which claims neither religious beliefs nor conscience beliefs – and thus freedom of
religion nor freedom of conscience – are conceptually contained within the other. Instead,
they should be understood as two separate sets of beliefs that sometimes overlap.158
Relatedly, Sorabji thinks that emphasizing the secularity of conscience – and thus its
conceptual distinctiveness from religion – can actually be advantageous for both
conscience and religion. “One possible benefit of resecularization,” he writes, “is that it may
reduce dogmatism about one’s own values, if we do not believe in a God-given law in our
155
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hearts, and it may encourage us to revise mistaken values.”159 Sorabji thinks that any sort
of legal regime that aims to protect conscience – especially one that might be operating
within a climate of religious pluralism – would need a conception of conscience that is
“itself secular enough to be open between different religious beliefs” such that the concept
can be used “in considering claims for protection independently of any particular religious
views.”160 This, of course, would not imply that such a regime would commit itself to
protecting every sincere belief, however disruptive.”161
V. Competing Conceptions of Conscience
In what follows, I will contrast the above view of conscience against some
competing notions of conscience present in the contemporary discussion of the concept.
A. Quasi-Religion and Quasi-Conscience
The first competing notion that I will focus on is the tendency to define conscience
so broadly such that what is described as ‘conscience’ ends up being more appropriately
labeled as quasi-conscience. That is, the tendency is to define ‘conscience’ too broadly and
to assign it features that have not been historically attributed to the concept. Interestingly,
this trend of broadly defining conscience mimics a tendency to broadly define religion in
the same sort of way such that what is described as ‘religion’ ends up being something
more akin to quasi-religion.
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Remember that in the Seeger and Welsh cases, for example, the Court ended up
treating nonreligious conscience beliefs as quasi-religious conscience beliefs so that they
might qualify for the statutory exemption whose scope was narrowly written. What was
evidently not a religious belief ended up being classified as such because it occupied “a
place parallel to” traditional religious beliefs in the life of their possessor. 162 As such, these
Court decisions overturned the view that the only sorts of beliefs that are eligible for legal
exemptions are those that are religious in content and instead supported the view that
beliefs that function like traditional religious beliefs in the life of their possessor are eligible
for legal exemptions as well. In so-doing, these decisions effectively expanded concepts like
‘religion’ or ‘religious beliefs’ into something like quasi-religion or quasi-religious beliefs.
Oddly enough, this trend of defining religion so broadly such that it ends up being
understood as something more like quasi-religion continues on into the contemporary
literature as well. Ryan Anderson and Sherif Girgis, for example, argue that ‘religion’
consists of “efforts to align your life with the truth about whatever transcendent source (or
sources) of being, meaning, and value there might be” and “efforts to honor or find
harmony with that source – call it the ‘divine.’”163 As one can imagine, overly broad
definitions of religion like this are problematic for at least a few reasons – some of which
are more or less mirrored in overly broad definitions of conscience too. First, Anderson and
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Girgis’ definition seems underinclusive in important ways. In defining religion as the effort
to align our lives with some transcendent source (or sources), they are being needlessly
narrow. Most likely, such a definition of religion would counterintuitively exclude some of
the most prominent Eastern religions like Buddhism and Confucianism due to their
naturalistic leanings.
Second, their definition seems overinclusive in important ways. Girgis and Anderson
argue that people are engaged in religious activities when they make efforts to align, honor,
or find harmony with the transcendent source of being, meaning, and value that there
might be – thus explaining why agnostics, atheists, and anti-theists are considered religious
under their definition.164 But this criterion of religion seems problematic insofar as these
last three groups would likely understand themselves as nonreligious or even anti-religious.
So, if Girgis and Anderson’s definition of religion concludes that self-identified nonreligious
and antireligious individuals are religious, then it seems problematic. Moreover, atheists,
agnostics, and anti-theists might just simply deny any sort of transcendent source of
ultimate value and meaning – and Anderson and Girgis even say as much. But we should
note that with these sorts of individuals, there would therefore be no source(s) of being,
meaning, and value – nothing “divine” – with which to align their life, honor, or find
harmony with. Thus, it seems like their definition must include doing more than just
aligning, honoring, or finding harmony with some transcendent source and would have to
include something like aligning, honoring, or finding harmony with the truth about the
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absence of anything divine. In such cases, we’re back again to counterintuitively defining an
individual who denies the existence of anything divine as ‘religious.’
Lastly, Girgis and Anderson seem to believe that these investigative efforts into this
possible transcendent source(s) must result in something like alignment, honor, or
harmony. This criterion also seems problematic insofar as it seems like the religious
individual need not arrive at a position of alignment, honor, or harmony in order to be
considered religious. For example, some individual might zealously look for the
transcendent source of being, meaning, and value that there might be, conclude that
atheism is true, and experience disharmony as a result of this realization – and even
dishonor this conclusion with contempt and resist aligning with it. Additionally, it would
seem odd to categorize an individual that is consistently on a sort of investigative
theological quest, working through comparative theological questions, and wrestling
through theological conundrums – without ever coming to a final harmony or alignment
about any of them – a nonreligious person.
As noted above, this trend of broadly defining religion mirrors a similar tendency to
broadly define conscience in the same sort of way such that what is described as
‘conscience’ ends up being something more akin to quasi-conscience. Martha Nussbaum,
for example, claims that ‘conscience’ is “the faculty in human beings with which they search
for life’s ultimate meaning.”165 Moreover, she notes that this faculty “is identified in part by
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what it does – it reasons, searches, and experiences emotions of longing connected to that
search – and in part by its subject matter – it deals with ultimate questions, questions of
ultimate meaning.”166 The first and primary objection against Nussbaum’s view is that it is
overinclusive. Historically speaking, we’ve seen that conscience has been understood most
fundamentally as a person’s capacity to form beliefs about what actions or attitudes had
been in the past, or would be in the future, wrong or not wrong for him to adopt or not
adopt in a particular situation. Nussbaum, however, believes that conscience is instead a
person’s capacity to form value beliefs about what is ultimately meaningful in life. Whereas
traditional conscience beliefs have been limited to beliefs about what actions or attitudes
might be wrong for us to adopt or not adopt, the beliefs of conscience according to
Nussbaum are something much more than these beliefs – but it may include them.
Nussbaum’s conscience beliefs would include any beliefs about what is or is not meaningful
to an individual independent of what actions or attitudes they might take to be wrong or
not wrong for them to adopt or not adopt. Beliefs about what an individual takes to be
meaningful would likely imply or else contain conscience beliefs in the historical sense, but
they should not be understood as the same.
Additionally, Nussbaum’s conscience will likely have a hard time squaring away
with several of the historical features typically attributed to conscience. First, conscience in

but it is also vulnerable, capable of being wounded and imprisoned. The tradition [of “liberty of conscience”
or “equal liberty of conscience”] argues that conscience, on that account, needs a protected space around it
within which people can pursue their search for life’s meaning (or not pursue it, if they choose). Government
should guarantee that protected space.” (19)
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the historical sense is understood to be the applier and not the supplier of our values.
Nussbaum’s conscience seems to reverse this role: conscience now seems to be the
capacity that primarily supplies our values – or something like our answers to these
questions of ultimate meaning. Second, whereas conscience in the historical sense creates
obligations for its possessor, Nussbaum’s conscience fails to do as much. Perhaps we could
understand Nussbaum’s conscience as derivatively producing hypothetical imperatives
given whatever answers to these questions of ultimate meaning that it produces. But even
if we stretch this far, it seems like Nussbaum’s conscience falls short of producing the
strong, overriding obligations that we see in the historical description.
Third, conscience in the historical sense actively judges your actions or attitudes,
confirms whether our actions or attitudes measure up to our values, and delivers acquittals
or accusations as a result. As the capacity to just generally “search for life’s ultimate
meaning,” Nussbaum’s conscience falls comparably short of conscience’s historical
description here as well. Nussbaum doesn’t seem to ascribe to conscience the same,
traditional cognitive roles of measurer, judger, accuser, acquitter, etc. Lastly, conscience in
the historical sense – in addition to possessing a multi-faceted cognitive role – also
possesses a multi-faceted affective role. Specifically, the conscience in the historical sense
can share knowledge with oneself of a moral defect and produce guilt or remorse, share
knowledge with oneself of a moral merit and produce something like pride or joy, or fail to
share knowledge with oneself of a moral defect or merit and produce something like a
sense of relief. In short, the historical notion of conscience produces more than just
“emotions of longing” connected to a search for ultimate meaning or value. In this way,
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perhaps Nussbaum’s conscience is, generally speaking, affectively much nicer and kinder to
its possessor than its historical depiction.
B. Conscience as Volitional Necessity
Lastly, we should note a further definitional trend in the literature on conscience –
namely, the tendency to define conscience as “volitional necessity.” Andrew Koppelman, for
example, argues that “conscience” is “an imprecise word for [the] internal compulsion to
act that is specified only by the possessor’s internal psychology.” 167 He thinks a better term
for conscience is what Harry Frankfurt calls “volitional necessity.”168 Frankfurt defines
someone who is bound by volitional necessity as someone who is “unable to form a
determined and effective intention – regardless of what motives or reasons he may have
for doing so – to perform (or to refrain from performing) the action that is at issue.”169
Accordingly, Koppelman thinks that an individual in the grip of a volitional necessity – and
so in the grip of conscience by his definition – “cares about something so wholeheartedly
that he cannot form an intention to act in a way that is inconsistent with that care.”170 This
suggests that volitional necessities are demands that someone feels like they must do
because they “care about something so wholeheartedly.”
The conception of conscience sketched above differs from Koppelman and
Frankfurt’s account of volitional necessity in at least two important ways. First, since
conscience beliefs are perceived obligations, we can understand them as demands that
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someone believes they must perform. However, conscience beliefs differ from volitional
necessities in that the demands of the former must be satisfied even if the individual does
not desire or “care” about performing the demand at all. Overall, this means that desire and
duty are largely separable within the demands of conscience but not so separable within
volitional necessities. Put another way, volitional necessities are demarcated by secondorder desires – or “desires about desires”171 – such that we not only desire to do X, but we
also desire to desire to do X. Demands of conscience, on the contrary, just tell us that we
ought to do X – regardless of whether we actually desire to do X or not. Whereas the
conscience places requirements on individuals independent of their desires, volitional
necessities are just desires all the way down. Unfortunately, when we define conscience as
volitional necessity, we risk reducing conscience to what John Henry Newman has referred
to as mere “self-will.”172
Moreover, because volitional necessities “can arise from anything at all that a
person cares about,” it is possible for the object of the volitional necessity to be amoral or
value-neutral.173 Another difference thus arises: whereas the demands of conscience
cannot be value neutral, the demands of volitional necessities “need not have any
connection to…value.”174 Thus, the value-neutral nature of volitional necessities stands in
contrast with the value-dependent nature of demands of conscience beliefs. Whereas
volitional necessities are value-neutral desires to act in a way that is consistent with that
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care, the beliefs of conscience are value-dependent requiring us to act in a way that is
consistent with them. Moreover, this second difference between the demands of conscience
and the volitional necessities is important when discussing the value of moral integrity
before the law: if a volitional necessity is thwarted by law, it may not necessarily involve an
imperilment to moral integrity because it is possible that no moral values were involved.
But when a demand of conscience is thwarted by law, it necessarily involves an
imperilment to moral integrity because moral values must always be involved. Insofar as
the demands of conscience require that individuals do things that they otherwise might not
want to do and necessarily involve imperilments to moral integrity, they should be
understood as different from volitional necessities.
C. The Christian Conscience
The idea that the conscience is a value-neutral capacity that is also neutral toward
religious values may be challenged by religious believers. Not only so, but it is also true that
majority of religious believers engaged in discussions about the freedoms of religion and
conscience in the United States are explicitly Christian. Accordingly, it thus seems
appropriate to engage with the concept of conscience as understood by Christians in order
to see if there is a fundamental disagreement with the account sketched above, and if so,
where the disagreement may lie. In what follows, I will show that even the most
conservative Christian accounts of conscience fail to sufficiently deviate from the account of
conscience sketched above. As such, I will conclude that even the most conservative
Christians have no reason to object to the account of conscience as a value-neutral capacity
that is neutral toward religious values or object to the legal implications of adopting such
an account.
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I will take as the most representative account of the conscience from a conservative
Christian perspective the account advanced by Andrew Naselli and J. D. Crowley. 175 Their
definition of the conscience – which is fundamentally constituted by verses from the New
Testament176 – is “your consciousness of what you believe is right and wrong.” 177 When we
compare this to the first feature of Sorabji’s definition of conscience – namely, that it is a
person’s belief or else capacity to form beliefs about what actions or attitudes had been in
the past, or would be in the future, wrong or not wrong for him to adopt or not adopt in a
particular situation – we see that they are very similar. Worth noting, however, is the fact
that Naselli and Crowley simply emphasize the conscience beliefs that the capacity of
conscience produces in their definition of conscience. Of course, their definition is not
incompatible with, but perhaps only reflects one aspect of Sorabji’s definition of conscience
– which remains agnostic about whether conscience refers specifically to “the things
believed or the believing of them.” A simple synthesis of their views, which is my
considered view, is as follows: conscience refers to the capacity to form beliefs about what
actions or attitudes had been in the past, or would be in the future, wrong or not wrong for
175
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him to adopt or not adopt in a particular situation and conscience beliefs or the beliefs of
conscience just refer to these beliefs. The case for the overall similarity of both accounts is
all the more justified when we emphasize the second feature of Sorabji’s conscience in
conjunction with the first: that these beliefs require personal self-awareness and are in the
first instance beliefs about what would be wrong for oneself. Both definitions overall
emphasize that conscience involves beliefs that we are aware of concerning what actions or
attitudes are right or wrong for us to adopt – either in the past, present or future – in a
given situation.
Naselli and Crowley also claim that their account of conscience implies that
conscience can – and oftentimes does – produce “different results for people based on
different moral standards.”178 They claim that “what you believe is right and wrong is not
necessarily the same as what actually is right and wrong…So someone’s ‘clear’ conscience
may actually be evil because it is based on immoral standards.”179 In essence, what they are
highlighting here is something that Sorabji has also noted: that we can hold different beliefs
about what is right or wrong for us because we hold to different “moral standards” – or to
use Sorabji’s language, different moral values. Where Naselli and Crowley seem to differ
from Sorabji is in their belief that there is, in fact, some correct moral standard or set of
values – and in particular, they believe that the correct moral standard or set of values are
uniquely Christian values and the moral standards depicted in the Bible.180 Sorabji might
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also believe that there is some correct set or standard of values, but he stops short of
claiming as much in his account of conscience. Relatedly, both accounts emphasize that the
values that conscience applies – and thus the beliefs that it produces – can, do, and should
change over time.181 Nevertheless, it’s clear that both accounts of conscience emphasize the
value-neutrality of conscience in that conscience can produce different beliefs about what’s
right or wrong for us depending on what moral values or standards we adopt – Christian or
otherwise.
Naselli and Crowley might disagree with Sorabji on a different point related to
conscience, but it seems like even this disagreement should not lead a conservative
Christian to reject Sorabji’s basic account of conscience as a value-neutral capacity that is
also neutral toward religious values. In particular, Naselli and Crowley argue that the
origins of the conscience stem from God insofar as God created us in his image with this
moral capacity.182 They write:
You’re made in the image of God, and God is a moral God, so you must be a
moral creature who makes moral judgments. And what is conscience if not

that they have a certain consciousness of those moral standards – a consciousness that is clear enough to
allow their own mind to either accuse or excuse their actions. It’s even clear enough for God to use as
evidence of judgment day (Romans 2:16).” (34)
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shining the spotlight of your moral judgment back on yourself, your thoughts,
and your actions.183
In arguing that our conscience is a God-given capacity, Naselli and Crowley might claim that
conscience is therefore not secular. But this shouldn’t matter much when looking at the
particular nature and value of conscience – especially when considering the legal
implications of its nature and value. God-given or otherwise, the nature of conscience as a
value-neutral capacity that is also neutral between religious values remains consistent
between the above accounts regardless of its origin story. And as noted above, the legal
value of conscience seems to depend more on possessing and exercising this capacity, not
on whether this capacity produces true beliefs. So, it seems that even the most conservative
Christians have no reason to resist the account of conscience as a value-neutral capacity
that is neutral toward religious values – or reason to object to the legal implications of
adopting this account.
VI. Conclusion
In this chapter, I developed and defended an account of conscience against
competing notions in order to better navigate the narrow version of the specialness
question in subsequent chapters. My account of ‘conscience’ is historically informed,
predicated upon the work of Richard Sorabji. The account is not an attempt to define a neat
and tidy set of necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘conscience,’ but is instead an
attempt to capture the more historically central or core aspects of the concept. Once I
formulated an account of ‘conscience,’ I first compared, contrasted, and defended this
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account of conscience against common, competing notions of conscience present in the
contemporary discussion of the concept. I ended the chapter by comparing and contrasting
this historically grounded account of conscience with a more conservative Christian
account of conscience.

72
CHAPTER 3: CATEGORICITY AND INSULATION FROM EVIDENCE
The Puritan mistake is sometimes still with us – religious liberty for my religion, and for
sufficiently similar religions, but not for religions or religious views that are too different or
too unacceptable.
– Douglas Laycock, “The Religious Exemption Debate,” p. 174
I. Introduction
In the next two chapters, I provide support for my central claim by analyzing several
possibly demarcating features of religious conscience beliefs taken to be legally relevant by
theorists in the field. Overall, I contend that there are no features held by either kind of
conscience that give us good grounds to adopt an Inegalitarian Response to the original
specialness question. Instead, I argue that a comparative analysis between the two kinds of
conscience actually gives us good reason to adopt an Egalitarian Response to the
specialness question since they are sufficiently similar in nature.
In this chapter in particular, I narrow in on two of Brian Leiter’s main features of the
religious conscience: categoricity and insulation from evidence respectively. After initially
interacting with Leiter’s categoricity feature, I turn my attention to Leiter’s arguments that
religious beliefs are insulated from evidence, and as a result, are not worthy of special legal
treatment. I argue that he fails to show that religious conscience beliefs are both in
principle responsive to empirical evidence and in practice typically more insulated from
this evidence than secular conscience beliefs. If I am right about this, then Leiter fails to
sufficiently distinguish the religious conscience from the secular conscience and fails to
answer the “central puzzle” of his book Why Tolerate Religion? Second, I look at whether or
not it is plausible to understand the religious conscience as insulated from other forms of
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evidence. Following the research of social-psychologist Jonathan Haidt, I argue that,
typically, both forms of conscience seem to be similarly insulated from a relevant kind of
evidence – namely, moral argumentation. I also show that, while it seems as though the
religious conscience usually draws from a larger set of moral values when compared to the
secular conscience, this should make no legal difference overall.184 Lastly, I consider
whether religious conscience beliefs uniquely appeal either directly or indirectly to private
evidence. In response, I conclude the chapter by offering a few cursory arguments why we
might prefer content-neutral approaches without making a complete case – hopefully
curtailing any lingering questions about comparative evidence.
II. Categoricity
The first feature that is supposed to “single out ‘religious’ states of mind from
others”185 is what Brian Leiter calls the categoricity feature. By this, Leiter thinks that
religious claims of conscience place heavy demands on action that “must be satisfied no
matter what an individual’s antecedent desires and no matter what incentives or
disincentives the world offers up.”186 Additionally, Leiter contends that “those who
genuinely conduct their lives in accord with the categoricity of the moral demands they
recognize are overwhelmingly religious.”187 While this feature is commonplace in most
major religions, it is plausibly not unique to religious states of mind. In fact, perhaps the
most salient feature of nonreligious moral systems is that the demands of morality are

184

See Joseph Dunne (2018) for the previously published portions of this chapter.

185

Brian Leiter (2013), 33

186

Brian Leiter (2013), 34

187

Brian Leiter (2013), 38

74
categorical insofar as our prior interests and desires must be overridden by some
superseding principle, duty, rule, etc.188 As Kenneth Himma remarks:
On any ordinary pretheoretical understanding of morality, the demands of
morality are categorical. Morality is the kind of thing that characteristically
requires sacrifice of prudential interests. This is most obviously seen in
negative moral norms, which prohibit the commission of certain acts. The
norm “Do not kill innocent persons” requires a prudential sacrifice of at least
this much: I must give up an option to kill innocent persons no matter what I
might gain from it.189
Incidentally, Leiter contends that categoricity is a necessary feature “of all claims of
conscience, not only religious claims”190 and that “an experience of categoricity is central to
anything that would count as a claim of conscience.”191 His mature position, then, is that all
conscience beliefs are, in principle, categorical, but in practice “those who genuinely
conduct their lives in accord with the categoricity of the moral demands they recognize are
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overwhelmingly religious.” Michael McConnell – a critic of Leiter – likewise argues that “the
demands of right and wrong may arise from nonreligious as well as religious systems of
belief.”192 If this is correct, then categoricity should be understood as a necessary condition
for all claims of conscience, not just the religious conscience. Furthermore, it would be a
mistake to understand categoricity as a sufficient condition for the religious conscience, for
possessing this feature would not be enough to make some claim of conscience uniquely
religious. Since this feature is shared by both kinds of conscience, something further is
needed to differentiate them – e.g., Leiter’s insulation from evidence feature.
Additionally, the view that categoricity is a necessary feature of both forms of
conscience is supported by the account of conscience developed in the previous chapter as
well. Remember that one of the core features of conscience is that it creates a strong
obligation for its possessor to follow. Oddly, Sorbaji also categorizes this obligation as one
that is “not always an overriding obligation, since there can be counter-obligations, so that
one is in a double bind, wrong if one does follow conscience and wrong if one does not.”
Orestes of ancient Greek tragedy helps to illustrate the sort of morally binding situation
that Sorabji has in mind where Orestes believed himself to be in the wrong if he did not
avenge his father’s death, but also in the wrong if he killed his mother – the murderer of his
father. So how does Sorabji’s description square with the categoricity of conscience,
especially when the obligation that conscience produces is not always an “overriding
obligation?”
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Sorabji contends that in these sorts of situations, it is “not that one duty is merely
prima facie, and that it is cancelled out by the other.”193 To the contrary, it seems like he
thinks it is possible to possess competing conscience beliefs concerning what is wrong or
not wrong for us to do or not do such that we are “damned if we do or damned if we don’t”
so to speak. This would not necessarily imply that either conscience belief fails to be
categorical, however. In fact, the reason these moral double binds seem to be so sticky and
troubling is precisely because the possessor feels as though both beliefs “must be satisfied
no matter what,” regardless of their “antecedent desires and no matter what incentives or
disincentives the world offers up” – which would include satisfying a competing belief of a
similar nature. So, while we can still claim that conscience produces categorical obligations,
we just might not consider them totally “overriding” only because our conscience can
produce competing categorical obligations that might sometimes interfere with each other.
III. Insulation from Evidence
By “insulation from evidence,” Leiter thinks that religious beliefs “do not answer
ultimately to evidence and reasons” – and he takes this feature as the primary delineator of
religious conscience beliefs from other conscience beliefs.194 Exactly how might religious
states of mind fail to answer to evidence and reasons? There seem to be two ways. On the
one hand, insulation from evidence could be understood as “a property of beliefs which, by
virtue of their content, cannot be validated or invalidated by empirical evidence.”195
Understood in this way, the objects of insulation are the religious conscience beliefs
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themselves, not necessarily the religious believer. On the other hand, “insulation from
evidence” could be understood as an individual epistemic attitude or state of mind that
believes despite the existence of discrediting evidence. Understood in this way, the object
of insulation is the religious believer, not the religious conscience beliefs.
Unfortunately, Leiter is not initially clear about which view he holds. At one point,
he claims that “insulation from evidence…will be understood as a claim about the religious
doctrine rather than about the typical epistemic attitudes of believers.” 196 At first, it seems
as though Leiter thinks religious conscience beliefs are in principle insulated from evidence.
But at another point, he claims that “the distinctively religious state of mind is that of faith
– that is, believing something notwithstanding the evidence and reasons that fail to support
it or even contradict it.”197 Here, he seems to adopt the other view: religious conscience
beliefs are just in practice more insulated from evidence when compared to their
nonreligious counterparts. Thankfully, Leiter clarifies his position in a later piece: “My
considered view, in fact, is that it is Believer Insulation that is crucial to the second of the
three characteristics of religion, though, of course, in some cases Believer Insulation will
not be a problem if the beliefs in question are marked by Belief Insulation.”198 Given his
clarifications, we can conclude that Leiter, in fact, holds the “Believer Insulation” position
(i.e., in practice insulation) – not the “Belief Insulation” position (i.e., in principle
insulation).
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François Boucher and Cécile Laborde argue that Leiter faces a dilemma about this
allegedly demarcating feature no matter which view he holds. They contend that if Leiter
accepts Believer Insulation, then “he cannot distinguish religion from fanatical adherence
to any set of beliefs.”199 The same seems true when we narrow our range from ‘religion’ to
‘religious conscience:’ under the first horn, the religious believer refuses to let available
evidence stand against their religious conscience beliefs, and as such, it would be difficult to
differentiate them from any other sort of fanatical adherence to some set of value beliefs. If
Leiter accepts Belief Insulation – and believes that “religious beliefs…neither claim support
from empirical evidence of the sciences nor purports to be constrained by empirical
evidence”200 – Boucher and Laborde contend that then “he cannot distinguish secular from
religious conscientious commitments.”201 If the dilemma holds, then it doesn’t matter
which view Leiter holds: his “insulation from evidence” feature fails to demarcate the
religious conscience from its secular counterpart in either case.
The second horn of the dilemma exists insofar as Boucher and Laborde take both
kinds of conscience to be, in principle, insulated from empirical evidence. To see why they
think this, they have us consider two different moral imperatives adopted by a religious
group and by a secular group – arguing that both are categorical and “arguably insulated
from empirical evidence and standards of justification found in natural science.”202 They
initially consider examples of religious conscience beliefs, e.g., the Buddhist who doesn’t
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eat meat because it “spreads fear among living creatures and goes against the virtue of
compassion” and the Quaker whose pacifism is grounded in the claim that “all wars and
outward fighting proceed from men’s lust.”203 Then, they explain that the secular analogs to
these religious conscience beliefs – namely, that “violence and the use of weapons to kill
other human beings is always wrong” and “that life has intrinsic value” – also “ground an
ethical commitment…while being just as impossible to prove with empirical evidence and
the tools of modern science.”204 Can we justifiably believe that both forms of conscience
are, in principle, insulated from empirical evidence?
A. Empirical Evidence
To answer this “in principle” question, we should return to the nature of conscience
itself. Remember that Sorabji claimed that the conscience produces value beliefs about
which past, present, or future actions or attitudes would be wrong or not wrong for us to
adopt or not adopt by applying certain values to our particular context.205 This means that
the evidential or justificatory basis on which conscience beliefs stand are our moral values.
We adopt values, and those values – at least in some way – explain why we hold the
conscience beliefs we do, serve to justify the conscience beliefs that we hold, and act as the
evidence that our conscience beliefs appeal to. Of course, these values can – and often do –
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run the risk of reflecting merely local conventions, customs, or superstitions, and therefore
require constant reflection and awareness of other values as Sorabji notes.206
If this is true, then why does Leiter think that a greater, in practice insulation from
empirical evidence is the distinguishing feature of the religious conscience? I suspect that a
methodological mistake by Leiter is partly to blame here. In his analysis, Leiter broadly
compares religious beliefs to conscience beliefs instead of comparing religious and
nonreligious conscience beliefs in particular. More specifically, though it seems clear from
his hypothetical scenario involving the Sikh and rural boy that Leiter had the narrow
version of the specialness question in mind – comparing secular and religious conscience –
his method for answering this question nevertheless operated as though he was trying to
answer the broad version of the question – comparing religion and conscience more
broadly. This insight is supported by the fact that Leiter’s method was to uncover the
general “features of religious belief that…distinguish religious beliefs from other kinds of
belief” in order to see whether those features warrant toleration.207 So, when Leiter argues
that ‘religious beliefs’ are insulated from empirical evidence, he seems to have a wider
range of religious beliefs in mind, which include ontological and epistemological beliefs as
well as conscience beliefs. In fact, when addressing this feature, Leiter relies exclusively on
examples highlighting the insulation from empirical evidence that uniquely ontological or
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epistemological religious beliefs seem to enjoy – e.g., arguments for the existence of God,
testimonial evidence supporting the belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, etc. Not once
does he cite an example of a uniquely religious conscience belief that might be insulated
from empirical evidence. Thus, it seems as though at least part of the reason that Leiter
included this feature was in response to thinking about ontological and epistemological
religious beliefs as opposed to religious conscience beliefs specifically.
B. Religious Ontological and Epistemological Beliefs
We should pause for a moment in order to highlight the fact that the view that
religious ontological and epistemological beliefs are insulated, in practice, from empirical
evidence is highly contentious.208 Unfortunately, Leiter just assumes this view and fails to
offer any substantive arguments in favor of his particular claim – even in spite of known
counterexamples to his position. Leiter writes:
There are, for example, “intellectualist” traditions in religious thought –
William Paley’s “natural theology” or neo-Thomist arguments come to mind –
according to which religious beliefs (for example, belief in a creator, or as in
American recently, belief in “an intelligent designer”) are, in fact, supported
by the kinds of evidence adduced in the sciences, once that evidence is rightly
interpreted.209
First, we should note that when Leiter talks about “religious beliefs” here, he cites as
an example the belief that God exists and the belief in an intelligent designer – both of
which are examples of explicitly ontological claims. Second, we should also note that Leiter
208
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tries to be charitable here, noting that “[i]t is doubtful, though, whether these intellectualist
traditions capture the character of popular religious belief, the typical epistemic attitudes
of religious believers.”210
But even if we table the comparison to popular religious beliefs, Leiter argues that
these “intellectualist traditions in religious thought might still be thought of as insulated
from evidence.”211 First, he notes that “it is dubious (to put the matter gently) that these
positions are really serious about following the evidence where it leads, as opposed to
manipulating it to fit preordained ends.”212 As noted above, Leiter just seems to assume
that this is the case without citing any evidence or advancing a substantive argument –
even though there are counterexamples to this claim. As Michael McConnell highlights:
But religious belief has been attested to by millions of seemingly intelligent
and rational people over long periods of time, who report that they have
experienced, in some way, transcendent reality. There is even, as Leiter
admits, a “large literature in Anglophone philosophy devoted to defending
the rationality of religious belief.” Leiter chooses to disregard this testimonial
evidence, along with its philosophical defense, without so much as
“address[ing] . . . in any detail”—really, at all—the arguments that are
offered. Why? The only reason he supplies is that the “dominant sentiment
among other philosophers” is that belief in God is “unsupported by reasons
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and evidence.” With all respect, there is no reason to think that members of
modern philosophy faculties have any special insights about God. 213
The irony here should not be lightly noted: Leiter’s claim that intellectualist traditions of
religious thought are insulated from evidence is advanced without sufficient evidence and
without regard for relevant evidence to the contrary.
Second, Leiter notes that “in the case of the sciences, beliefs based on evidence are
also revisable in light of the evidence; but in the intellectualist traditions in religious
thought just noted, it never turns out that the fundamental beliefs are revised in light of
new evidence.”214 Again, Leiter just seems to assume that this is the case without citing any
evidence or advancing any substantive argument – even though there are counterexamples
here as well. As Michael McConnell notes:
Developments in biology, physics, linguistics, archeology, and other
disciplines have had profound impact on Biblical hermeneutics and theology
in mainstream Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, and ‘practical reason’
has played a major role in natural law thinking since at least Thomas
Aquinas. To be sure, some religious traditions are more insulated from
scientific developments than others. The Navajo creation story, for example,
is impervious to archeological and linguistic evidence that the tribe migrated
to the Southwest from Canada only a few centuries before the arrival of
Europeans, and fundamentalist Christian belief in the historicity of Noah’s
flood and the literal six-day creation, depending on how these ideas are
213
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understood, is much the same. But to say that ‘insulation from evidence’ is a
defining characteristic of ‘all’ (or even most) religions is simply false. Religion
is constantly changing, and constantly interacting with the culture and other
ways of understanding the world.215
Concerning these “intellectualist” religious traditions, Leiter simply concludes: “The whole
exercise is one of post-hoc rationalization, as is no doubt obvious to those outside the
sectarian tradition.”216
As I see it, the sword cuts both ways: what seems obvious to those inside the
sectarian tradition is not obvious to those outside the sectarian tradition either. As
McConnell notes, “no religious believer would recognize [Leiter’s] description.”217
McConnell writes:
Religious believers do not think they are “insulating” themselves from all the
relevant “evidence.” They think they are considering evidence of a different,
nonmaterial sort, in addition to the evidence of science, history, and the
senses. It would be more accurate, and less loaded, to amend this second part
of Leiter’s definition to say that religion is a system of belief in which
significant aspects are not based on science or common sense observations
about the material world.218
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If religious believers are insulated from the “only epistemically relevant considerations,”219
then it’s no surprise that Leiter reaches the conclusion that he does. McConnell continues:
In a footnote, Leiter acknowledges that “of course” there may be matters
such as the “meaning of life” that “are insulated from evidence only in the
sense that no scientific evidence would seem to bear on them.” But he
immediately dismisses the importance of this observation on the ground that
“[s]uch beliefs are not my concern here, mainly because they are not
distinctive to religion.” What could he be thinking? His entire argument is
built around the idea that religion is “a culpable form of unwarranted belief”
precisely because of its “insulation from evidence.” If it turns out that
religion’s “insulation from evidence” is attributable to the fact that “no
scientific evidence bears” on many questions of a religious nature, then
religious belief cannot be criticized on these grounds. There is no reason to
apply the “ordinary epistemic standards” of science and material observation
to questions on which they do not bear. If Leiter is confining his “concern” to
beliefs on which “scientific evidence would seem to bear,” he is leaving out
most of what is central to religion, including beliefs underlying almost all
claims of religious conscience, which are the subject of his book. 220
Overall, then, Leiter’s view just seems to be “a sectarian premise, predicated on a
questionable view about evidence”221 – but admittedly, so is the view that there are other
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viable forms of evidence in addition to common sense and the sciences. Of course, Leiter is
free to “confine himself to whatever categories of evidence may strike him as persuasive,
but he cannot reasonably label as ‘culpable’ or ‘unwarranted’ the sincere conclusion of
many persons, including thinkers of the first rank, that there are nonmaterial aspects of
reality supporting religious belief.”222
So, the otherwise obvious, additional evidence to those inside the sectarian tradition
might not be so obvious to those outside the sectarian tradition such that those on the
outside might be the ones lacking – not those on the inside. But even if Leiter is right that
religious ontological and epistemological beliefs are, in practice, more insulated from
empirical evidence – and those on the inside of sectarian traditions are wrong – it might
not matter much to the original specialness question. McConnell argues that, “even for
those who agree with Leiter as a matter of personal conviction that there is no persuasive
evidence supporting the truth of religious belief, but agree with Madison and Washington
that the truth of religion is not a subject on which the government should take a stand,
Leiter’s conclusions do not follow, because they rest on the view that the state should treat
religious beliefs and arguments as lacking evidentiary warrant.”223 In short, McConnell
argues that the truthfulness of religious beliefs – here, specifically ontological or
epistemological religious beliefs – is just not an issue that the government should take a
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stand on. Instead, it is “better to proceed on the premise that people may reasonably
disagree about the truth or falsehood of religious claims.”224
C. Religious Conscience Beliefs
Nevertheless, does Leiter think that religious conscience beliefs are, in practice,
insulated from empirical evidence in the way that their ontological and epistemological
counterparts are alleged to be? When broadly comparing ‘religion’ and ‘morality,’ we get
close to Leiter’s answer to this question:
Is moral belief necessarily insulated from reasons and evidence? [F]or
cognitivist realists like Richard Boyd and Peter Railton…moral judgments are
not insulated from reasons and evidence as they are understood in the
sciences; indeed, just the opposite. So on this view, morality is not at all like
religion; it answers to reasons and evidence – and answers successfully!
Noncognitivist antirealists, by contrast, conceive of moral judgments not as
expressing beliefs…but as expressing mental states that are not truth-apt,
such as feelings. On this picture, then, moral judgments are by their nature
insulated from reasons and evidence; just as feeling cheerful or sad is not
answerable to reasons or evidence, so too with moral judgment. Religious
judgments are still different, on this account, since some religious judgments
do express beliefs and so, in principle, could be answerable to reasons and
evidence, but are nonetheless taken to be insulated from them. So on either
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of the two main contenders for a credible metaphysics and semantics of
morality, morality is still different from religion.225
A few points about this paragraph are in order. First, Leiter actually presents a falsedichotomy here since it is possible – indeed, some say plausible – to hold non-naturalist
versions of metaethical cognitivism.226 This point is important when you consider that nonnaturalist forms of cognitivism involve some degree of insulation from empirical evidences.
Second, since Leiter’s discussion about moral or religious beliefs focuses on their insulation
from empirical evidence, his views on their insulation from other forms of evidence – e.g.,
conceptual evidence – remain an open question. Third, this paragraph nicely illustrates
Leiter’s initial ambiguity about whether he holds Believer or Belief insulation. When
discussing metaethical cognitivism, Leiter seems to hold Belief Insulation: “So on this view,
morality is not at all like religion [because] it answers to reasons and evidence.” Yet, when
discussing metaethical noncognitivism, Leiter seems to hold Believer Insulation: “Religious
judgments are still different, on this account, since some religious judgments do express
beliefs and so, in principle, could be answerable to reasons and evidence, but are
nonetheless taken to be insulated from them.” Lastly, this paragraph also illustrates the
confusion that results from Leiter’s methodological mistake. Leiter understands the
“central puzzle” of Why Tolerate Religion? to be “why the state should have to tolerate
225
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exemptions from generally applicable laws when they conflict with religious obligations
but not with any other equally serious obligations of conscience.”227 But as we noted above,
his method for answering this puzzle oddly focuses on ‘religion’ more broadly – not
religious conscience specifically. In other words, Leiter mistakenly answers the narrow
version of the specialness question through broad version methodology – thus disallowing
him from straightforwardly addressing the narrow question.
Given Leiter’s claims up to this point, it doesn’t seem like he takes much of a stand
on whether or not religious conscience beliefs are, in practice, insulated from empirical
evidence even though he repeatedly claims that religious beliefs, in general, are. Again, it
seems like his methodological mistake prevents making this distinction. Leiter must believe
that religious conscience beliefs respond to the same kinds of evidences – and in roughly
the same way – as other kinds of religious beliefs if he believes that religious conscience
beliefs are, in practice, largely insulated from empirical evidence. Unfortunately, Leiter
gives us no reason to believe that religious conscience beliefs respond to the same kind of
evidence as their ontological or epistemological counterparts allegedly do. He only thinks
that religious beliefs are, in general, insulated from empirical evidence in practice – which
may or may not include religious conscience beliefs.
In fact, when contrasting ‘morality’ and ‘religion,’ Leiter actually seems to give us
reasons to believe that the opposite is true: namely, that religious beliefs – understood as
ontological or epistemological religious beliefs – and moral beliefs – which would include
religious conscience beliefs – may differ with respect to evidence.
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Consider this: if one is a metaethical cognitivist as Leiter describes it above – and
believes that moral judgments are, in principle, truth-apt and responsive to empirical
evidence as he assumes – then moral beliefs (which include conscience beliefs) would be
distinct from religious ontological and epistemological beliefs when those religious beliefs
are, in principle, insulated from empirical evidence. Interestingly, a straightforward
reading of Leiter in the above paragraph seems to suggest that he holds this kind of Belief
Insulation position: after all, moral beliefs are “not at all like religion” insofar as moral
belief “answers to reasons and evidence as they are understood in the sciences” and
religion does not.228 Under this sort of scenario, the conscience part of the religious
conscience would be in principle open to empirical evidence, but the religious part of the
religious conscience would not. While we know that Leiter actually holds the Believer
Insulation position,229 it is not similarly clear whether he is a metaethical cognitivist as
described above.230 So, a straightforward reading indicates that Leiter takes moral and
religious beliefs to differ with respect to evidence. But an adjusted reading makes it unclear
whether or not Leiter thinks that religious conscience beliefs are insulated from empirical
evidence the way that their ontological and epistemological counterparts are alleged to be.
Leiter argues that if one is a metaethical noncognitivist – and believes that moral
judgments are, in principle, not truth-apt and responsive to empirical evidence – then
228

Brian Leiter (2013), 50-51

229

Brian Leiter (2016), 548

230

Brian Leiter (2013), 152. Leiter clearly express his views about non-naturalist versions of moral realism in

a footnote: “Nonnaturalist versions of moral realism are, in my opinion, mere artifacts of academic
philosophy, which, through specialization, encourages the dialectical ingenuity that results in every position
in logical space finding a defender, no matter how bizarre.” (152)

91
moral beliefs (including conscience beliefs) are still distinct from religious beliefs. His
defense here is to argue that, contrary to noncognitivist moral judgments, at least some
religious beliefs are nevertheless, in principle, truth-apt and answerable to empirical
reasons and evidence. Again, he seems to mean the ontological and epistemological kind,
for these are the only kind of religious belief cited for example when discussing the
insulation feature. Under his second scenario, the conscience part of the religious
conscience would not be in principle open to empirical evidence, but the religious part of
the religious conscience would. As was the case before, we know that Leiter holds the
Believer Insulation position,231 but we don’t know whether he is a metaethical
noncognitivist. So, under this scenario, it remains unclear whether Leiter thinks that
religious conscience beliefs are insulated from empirical evidence in the way that their
ontological and epistemological counterparts are alleged to be as well.
Even though Leiter repeatedly claims that religious beliefs are, in general, insulated
from empirical evidence, he nevertheless fails to clearly show that religious conscience
beliefs are, in practice similarly insulated from empirical evidence. It seems like we can
only assume that they are if we also assume that Leiter is a metaethical cognitivist of some
kind and that religious conscience beliefs are, in principle, truth-apt and answerable to
empirical evidence. If Leiter were to adopt a form of metaethical cognitivism, then the
specific moral judgments produced by either kind of conscience would amount to moral
beliefs that are, in principle if not always in practice, truth-apt and responsive to such
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evidence.232 In such a case, Leiter would still need to show that religious conscience beliefs
are somehow more insulated from empirical evidence than their nonreligious counterparts
– and more insulated such that differential legal treatment would be justified. In the
absence of an argument from Leiter showing that religious conscience beliefs are both in
principle responsive to empirical evidence and in practice typically more insulated from
this evidence in a legally differentiating way when compared to their nonreligious
counterparts, we should suspend judgment on any conclusion he draws about their
respective legal treatment.
Perhaps the greatest implication of my critique is that, by failing to show that the
religious conscience is both in principle responsive to empirical evidence and in practice
typically more insulated from this evidence than secular conscience in a way that justifies
differential legal treatment, Leiter has failed to answer the “central puzzle” of Why Tolerate
Religion? His conclusion that the state has no principled reason to grant exemptions from
generally applicable laws to “religious obligations but not [to] any other equally serious
obligations of conscience” rests on the assumption that religious conscience beliefs are
232

Brian Leiter (2016), 550. The idea here is that religious beliefs typically involve moral judgments, and as a

result, Leiter’s approach to moral judgments as either cognitive or noncognitive would apply to religious
moral judgments as well. Leiter surprisingly thinks that “[t]his is correct, but also irrelevant. For what is
crucial is that all religions involve non-moral judgments about the way the world is that cannot be
interpreted in non-cognitive terms: e.g., that Christ rose from the dead after his resurrection, that one or more
supernatural beings exist, that everything that lives is the reincarnation of a prior living being, and so on.
These claims are cognitive, and systematically false or, at best, unwarranted. They are also distinctive of
religion but not of moralities.” (550) Perhaps Leiter sees this point as “irrelevant” only because he doesn’t
fully appreciate the implications of his methodological mistake.

93
differentiated by their insulation from empirical evidence.233 As Michael McConnell notes,
“it is the ‘insulation from evidence’ that most clearly distinguishes religion in Leiter’s
definition, and does almost all the work in his analysis”234 – and if I’m right that Leiter has
failed to distinguish the religious conscience through this feature, then his analysis is
largely undermined and never gets off the ground.
IV. Other Forms of Evidence
To be sure, Boucher and Laborde similarly fail to offer an argument for their
metaethical assumptions – namely, that both forms of conscience are, in principle,
insulated from empirical evidence. Additionally, it’s not clear whether they think that the
religious conscience is somehow differently insulated from nonreligious conscience with
respect to other evidences. Independent of these scholars, however, can we justifiably
believe that the religious conscience is somehow differently insulated with respect to other
forms of evidence – and ultimately in a way that justifies special legal treatment? In what
follows, I’ll argue that: (a) typically, both forms of conscience seem to be similarly insulated
from a relevant kind of evidence – namely, moral argumentation; and (b) the secular
conscience typically seems to be, at least in some sense, comparably more insulated from
moral values. I think a reasonable case can be made for (a) and (b) via Jonathan Haidt’s
work in moral psychology and that, even when (a) and (b) are plausible, treating religious
conscience with special legal solicitude is not.
A. Moral Argumentation
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In The Righteous Mind, Haidt’s first principle of moral psychology states that
“[moral] intuitions come first [and] strategic reasoning second.”235 Haidt writes:
Moral intuitions arise automatically and almost instantaneously, long before
moral reasoning has a chance to get started, and those first intuitions tend to
drive our later reasoning. If you think that moral reasoning is something we
do to figure out the truth, you’ll be constantly frustrated by how foolish,
biased, and illogical people become when they disagree with you. But if you
think about moral reasoning as a skill we humans evolved to further our
social agendas – to justify our own actions and to defend the teams we
belong to – then things will make a lot more sense. Keep your eye on the
intuitions, and don’t take people’s moral arguments at face value. They’re
mostly post hoc constructions made up on the fly, crafted to advance one or
more strategic objectives.236
By intuitions, Haidt means the “dozens or hundreds of rapid, effortless moral judgments
and decisions that we all make every day.”237 And by moral judgments, Haidt is referring to
a rapid cognitive process distinguished from reasoning238 that is “akin to the judgments
animals make as they move through the world, feeling themselves drawn toward or away
from various things.”239 While Haidt seems to initially indicate that our moral judgments
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are, in principle, insulated from moral argumentation, he does concede that it’s still
“possible for people simply to reason their way to a moral conclusion that contradicts their
initial intuitive judgment, although [he] believe this process is rare.”240 He thinks that
friends can challenge us, giving us reasons and arguments that sometimes “trigger new
intuitions, thereby making it possible for us to change our minds.”241 Thus, Haidt maintains
that while our moral judgments seem to be, at least in principle, open to this sort of
evidence, in practice he thinks they are largely insulated.242
This first principle of moral psychology is important for establishing (a) in that
Haidt is presumably talking about all moral judgments – religious or otherwise. If (a) is
true, then we may actually have good reason to treat religious and secular conscience
beliefs equally before the law since they would be practically indistinguishable concerning
their insulation from this sort of evidence. Both kinds of conscience beliefs are intuitive
moral judgments produced by applying values to our actions or attitudes that are not
themselves initially justified by some moral argument or line of reasoning. Both kinds of
conscience adopt some moral values, apply these values to our particular actions or
attitudes, and produce an intuitive moral judgment. And the intuitive moral judgments
produced by both kinds of conscience are described as being in principle open to moral
240
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arguments even though, in practice, they are typically insulated from this evidence.243 At
this point, then, there are no grounds for affording religious conscience special legal
solicitude if it nearly indistinguishable from secular conscience with regard to its insulation
from moral argumentation.
B. Moral Values
Concerning (b), does Haidt’s research help us develop a plausible case that the
secular conscience is typically more insulated from moral values – and perhaps in a way
that justifies special legal solicitude for religious conscience? Here, we can turn to Haidt’s
second principle of moral psychology, which states that “there’s more to morality than
harm and fairness.”244 By this principle, Haidt only means to make a descriptive claim
about what sorts of “moral foundations”245 and related values246 that people from across
different cultures draw from as an anthropological fact. He writes:
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The moral domain is unusually narrow in WEIRD [i.e. – western, educated,
industrial, rich, and democratic] cultures, where it is largely limited to the
ethic of autonomy (i.e., moral concerns about individuals harming,
oppressing, or cheating other individuals). It is broader – including the ethics
of community and divinity – in most other societies, and within religious and
conservative moral matrices within WEIRD societies.247
So, Hadit’s research indicates the following: that nonreligious and non-conservative
individuals within a WEIRD culture typically draw from comparatively fewer moral
foundations and related values than their religious and conservative WEIRD counterparts
when explaining or justifying moral judgments. The more nonreligious and liberal WEIRD
individuals, according to Haidt, typically draw from just three moral foundations and their
related values – what he calls the Care/Harm foundation,248 the Fairness/Cheating
foundation,249 and the Liberty/Oppression foundation.250 Conversely, more religious and

they send out a signal that (eventually) changes the animal’s behavior in a way that is (usually) adaptive.”
(144)
246

Haidt (2013) explains that each moral foundation has characteristic emotions – e.g., compassion is a

characteristic emotion of the Care/Harm foundation – and relevant virtues and values – e.g., obedience and
deference are the virtues and values of the Authority/Subversion foundation. (146)
247

Jonathan Haidt (2013), 129; emphasis added

248

Jonathan Haidt (2013): this foundation “makes us sensitive to signs of suffering and need; it makes us

despise cruelty and want to care for those who are suffering.” (178)
249

Jonathan Haidt (2013): this foundation “makes us sensitive to indications that another person is likely to

be a good (or bad) partner for collaboration and reciprocal altruism. It makes us want to shun or punish
cheaters.” (178)

98
conservative WEIRD individuals tend to draw from three additional moral foundations –
the Loyalty/Betrayal foundation251, the Authority/Subversion foundation252, and the
Sanctity/Degradation foundation.253 Hence, this is why Haidt suggests that there is, at least
descriptively, “more to morality than harm and fairness:” after all, liberals typically appeal
to only three moral foundations whereas conservatives tend to appeal to all six.254
For our present purposes, what’s important to highlight is that nonreligious WEIRD
individuals seem to typically draw on three moral foundations and their related values
whereas religious WEIRD individuals typically draw on all six moral foundations and their
related values. Haidt’s second principle implies that there is a descriptive difference with
our moral beliefs that trends along secular and religious lines: religious moral beliefs
250
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team player. It makes us trust and reward such people, and it makes us want to hurt, ostracize, or even kill
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typically draw from a larger evidential base (i.e., a larger set of moral values) when
compared to their secular counterparts (i.e., a smaller set of moral values). If this is true,
then (b) seems plausible: the religious conscience would typically apply a broader range of
values and must therefore work with a greater range of evidence in order to produce
beliefs about what would be wrong or not wrong for one to do or not do. Using Haidt’s
language, the religious and secular individual would obviously both possess moral beliefs
(including conscience beliefs), but their intuitive moral judgments would be produced by a
different set of moral foundations and related values getting “triggered” by and applied to
particular events. Thus, the more religious person must typically process the intuitive
moral judgments produced by six moral foundations and related values, while the more
secular person must typically process the intuitive moral judgments produced by only
three moral foundations and related values.255
If (b) is plausible, then there seem to be only two reasons why we might grant
special legal treatment to the religious conscience: either because there is something
special about the different moral value(s) that the religious conscience applies or else
because there is something special about the religious conscience having to apply a greater
number of values. Under the first scenario, there would have to be something special about
the value(s) uniquely applied by the religious conscience – something that the value(s)
applied by the secular conscience lack(s) – that would warrant preferential legal treatment.

255

This helps us, for example, understand why we see such a vast difference between the political left and

right over the use of concepts such as ‘sanctity’ and ‘purity’. Those on the right are driven by intuitions
triggered by the sanctity foundation and those on the left lack these intuitions. For more on this, see Jonathan
Haidt (2013), Chapter 8 “The Conservative Advantage,” 180-216.
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Under the second scenario, there would have to be something special about having to
navigate and apply a greater number of values – something the secular conscience does not
have to do – that would warrant preferential legal treatment.
We can plausibly dismiss the second reason as drawing a distinction without a
moral difference. After all, navigating a greater number of moral values en route to
formulating one’s conscience belief just doesn’t seem to amount to a principled reason for
granting totally different legal protections to the religious conscience objector. Regarding
the first reason, however, we can make a few points. First, we should note that Haidt’s
research concerns trends with respect to these moral foundations and values: the religious
conscience seems to typically draw from a larger set of moral values or foundations, while
the secular conscience seems to typically draw from a smaller set of moral values or
foundations. This means that it is possible for both forms of conscience to not only
sometimes draw from an atypical moral foundation and related value, but to sometimes
draw from an atypical moral foundation and related value with an atypical weightiness as
well.256 So, it seems then, that granting special protections to religious conscience on the
grounds that it typically draws from a certain set of arbitrarily designated, special values
would inevitably lead to unwarranted exclusivity and underinclusivity. While it is true that
laws draw somewhat arbitrary lines all the time that are over and underinclusive, drawing
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Fairness words in their sermons, while Baptist (religious, conservative) preachers made greater use of
Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity words in their sermons. (188) This indicates that there are outlier religious
consciences – e.g., Unitarian consciences – that typically and weightily draw on the first three moral
foundations and related values.
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a line between moral values in this way might be especially arbitrary – which leads to the
next point.
Second, qualitatively comparing some moral values to other moral values – when
possible – seems difficult to do. You might think that moral values are incommensurable,
and so any sort of comparative question would be, in principle, impossible to navigate. You
might also think that it is in principle possible to show that some moral values are better to
adopt than others – and that some value beliefs are more justified than others. But, as
noted, when this is possible, it is oftentimes difficult to do – especially when comparatively
evaluating the values that underlie conscientious objections. This would amount to, for
example, exempting a religious conscientious objector to conscription but not a similarly
situated secular objector solely on the basis that the value underlying the religious
conscience belief is somehow better or more worthy of entirely different legal
protections.257 Lastly, you might also worry whether courts are the appropriate arbiters of
these comparative questions between underlying moral values. Not only are these
questions difficult to navigate, but answering them might effectively cause the state to take
a definitive stance on some conception(s) of the good life or to endorse some sectarian
value(s) over some nonsectarian value(s). Disallowing courts to be the arbiters of
questions comparing moral values may actually protect against the “totalization of
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whose pacifism is grounded in one kind of value and claim - i.e., that “all wars and outward fighting proceed
from men’s lust” – but not the secularist whose conscientious objection is grounded in a different sort of value
and claim – i.e., that “violence and the use of weapons to kill other human beings is always wrong.” (502)
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morality” on the part of the government258 as well as encourage the sort of “skepticism and
humility that we owe one another as compatriots in a pluralistic society.”259
V. Private Evidence
Of course, there may still be other kinds of evidence not discussed above that are
relevant to conscience beliefs – religious or otherwise. For example, John Corvino contends
that McConnell overlooks the more pertinent private evidence that religious beliefs appeal
to when responding to Leiter’s insulation from empirical evidence feature. Corvino notes
that even if one grants McConnell’s “evidence of a different, nonmaterial sort,”260 this sort
of evidence is “often private in a way that renders it effectively useless for the purpose of
resolving interpersonal disputes.”261 In virtue of their evidence being private, the “law
258
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Sawicki argues that true respect for any claims of conscience demands a consistent, coherent, and repeatable
mechanism for legal accommodation, even if that test is open-ended and results in uncertainty at the margins.
(1395) She thinks that the most promising legal mechanism for determining the permissibility of
conscientious exemptions may be the kind of content-neutral balancing test often used in constitutional law –
indeed, the kind that we see with RFRA. (1396) While she grants that a balancing approach may be subject to
criticism (e.g., that it risks being used as a proxy for judgments based on majoritarian values), she thinks that
the alternative to establishing a content-neutral guiding principle is to “abandon the promise of freedom of
conscience and concede that American society considers exercises of personal conscience to be valuable only
to the extent that they align with widely accepted moral principles.” (1396) This alternative, Sawicki argues
“would undermine the foundational purpose of legal accommodation of conscientious belief, which is to
protect individuals from oppressive majoritarian understanding of morality.” (1396)
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avoids inquiring into the plausibility of religious claims” and governments remain
powerless to persuade religious believers otherwise – acknowledging that religious claims
“are generally accepted ‘on faith.’”262 Corvino concludes:
It is precisely by being ‘beyond human understanding’ that religious beliefs
are ‘insulated from evidence’ in Leiter’s sense,263 and precisely for that
reason that Justice Scalia opined that, in a religiously diverse nation, any
system requiring strict scrutiny for laws burdening religious beliefs is
‘courting anarchy.’”264
A. Content Neutrality
In response to Corvino, we should note a few things. First, Corvino’s private
evidence feature may be understood as a friendly amendment to Leiter’s admittedly
obscure insulation feature: perhaps a better way to understand Leiter’s insulation feature
is not that religious beliefs are narrowly insulated from empirical evidence but that
religious beliefs appeal to uniquely private evidence for justification instead. Though this
may be closer to what we commonly mean when we suggest that religious beliefs are
insulated from evidence, even Corvino’s updated feature – like Leiter’s – needs further
clarification about the specific role and place that private evidence occupies in both
religious and conscience beliefs in order to be helpful. At the very least, it seems clear that
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discussed in this chapter, being insulated from evidence in Leiter’s sense means being insulated in practice
from empirical evidence, not being insulated “beyond human understanding” – which is too sweeping.
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religious ontological beliefs can often appeal to private evidence for justification instead of
empirical evidence. But what’s not entirely clear is whether religious conscience beliefs can
similarly appeal to private evidence for justification instead of moral values. Regardless,
even if religious conscience beliefs do not directly appeal to private evidence, they may
nevertheless indirectly appeal to private evidence insofar as religious conscience beliefs –
at least to some degree – are influenced by religious ontological beliefs that directly appeal
to private evidence.265
Second, even when we grant that religious conscience beliefs uniquely rely on
private evidence either directly or indirectly, should this make a legal difference overall?
Though there may be evidential differences between religious and nonreligious conscience
beliefs, perhaps there is no reason to think that their evidential position is ultimately a
relevant consideration when determining the permissibility of granting legal exemptions.
In other words, perhaps the whole discussion surrounding the respective insulation of
265

It’s worth highlighting here that the opposite seems possible too: religious ontological beliefs can be

indirectly influenced by – at least to some degree – moral values insofar as they are influenced by religious
conscience beliefs that directly appeal to moral values. On the one hand, religious ontological beliefs (which
appeal to empirical evidence and/or private evidence) can affect our religious conscience beliefs – e.g.,
believing that God exists can affect what actions I take to be right or wrong. But the opposite also seems true:
religious conscience beliefs (which appeal to moral values) can affect our religious ontological beliefs – e.g.,
believing that certain actions are right or wrong can affect whether I believe that God exists. Thus, it is not
only possible for ontological beliefs to affect our conscience beliefs, but it is also possible for conscience
beliefs to affect our ontological beliefs – that is, to sort of “suppress the truth in unrighteousness.” (Romans
1:18 NASB) The main point here is simple: because the evidentiary or justificatory relationship between
religious ontological beliefs and religious conscience beliefs is not straightforward, we cannot simply assume
that religious conscience beliefs are always asymmetrically influenced by religious ontological beliefs.
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religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs from evidence is a red herring because, when
determining the permissibility of granting legal exemptions, the legal mechanism should be
content-neutral.266
By adopting an approach that deemphasizes the particular content of a
conscientious objection, courts may be able to set aside questions about evidence
altogether and instead emphasize extrinsic features (e.g., the infringement of rights or
harm caused to third-parties) over intrinsic features (e.g., whether the content is justified
by private evidence) as relevant to determining whether granting a legal exemption is
justified. Of course, other approaches consider the particular content of a conscientious
objection as significant and, in some way, determinative of whether or not a legal
exemption is justified. Approaches in this vein may consider the bad evidential basis of a
conscience belief as a good reason to withhold accommodations and a good evidential basis
as a good reason to grant accommodations. The larger question at hand in response to
Corvino, then, is whether we ought to adopt a content-neutral or a content non-neutral
approach to granting legal exemptions. In what follows, I offer a few cursory reasons why
we might prefer content-neutral approaches without making a complete case – hopefully
curtailing any lingering questions about comparative evidence.
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Separate from the central question in this paragraph is the following: even when we grant the content non-

neutralist that a religious conscience’s direct or indirect appeal to private evidence constitutes a weighty and
relevant factor in deciding whether or not to grant an exemption, just how weighty and relevant that reason
is or should be remains unhelpfully unclear – especially when considered amongst competing reasons for
granting or not granting an exemption. This related though different question will be covered at length at the
end of the next chapter.
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Nadia Sawicki is an example of a contemporary theorist who defends a contentneutral view. Broadly, she argues that true respect for any claim of conscience demands a
consistent, coherent, and repeatable mechanism for legal accommodation, even if that test
is open-ended and results in uncertainty at the margins.267 More specifically, she thinks
that the most promising legal mechanism for determining the permissibility of
conscientious exemptions may be the kind of content-neutral balancing test often used in
constitutional law – indeed, the kind that we see with RFRA.268 While she grants that a
balancing approach may be subject to criticism (e.g., that it risks being used as a proxy for
judgments based on majoritarian values), she thinks that the alternative to establishing a
content-neutral guiding principle is to “abandon the promise of freedom of conscience and
concede that American society considers exercises of personal conscience to be valuable
only to the extent that they align with widely accepted moral principles.”269 This
alternative, Sawicki argues “would undermine the foundational purpose of legal
accommodation of conscientious belief, which is to protect individuals from oppressive
majoritarian understanding of morality.”270
Amy Sepinwall reaches a similar conclusion about content-neutrality when
addressing a separate though related question: when is a claim of moral complicity
compelling enough to warrant an accommodation – especially when that accommodation
would impose costs on third parties? Her answer is that conscientious objections should
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likewise be evaluated under a sort of content-neutral RFRA regime but that “a separate,
additional set of considerations must be brought to bear – namely, considerations tracking
the interests of third parties.”271 Thus, she suggests adding to the content-neutral RFRA test
an additional feature: roughly, third-party costs “exceeding some threshold amount should
be found untenable – and exemptions should be denied when these excessive costs would
otherwise result.272 Specifying exactly where this threshold might be on a cost spectrum is,
Sepinwall thinks, “a matter for democratic deliberation.”273
Sepinwall adds this extrinsic feature to her test of exemption demarcation because
of the reasons she sees for refraining from evaluating the intrinsic content of any given
conscience belief. Because courts are limited when evaluating the more intrinsic features of
a conscience belief, Sepinwall believes that courts should instead focus on more extrinsic
features when determining whether a legal exemption is warranted.
In fact, Sepinwall argues that moral beliefs in general – which include conscience
beliefs – should enjoy total deference by courts. A position of total deference to objectors’
moral beliefs appropriately maintains the “skepticism and humility that we owe one
another as compatriots in a pluralistic society.”274 And given the reality of moral and
religious pluralism, “we are often without a capacity for certitude … in moral and religious
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matters … that would allow us to discern truth and falsity” – it seems like an attitude of
“moral deference on the part of the state” is appropriate.275
But what about particular moral beliefs that are highly objectionable like racism or –
to cite Sepinwall’s example – homophobia?276 Should certain limits on moral deference and
content-neutrality be appropriated so as to ensure that courts, as State actors, are not
compelled to treat highly objectionable moral beliefs like racism as on par with other moral
beliefs? To this question, Sepinwall offers three responses. First, she argues that “according
deference to a claim that denigrates another group is not the same as endorsing that
claim.”277 Though a court should treat the moral belief with deference and neutrality,
Sepinwall thinks that courts have a responsibility to clearly articulate that such a moral
view “flies in the face of our most fundamental constitutional values…[thereby serving]
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religious freedom but also [speaking] in favor of the notion of equal respect that underpins
our constitutional regime.”278
Second, deferring to and remaining neutral toward a moral claim doesn’t necessarily
commit a court to issuing an exemption: the objector’s assertion must still be weighed
against a governmental interest. Hence, the entitlements that citizens enjoy would be
defeasible. It may turn out, for example, that in some instances, “the government will invoke
its compelling interest in the eradication of, say, racism, and it will wield that interest to
defeat the bid for an exemption.”279 We should note, too, that the moral belief must also be
weighed by the court against the interests of third parties – at least according to
Sepinwall’s revised test. She writes:
Third parties will presumably be able to marshal arguments that acceding to
the believer’s hateful claim inflicts a grave injury on them—one so grave that
the court should find it dispositive. But even if third parties choose not to
become too vexed about the believer’s claim, the state must, again in its
capacity as a defender of our constitutional regime, add to its arguments
about the compelling interests underpinning the challenged legal
requirement a statement decrying the challenge because it deviates from our
most cherished constitutional values.280
In sum, Sepinwall argues that courts should afford a great deal of deference and
neutrality when facing a conscientious objection. After all, “pluralism demands respect for
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religious differences, but that respect goes both ways: it entails that we must be open to
many claims of conscience, but we must also ensure that these claims do not unduly or
disproportionately interfere with the interests of discrete third parties.”281 However, the
deferential conclusion sketched here does not necessarily entail that an objector is always
entitled to an exemption. Even though the courts “should in general treat as true the
religious adherent’s claim…, they must still consider whether acceding to a request for an
accommodation would impose undue burdens on third parties.”282
Finally, Nathan Chapman offers several reasons why we ought to grant broad,
content-neutral, defeasible entitlements for conscience beliefs. He argues that grating such
entitlements for conscience may help to protect against tyranny insofar as “protecting
conscience undermines the totalization of morality by the government.”283 By promoting a
robust liberty of conscience, several anti-tyrannical consequences are encouraged – such as
fueling advancements in otherwise stagnant democratic deliberation and aiding the
elimination of at least some disputes over moral differences that “might otherwise
monopolize the public sphere of a pluralistic society” – which may then leave “objectors
and their opponents more resources … to debate (and to collaborate on) other important
matters.”284 Such debate and collaboration may also generate social trust between groups
that might otherwise be suspicious of each other.”285 Securing broad, content-neutral,
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defeasible protections for conscience also “limits the government’s pretensions to absolute
moral authority,” permits “nonconformist moral thought that aims to undermine moral
tyranny,” and allows the kind of justifiable civil disobedience that has “an important place
in political history and theory” – the kind that can be “particularly effective at jarring a
morally apathetic society into taking notice and making important changes.”286 Lastly, such
protections for conscience may also keep minority thoughts and practices alive against the
conclusions promoted by the majority, allow for “majority decisions to be provisional,”
allow the “persuasiveness of minority speech to be aided by the persuasiveness of minority
action,” and allow for those who disagree with prevailing norms to prolong internal and
national dialogues over contested moral issues.287
VI. Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided support for my central claim – namely, that because
religious conscience beliefs are sufficiently similar to other conscience beliefs, there is no
good reason to treat them differently before the law. In particular, I narrowed in on two of
Brian Leiter’s main features of the religious conscience: categoricity and insulation from
evidence respectively. After showing that Leiter’s categoricity feature is shared by both
kinds of conscience, I turned my attention to Leiter’s arguments that religious beliefs are
insulated from evidence, and as a result, are not worthy of special legal treatment. I argued
that Leiter failed to show that religious conscience beliefs are both in principle responsive
to empirical evidence and in practice typically more insulated from this evidence than
secular conscience beliefs. If I am right about this, then Leiter failed to sufficiently
286
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distinguish the religious conscience from the secular conscience and failed to answer the
“central puzzle” of his book Why Tolerate Religion? I then looked at whether or not it is
plausible to understand the religious conscience as insulated from other forms of evidence.
Following the research of social-psychologist Jonathan Haidt, I argued that, typically, both
forms of conscience seem to be similarly insulated from a relevant kind of evidence –
namely, moral argumentation. I also showed that, while it seems as though the religious
conscience usually draws from a larger set of moral values when compared to the secular
conscience, this should make no legal difference overall. Lastly, I considered whether
religious conscience beliefs uniquely appeal either directly or indirectly to private
evidence. In response, I concluded the chapter by offering a few cursory arguments why we
might prefer content-neutral approaches without making a complete case – hopefully
curtailing any lingering questions about comparative evidence.
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CHAPTER 4: FURTHER FEATURES
Religion is a special phenomenon, in part, because it plays such a wide variety of roles in
human life: it is an institution, but it is more than that; it is an ideology or worldview, but it is
more than that; it is a set of personal loyalties and locus of community, akin to family ties, but
it is more than that; it is an aspect of identity, but it is more than that; it provides answers to
questions of ultimate reality, and offers a connection to the transcendent; but it is more than
that. Religion cannot be reduced to a subset of any larger category. In any particular context,
religion may appear to be analogous to some other aspect of human activity - to another
institution, worldview, personal loyalty, basis of personal identity, or answer to ultimate and
transcendent questions. However, there is no other human phenomenon that combines all of
these aspects; if there were such a concept, it would probably be viewed as a religion.
– Michael McConnell, “The Problem of Singling out Religion,” p. 42
I. Introduction
As in the last chapter, I continue to provide support for my central claim by
analyzing several possibly demarcating features of religious conscience beliefs taken to be
legally relevant by theorists in the field. Overall, I contend that there are no features held
by either kind of conscience that give us good grounds to adopt an Inegalitarian Response
to the original specialness question. Instead, I argue that a comparative analysis between
the two kinds of conscience actually gives us good reason to adopt an Egalitarian Response
to the specialness question since they are sufficiently similar in nature.
In this chapter in particular, I narrow in on three further, possibly delineating
features of the religious conscience that theorists take to be legally relevant. First, I
investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are more central to our identity – and
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relatedly, whether they are more central to our moral integrity. Ultimately, I argue that
both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs are sufficiently central to our identity
and moral integrity such that there is no obvious reason to grant preferential legal
treatment to one over the other. Second, I investigate whether religious conscience beliefs
are more primordial, unchosen, or non-voluntary. I contend that granting legal exemptions
on the grounds that the belief or practice in question is primordial or non-voluntary is
problematic for at least three reasons. First, I argue that non-voluntariness should not be
classified as a necessary condition for obtaining a legal exemption. Second, I argue that
non-voluntariness should not be understood as a sufficient condition for obtaining a legal
exemption either. And third, I argue that, even if we grant non-voluntariness as a sufficient
condition, it should not be understood as the only sufficient condition for obtaining a legal
exemption.
As I end chapter four, I investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are uniquely
linked to unjustified intolerance and prejudice so that differential treatment before the law
is warranted. I argue that, because both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs have
similar propensities for unjustified prejudice and intolerance, their differential treatment
before the law is plausibly unwarranted. First, I argue that unjustified prejudice and
intolerance are similarly correlated to religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs insofar
as the driving force behind the prejudice and intolerance is, at least in principle, shared by
both kinds of conscience. Second, I argue that we should be skeptical that religious
conscience beliefs enjoy a uniquely strong in-practice-link to unjustified prejudice and
intolerance. If these claims are right, then it seems like we should accept an antiintolerance approach over an exclusively anti-religious approach. And if the anti-
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intolerance approach is adopted, then we have no reason to treat religious conscientious
objectors with special, negative treatment. Nevertheless, I conclude by highlighting a
further problem for both the anti-religious approach and the anti-intolerance approach:
just how relevant or how weighty should content-based reasons be in the exemption
calculus if we discover unjustifiably intolerant content in a person’s conscience belief,
practice, or ideology?
II. Central to Identity
The first feature we will investigate as possibly demarcating religious conscience is
the central to identity feature. That is, perhaps the religious conscience is
disproportionately central to the identity of its possessor when compared to the centrality
of the secular conscience to its possessor – and as such, the former is thought to be more
deserving of legal protections. As Alberto Giubilini notes, the conscience in general
“delimits a sphere of personal morality that is an essential part of our sense of personal
identity, understood as our sense of who we are and of what characterizes qualitatively our
individuality (for instance, our character, our psychological traits, our past experience,
etc.).”288 Perhaps the religious conscience is more central to our identity such that it is more
constitutive of, more important to, or plays a greater role in shaping the identity of its
possessor. Do we have reason to believe that this is the case? And if it is the case, should
this count as a good reason to legally privilege the religious conscience?
One reason that people might initially think that religious conscience beliefs are
more central to our identity is that religious beliefs in general seem to be more central to
our identity than other kinds of beliefs. As such, it seems plausible to legally single out
288
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religious beliefs: after all, they seem to serve as a proxy for, or else provide “evidence for
deep and important commitments” – roughly, the sorts of things that are central to our
identity.289 This way of thinking is flawed for at least two reasons. First, even if we take the
above claim at face value, religious beliefs are nevertheless “both over and underinclusive
as a proxy for deep and important commitments” anyway.290 As John Corvino notes, “not
every religious claim is deep and important, and not every deep and important claim is
religious.”291 In other words, not every belief central to one’s identity is religious and not
every religious belief is central one’s identity. Second, and more importantly, reasoning in
this way commits the same sort of methodological error that Leiter committed; things get
conceptually muddy and complicated when we try to compare and contrast religious
beliefs in general – which include conscience beliefs – with conscience beliefs in general – of
which some are religious – for legal privileging purposes. The objects of comparison central
to the narrow version of the specialness question are religious and secular conscience
beliefs – not religious and conscience beliefs more generally.
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To work through this feature in a clearer way that avoids Leiter’s methodological
mistake, we should again look back at the nature of conscience – i.e., the faculty that applies
our values in order to produce beliefs about what actions or attitudes are wrong or not
wrong for us to adopt or not adopt in our past, present, or future situations. Interestingly,
Richard Sorabji thinks that the conscience in general, religious or otherwise, is not
necessarily central to our identity – and that being central to one’s identity is just a
contingent and correlated feature of conscience, not constitutive of it. According to Sorabji,
then, being central to one’s identity is neither a necessary or sufficient condition of
conscience: conscience beliefs, religious or otherwise, need not be central to one’s identity,
and those beliefs that happen to be central to one’s identity need not be conscience beliefs.
To illustrate his position that conscience beliefs in general are not necessarily
central to one’s identity, Sorabji has us consider the example of the Money Lover:
His success in making money made him feel not merely good at moneymaking, but also like a good person (a “jolly good fellow”). Moneymaking
allowed him to structure his identity, and if “good person” is a moral
category, his moral identity. His belief in the need to make money might be
intensely felt, and it would facilitate his rational capacity for directing his life.
What is needed to make his belief and practice one of conscience is some
reference to what it would be morally wrong for him to do or not to do. In the
example imagined, the belief and practice of moneymaking would not need
protection as a matter of conscience, since it is an agreed form of life in no
danger from opposing viewpoints. But if for any reason it needed to be
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presented as a matter of conscience, that could easily be achieved by citing
duties to family and shareholder, or, more admirably, by deliberately taking
on duties to society.292
In this example, it’s clear that beliefs that are central to one’s identity are not necessarily
conscience beliefs – e.g., they could be beliefs that you’re good at money-making, and that
money-making makes you feel good. So, beliefs that are central to one’s identity are not
sufficient for being conscience beliefs – much less religious conscience beliefs. But is Sorabji
right that conscience beliefs, religious or otherwise, are not necessarily central to one’s
identity? Is it possible that our conscience beliefs are not central to our identity?
A. Moral Identity
I don’t think Sorabji effectively makes the case that conscience beliefs are not
central to our identity. In the above paragraph, Sorabji uses the Money Lover to seemingly
illustrate that someone can have a moral identity without reference to conscience beliefs
about what “would be morally wrong for him to do or not to do.” Contrary to Sorabji,
however, it seems as though conscience beliefs at least partly constitute our moral identity
– for it seems difficult to articulate one’s complete moral identity without ever referencing
what they believe to be morally wrong to do or not do. While it is possible to highlight at
least some aspects of our moral identity that are not necessarily conscience beliefs, it just
seems impossible to discuss the totality of our moral identity without any reference to our
conscience beliefs. If conscience beliefs are necessarily central to our moral identity, then it
seems as though conscience beliefs might be necessarily central to our overall identity as
well. After all, it seems plausible to think that our overall identity is at least partly
292
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constituted by our moral identity. Even Sorabji seems to indicate as much: moneymaking
allowed the Money Lover “to structure his identity” – which included “his moral identity.”
If I am right about this – namely, that conscience beliefs, religious or otherwise, are
necessarily central to our overall identity insofar as conscience beliefs are a necessary
aspect of our moral identity, and that our moral identity a necessary aspect of our overall
identity – then is there reason to legally privilege the religious conscience over the
nonreligious conscience? The answer seems to be “no” at first glance if both forms of
conscience are similarly central to our moral identity if not our overall identity. It seems as
if we should just treat both forms of conscience similarly before the law if they are at least
similarly central to our moral or overall identity. As Gemma Cornelissen notes, “the identity
approach locates a plausible basis for the concern behind religious exemptions, but it fails
on its own to explain why religious beliefs should be considered more central to
individuals’ identities than other personal attributes, including non-religious beliefs.”293
But, importantly, what if these forms of conscience are dissimilarly central to our identity
such that the religious conscience is somehow more central to our moral or overall
identity?
Even if religious conscience beliefs are somehow more central to an individual’s
moral or overall identity, I still don’t think that it is a sufficient reason for preferential
treatment before the law. While it’s true that “the identity approach seems, at least at first
glance, to come close to what people are concerned with when they claim a religious
exemption,”294 it doesn’t seem as though identity concerns are the only relevant grounds
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for an exemption worth considering. As such, it seems possible that the nonreligious
conscience – as well as the religious conscience, really – could be justifiably granted the
same legal exemption, but on non-identity grounds. In fact, Sorabji accepts this conclusion,
believing that conscience’s “connection with being in the wrong accounts for the force of,
and respect for, conscience of others, for no one wants to be in the wrong.” 295 As such, he
doesn’t think that we would need to look for something additional in order to ground
protections for conscience – such as its “being central to people’s identity.”296 In this sort of
scenario, religious conscience might be more central to one’s identity – moral or otherwise
– but it might not matter much with respect to comparative treatment before the law: there
might be adequate, non-identity grounds for legal exemptions that are similarly shared by
either form of conscience. As noted by Sorabji, the relevant feature for grounding an
exemption might just be that the belief in question is conscientious in nature, not
necessarily that it is central – or more central – to one’s identity.
While that may be true, it’s also worth noting here that even if the religious
conscience were understood to be more central to one’s identity – moral or otherwise –
there might be simpler reasons to treat both forms of conscience equally. If we suppose
that being central to one’s identity is a relevant consideration for determining the
permissibility of an exemption and that secular conscience is nevertheless central to one’s

295

Richard Sorabji (2014), 217. For Sorabji, an appeal to conscience has force because “when it concerns the

present or future, it represents a person’s belief about what it would be wrong for them to do in an expected
situation calling for decision. A person’s sense of what it would be wrong for them to do has a special weight,
and causes a degree of inhibition against overriding it.” (205)
296

Richard Sorabji (2014), 217

121
identity even though it’s not as central as the religious conscience, then it seems plausible
to think that the secular conscience would remain sufficiently central to one’s identity so as
to warrant the exemption. We can see this point illustrated in the Seeger and Welsh cases,
for example. We can, for the sake of argument, just suppose religious conscience beliefs
against conscription were more central to the identity of the objectors than the secular
conscience beliefs against conscription in these cases. But even if they were more central, it
still seems as though the secular conscience beliefs against conscription were sufficiently
central to their identity so as to warrant the same exemption. After all, the secular
conscience beliefs in these cases qualified for the exemption because they seemed to
sufficiently occupy “in the life of [their] possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.”297 As Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure
argue, “it is not religious convictions in themselves that must enjoy a special status but,
rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to structure their moral identity.”298
B. Moral Integrity
Just as some have inquired about the centrality of religious conscience beliefs to the
moral identity of their possessor, others have relatedly inquired about the centrality of
religious conscience beliefs to the moral integrity of their possessor. This might sound like
doubletalk, but it’s important to point out that moral identity, conscience, and moral
integrity are different but related concepts. Alberto Giubilini writes:
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The concept of personal identity in the sense in which the notion is used here
– i.e., what defines me as this particular person in a qualitative sense – is
intimately related to the notions of conscience and of moral integrity, and
more specifically to the “identity view of integrity.” According to this view,
for people to have integrity means to remain faithful to “identity-conferring
commitments,” i.e., “commitments that people identify with most deeply, as
constituting what they consider their life is fundamentally about.”299
So, on the one hand, one’s moral identity can be constituted by something like Taylor and
Maclure’s “core beliefs,” or what Giubilini refers to as “identity-conferring commitments” –
and which, I should add, plausibly include our conscience beliefs, religious or otherwise. On
the other hand, one’s moral integrity is constituted by the degree to which we “remain
faithful” to these “core beliefs” or “identity-conferring commitments” – which, again,
plausibly include our conscience beliefs. When someone fails to “remain faithful” to their
“core beliefs” or “identity-conferring commitments,” they are, to some degree, lacking
moral integrity. When we fail to integrate our moral values and beliefs with our actions or
attitudes – and when we possess knowledge of this defect – we are said to have a guilty
conscience. We might say that it is hard to “live with myself”300 insofar as part of us “knows
of the defect but is keeping it a secret” and “the other shares the secret.”301 As Sorabji notes,
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“for those who feel the force of conscience strongly, the expression ‘I could not live with
myself’ displays the connection of a clear conscience with integrity.”302
The relevant question at hand concerns what sort of relationship religious and
nonreligious conscience beliefs have to our moral integrity respectively. After all, requests
for exemptions are commonly made on the grounds of respecting moral integrity –
especially in healthcare contexts.303 When we suppose that both kinds of conscience belief
are similarly central to our moral integrity, there remains no obvious reason to legally
privilege religious conscience beliefs over secular conscience beliefs. And even when we
suppose that the religious conscience is – if possible – somehow more central to our moral
integrity, there nevertheless seems to be no obvious reason to legally privilege the religious
conscience over the secular. Even in this latter scenario, it is plausible to think that, when
the religious conscience is – if possible – somehow more central to one’s moral integrity,
the secular conscience may be nonetheless sufficiently central to one’s moral integrity so as
to warrant similar accommodations. Perhaps Seeger and Welsh are good examples of cases
where nonreligious conscience beliefs were understood to be sufficiently central to one’s
moral integrity so as to warrant granting them the same legal accommodations enjoyed by
religious conscience beliefs that were admittedly central to one’s moral integrity. Overall
then, the same sort of argument made when discussing the relationship between religious
conscience and moral identity can be plausibly made when discussing the relationship
between religious conscience and moral integrity as well.
III. Primordialism and Non-Voluntariness
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The next feature under investigation concerns primordialism and nonvoluntariness. More specifically, I will investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are
somehow less freely chosen or constructed such that they deserve special legal treatment
over and above their more freely chosen, secular counterparts. Sonu Bedi, for example,
contends that the primordial and non-voluntary nature of a given belief should be a
relevant consideration when determining the permissibility of granting a legal exemption.
He argues that “granting religious groups exemptions from facially neutral laws stands on
the horns of an often neglected but core dilemma” involving the role of choice:304
On the one hand, contemporary theory has come to see religious affiliations
and practices as contingent, open-ended and freely constructed. On the other
hand, in order to justify different or special treatment for such groups we
must view these affiliations as unchosen, static and not freely constructed. I
argue that we cannot have it both ways…We must be able to identify the
difference between religion and mere preference, and this difference must be
enough to justify the religious exemption. I argue that doing so requires
viewing the religious practice as anything but voluntary. That is, in
establishing the all-important exemption, we must see the religious practice
as effectively unchosen, rigid and inhospitable to contestation. Consequently,
securing an exemption entails rejecting the open-ended, freely constructed
and contingent characterization of religious affiliations. Put simply, the more
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the religious group is seen as just like any other voluntary association or
preference, the more difficult it becomes to justify an exemption.305
So, Bedi argues that religious beliefs in general – and by association, religious
conscience beliefs in particular – can only enjoy special treatment in the form of legal
exemptions if they are understood to be “effectively unchosen, rigid and inhospitable to
contestation.” Conversely, any sort of “voluntary association or preference” would stand
comparatively less justified for special treatment in the form of legal exemptions. Thus, the
justification for special legal treatment and the lack of free-choice are, according to Bedi,
inversely proportional: as our role in choosing beliefs decreases, our justification for
deserving special treatment in the form of a legal exemption increases – and vice versa.
A. The (Religious) Belief Continuum
Bedi’s above argument rests on a few, key claims worth highlighting and analyzing.
The first is that religious beliefs “can be characterized along a continuum.”306 On one end,
the religious belief “is entirely unchosen” – “something one cannot help but do.”307 Here,
religion is understood to be “a priori and given: there is no choice in being Sikh or
Christian” because religious beliefs “are rigid, static and compelled.”308 Religion more
generally is “primordial.”309 Bedi continues:
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It is primordial because unlike a simple preference or membership in the
voluntary association—the Rotary Club or the local charity group, religious
affiliations are importantly prior and essential. We are born into them. They
shape and inform our identity rather than vice versa…On the primordial end
of the continuum, religious practices are rigid and unchangeable instead of
mutable and fluid. After all, if we cannot choose such practices—that is, they
are simply given—we as individuals cannot alter, change or even revise
them.310
On this far end of the spectrum, our religious beliefs – which would include religious
conscience beliefs – are entirely unchosen.
On the other far end of the spectrum, religious belief “is characterized as entirely
voluntary.”311 Here, religious beliefs are entirely chosen:
The other end contends that all religious affiliations and practices are chosen
making the very notion of a coherent community a fiction. After all, as an
empirical matter individuals do convert, leave particular faiths, and even pick
and choose which religious tenets to follow. Here we are seen as choosing
everything, leaving nothing up to mere circumstance. Religious practices are
mere preferences alterable as we see fit. Far from being constrained by such
affiliations, we create, change, affirm, fix and amend them. They do not
determine our behavior, rather we determine them.312
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Bedi “highly doubt[s] that religion occupies one extreme or the other” and, instead,
occupies a position somewhere in the middle – which seems plausible enough. In the
middle, religious beliefs – which, again, would include religious conscience beliefs – would
include elements that are both chosen and unchosen.
Gemma Cornelissen similarly investigates the “nature of believing” when evaluating
the original specialness question, concluding alongside Bedi that religious beliefs likely lie
somewhere in the middle.313 Cornelissen agrees with the “standard picture” in philosophy
that belief acquisition broadly speaking is roughly analogous to catching a cold. 314 In some
sense, she agrees that “one cannot decide what one believes” since “beliefs aim at truth” –
but that this should be taken with two large caveats.315 First, it’s clear that “we can control
many aspects of our surrounding circumstances which tend to give rise to and sustain
certain beliefs and not others.”316 “We can,” Cornelissen writes, “choose to attend church
services in attempt to promote in ourselves a belief in that church’s teaching” for
example.317 Similarly, we can choose to place ourselves in a particular context that tends to
give rise to and sustain a cold as well. While we don’t choose to have a cold in a strong
sense, we do choose to set ourselves up in a particular way in order to catch that cold.
Second, it seems like we can also “control the extent to which we exercise or apply our
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beliefs in reasoning and behavior.”318 Cornelissen illustrates this point with an interesting
Seeger and Welsh-like example: “An individual might have little control over believing that
war is wrong but, in theory, she could very well choose not to apply her belief if
conscripted.” Accordingly, Cornelissen argues that beliefs seem to “require endorsement:
they become relevant only when the believer not only ‘holds’ them to be true, but actively
chooses to ‘take’ them as true in her reasoning.”319 So, like Bedi, Cornelissen also takes
religious beliefs – which include religious conscience beliefs – to lie somewhere in the
middle of the belief continuum described above.
We should also notice that Bedi and Cornelissen’s position is compatible with
Haidt’s views – namely, that conscience beliefs in general seem to be typically insulated
from moral argumentation in similar ways. For Haidt, the process of forming moral beliefs
begins by non-volitionally and primordially adopting moral values (which run the risk of
reflecting merely local conventions, customs, or superstitions), then non-volitionally
applying these values to our particular actions or attitudes, and then non-volitionally
producing an intuitive moral judgment. The only seemingly chosen or non-primordial
aspect of this process is a “post-hoc rationalization” step involving appeals to moral
arguments in order to justify our beliefs.320 Interestingly, Haidt believes that the nonvolitional and primordial intuitive moral judgments of conscience are still, at least in
principle, open to change and amendment (e.g., through moral argumentation or intuitive
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moral judgments produced in us) even though, in practice, they are typically unchanging
and insulated from relevant evidence.
The process Haidt describes seems to fit well with Cornelissen’s “standard picture”
of belief acquisition: there are non-volitional and primordial aspects to our beliefs that are,
in principle, open to change – but this change typically happens in an indirect sort of way,
e.g., by controlling our belief-forming influences and controlling the extent to which we
exercise or apply our beliefs in reasoning and behavior. Cornelissen’s second caveat – that
we can control the extent to which we exercise or apply our beliefs in reasoning and
behavior – might help to explain Haidt’s finding that our moral beliefs are, in practice,
typically insulated from relevant and contrary evidence. Though friends might challenge us
and give us reasons and arguments that sometimes “trigger new intuitions, thereby making
it possible for us to change our minds,” we could nevertheless fail to endorse the intuition
or belief, failing to actively choose to “take” them as true in our reasoning even when we
might non-volitionally “hold” them to be true.
B. Non-Voluntariness and Legal Exemptions
Bedi continues that “much contemporary theory rejects the primordial view and
explicitly moves towards the paradigm of choice and contestability.”321 As noted above, he
thinks that by moving “in the direction of anti-primordialism…we undercut the ability to
grant an exemption, to treat religion as special or different from a mere preference or
voluntary association.”322 Justifiably granting an exemption gets so undermined because –
according to Bedi’s second, key claim – “the only way to effectively justify [an] exemption is
321

Sonu Bedi (2007), 237

322

Sonu Bedi (2007), 237

130
to treat the affiliation or practice as non-voluntary, as anything but contestable or fluid.”323
Is it true that the only justifiable grounds for granting a legal exemption that the belief in
question be non-voluntary? Why think that non-voluntary, primordial beliefs are the only
sorts of beliefs worthy of legal exemptions?
I find Bedi’s second, key claim to be problematic for at least three reasons. First, it
seems as though non-voluntariness should not be classified as a necessary condition for
obtaining a legal exemption – a view that Bedi clearly posits insofar as he thinks that
justifying a religious exemption requires that the religious belief be non-voluntary. To see
why I think non-voluntariness fails as a necessary condition, let’s look again at the Seeger
case. The reason that a legal accommodation was afforded to the conscientious objector
had nothing to do with whether or not his belief was freely chosen. What was centrally in
question was whether the objector’s belief, freely chosen or not, occupied “in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption comes within the statutory definition.” So, the pacifist who freely chooses not to
serve in the war after carefully considering the nonreligious arguments for pacifism would
still qualify for a legal exemption in Seeger because of their belief’s functional equivalence
to traditional religious beliefs – not because of its non-voluntariness. The legal conclusion
in Seeger seems like the acceptable moral conclusion as well, for we seem morally justified
in granting a legal exemption to the pacifist who voluntarily acquired their beliefs, thus
demonstrating the non-necessity of non-voluntariness.
Second, it seems that non-voluntariness should not be understood as a sufficient
condition for obtaining a legal exemption either. Remember that Bedi claims that the only
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way to justify an exemption is that the belief in question be non-voluntary. This implies
that Bedi understands non-voluntariness as, at the very least, sufficient for warranting a
legal exemption. To see why non-voluntariness remains insufficient for warranting a legal
exemption, however, just consider the real or imagined unjust discriminator whose beliefs
are unchosen and primordial and who requests a legal exemption from some law in order
to unjustly discriminate to an unacceptable level. The unjust discriminator would satisfy
Bedi’s necessary and sufficient condition of possessing a non-voluntary belief – yet,
intuitively, it seems like we are not morally justified in granting the unjust discriminator a
legal exemption. Other interests (e.g., third-party harms) may be sufficient for blocking a
legal exemption in such a case. Thus, this counterexample shows that non-voluntariness is
insufficient to justify granting the requested legal exemption.
Third, it seems that, even if we grant non-voluntariness as a sufficient condition, it
should nevertheless not be understood as the only sufficient condition for obtaining a legal
exemption. Interestingly, Bedi not only takes non-voluntariness as merely sufficient for
warranting a legal exemption; he actually takes non-voluntariness as the only sufficient
ground for warranting a legal exemption. Contrary to Bedi’s position, there seem to be
other sufficient grounds for justifying legal exemptions – grounds that are likely more
important and overriding, in fact. Again, we can look to Seeger to illustrate this point. What
really seems to be doing the justificatory work in cases like Seeger is that the belief is
perceived to be an obligation to its possessor – voluntarily chosen or not. That is, what
seems central in these cases is that the belief in question places heavy demands on an
individual’s action that “must be satisfied no matter what an individual’s antecedent
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desires and no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up.”324 Accordingly,
it seems as though what more centrally and sufficiently justifies granting legal exemptions
are considerations related to obligation such as one’s moral identity, moral integrity, and
the like – or some combination of these and related features. After all, requiring someone to
act against their perceived obligations, freely chosen or not, would in some sense cause
them to undermine their moral identity or moral integrity such that may not be able to “live
with themselves.”325 Bedi rhetorically asks if something “is a choice that some have decided
to take, why should it receive an exemption?”326 We can respond: for a multitude of other
sufficient and possibly more important non-volitional reasons including protecting one’s
moral identity, moral integrity, and the like.
IV. Unjustified Intolerance and Prejudice
The last feature that I will look at in this chapter is whether or not religious
conscience beliefs enjoy a unique link to unjustified intolerance and prejudice such that
negative differential treatment before the law is justified. To illustrate what I have in mind
with this feature, consider John Corvino’s discussion about the intrinsic value of religion.
He notes “that religion – like health, education, family, and so on – is a fundamental good
worth promoting” insofar as it “engages the distinctively human capacity for grappling with
basic questions about meaning and existence,” “binds people together, often for charitable
purposes that promote the general welfare,” “provides a way to mark major life events, and
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it offers solace in times of grief and despair.”327 Though he agrees that religion doubtlessly
“does all of these things, and does them well,” Corvino also thinks that religion doubtlessly
“does great evil” as well.328
If that’s true, then perhaps we’ve identified a reason to treat religious conscience
unequally before the law: religious conscience beliefs might have a comparatively greater
propensity for conflict insofar as they enjoy a unique link to unjustified intolerance and
prejudice. In response to this idea, I will argue that religious and nonreligious claims of
conscience arguably have similar propensities for conflict such that unequal treatment
before the law would be unjustified.
A. Nehushtan’s Anti-Religious Approach
As noted, some writers have worried that we may have the legal picture backwards:
given the features of religious belief, we may actually have good reasons to afford special,
negative legal treatment toward religious beliefs. For example, Yossi Nehushtan contends
that, contrary to their typical codification, religious conscience beliefs are undeserving of a
special legal status because they possess a strong tie to unjustified intolerance. This means
that Nehushtan defends the view that we should accept an anti-religious approach to
granting conscientious exemptions.329 His argument for this conclusion is as follows:
(1) Unjustified intolerance should not be tolerated;
(2) Empirical evidence links religion and intolerance, that is, people’s
responses to measures of religion and intolerance are closely related;
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(3) Theoretical evidence links (some) religions and intolerance;
(4) The religiosity of conscience gives the state a reason to refuse to grant
conscientious exemptions.330
Overall, Nehushtan and Leiter seem to agree, then, that religious beliefs “are far more likely
to cause harms and infringe on liberty” and, as such, believe that there might be “special
reasons not to tolerate religion.”331
Should we accept Nehushtan’s argument and adopt an anti-religious approach? For
now, I will assume his first premise (since he defends it at length elsewhere 332) and instead
focus on the remaining premises. I should note, however, that nothing about Nehushtan’s
first premise gives us any reason to treat religious conscience differently than its
nonreligious counterpart – that is, with either special positive or special negative
solicitude. Upon accepting (1), Nehushtan’s conclusion is just that “conscientious objections
that rely on intolerant values should not be tolerated, including, when necessary, a refusal
to grant conscientious exemptions.”333 What he fails to highlight is the fact that either kind
of conscience, religious or otherwise, can rely on unjustifiably intolerant values. Given the
nature of conscience, we know that conscience, religious or otherwise, is the applier of our
values – values that commonly risk being intolerant because of their tendency to be derived
from local custom or superstition. As far as the argument is concerned at this point, it
doesn’t seem as though Nehusthan necessarily holds an anti-religious position per se.
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Instead, it seems as though he’s arguing for an anti-intolerance position where any
conscientious objection that might “rely on [unjustifiably] intolerant values,” religious or
otherwise, should not be tolerated – up to the point of withholding the legal exemption.
Furthermore, we should note that Nehushtan’s argument, at least as written, is
formally invalid. More specifically, Nehushtan qualifies the kind of intolerance he has in
mind with premise (1) – namely, unjustified intolerance. But in premises (2) and (3),
Nehushtan drops the qualifier and merely describes the empirical and theoretical links that
religion has to mere intolerance. So, in order for his argument to be valid – and for
Nehushtan to conclude that the religiosity of conscience gives the state a reason to refuse to
grant conscientious exemptions – Nehushtan must add the unjustified qualifier to premises
(2) and (3). In what follows, I will simply assume this friendly amendment to Nehushtan
and interact with the valid version of his argument.
Yet, even after we offer a friendly amendment to Nehushtan’s argument in order to
make it valid, is it nevertheless sound? That is, are premises (2) and (3) true? Nehushtan
claims that both empirical and theoretical evidence links some religions – specifically
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism – and intolerance. Concerning (2), Nehushtan explains that
“scholars do not dispute the strong and unique empirical links between religious
orientation and prejudice or intolerance.”334 Two conclusions about this empirical link are
highlighted. First, “religion and intolerance are indeed closely related” in that, “as a broad
generalization, the more religious an individual is, the more prejudiced that person is.”335
Second, “the first conclusion should be qualified and treated with caution” – the most
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important such qualification being “the need to differentiate between various types of
religious orientation.”336 The importance of differentiating between various types is
understood when we consider that “different religious orientations can entail various
degree of intolerance towards different target-groups.”337
To illustrate the different prejudices and intolerances displayed among particular
religious orientations, consider the results of the following study:
The target of prejudice is important when considering prejudice-religious
orientations relationships. The intrinsic [religious orientation, where religion
is an end in itself, was] consistently negatively related to the self-reported
racial/ethnic intolerance, but it was positively related to intolerance of gay
men and lesbians and possibly to authoritarianism and intolerance of
communists and religious outgroups though there are few relevant studies.
The extrinsic [religious orientation, where religion is merely a means to selfserving ends,] was sometimes positively related to racial/ethnic and
gay/lesbians intolerance. [The quest religious orientation, where religion is
perceived as a quest or a way of finding the truth rather than as the truth
itself,] showed a weak tendency to be associated with tolerance for racial
groups; a much stronger effect appeared for gay/lesbian as targets. Finally,
[religious fundamentalism] was consistently related to increased prejudice
against gay/lesbian persons, women, Communists and religious outgroups,
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as well as authoritarianism, but its relationship with racial/ethnic
intolerance is less clear cut.338
So, it seems as though the main takeaway from this research is that different
religious orientations not only differ with regard to the kind of prejudice and intolerance
(i.e., negatively or positively related), but also with regard to the object of prejudice and
intolerance as well (e.g., races/ethnicities, gays/lesbians, women, authoritarians,
communists, religious outgroups, etc.). Even though different religious orientations are
differently prejudiced against and intolerant of different people groups, Nehushtan
concludes (2): there is a strong and unique empirical link between religious orientation in
general and prejudice or intolerance.
Though these studies are admittedly vulnerable to criticism339 and fail to give us a
full picture of things,340 Nehushtan nevertheless contends that “the results in these studies
338
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over time” provide us cursory reasons for accepting (3): “the relevant resemblance
between Christianity, Judaism and Islam, and the fact that the description of religious
fundamentalism is potentially applicable to at least these three religions, all provide
[theoretical] grounds to believe in the applicability of the above findings to Judaism…Islam,
[Christianity] and perhaps to other similar religions as well.”341
B. The Anti-Intolerance Approach
Now that we’ve seen Nehushtan’s argument laid out, we can return to the original
question of this section: should we adopt an anti-religious approach? At the very least, I
don’t think that Nehushtan has offered a complete argument for accepting an anti-religious
approach. But more strongly, I think there are better reasons to accept an anti-intolerance
approach instead when we accept Nehushtan’s first premise. To see why, first consider
that, in order to justify adopting the anti-religious approach over the anti-intolerance
approach, Nehushtan would need to show that religious beliefs have a uniquely strong tie to
unjustified prejudice and intolerance that other beliefs fail to possess. More specifically,
Nehushtan would need to show that religious conscience beliefs have a uniquely strong tie
to unjustified prejudice and intolerance that nonreligious conscience beliefs fail to possess
– and that this tie is sufficiently unique such that differential legal treatment is warranted.
Unfortunately, Nehushtan only shows that religious beliefs are, in general, strongly tied to
prejudice and intolerance – not that they have a uniquely strong tie to unjustified prejudice
and intolerance in a way that justifies their special, negative treatment before the law. To
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fully make this case, Nehushtan would need to consider the tie to unjustified prejudice and
intolerance that nonreligious conscience beliefs have also.
Additionally, this central claim that religious conscience beliefs possess a uniquely
strong tie to unjustified prejudice and intolerance just seems false. At the outset, it seems
like we can safely claim that various conscience beliefs in general possess at least some
kind of prejudice or intolerance – regardless of the strength. Any sort of value belief with a
particular content has the potential to be prejudiced against something or intolerant of
something. This claim seems especially plausible when we grant, alongside Nehushtan, that
both the kind and objects of prejudice and intolerance can vary. More crucially, however,
the justification of the prejudice and intolerance is what seems to be important here:
religious conscience beliefs allegedly have a uniquely strong tie to unjustified prejudice and
intolerance that nonreligious conscience beliefs lack. Contrary to Nehusthan, I will now
argue that religious conscience beliefs fail to possess a uniquely strong in principle or in
practice tie to unjustified prejudice and intolerance.
First, it seems as though unjustified prejudice and intolerance are similarly
correlated to religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs insofar as the driving force
behind the prejudice and intolerance is, at least in principle, shared by both kinds of
conscience. To see why this is the case, consider the example of suicide bombers offered by
Jonathan Haidt:
To take one example, religion does not seem to be the cause of suicide
bombing. According to Robert Pape, who has created a database of every
suicide terrorist attack in the last hundred years, suicide bombing is a
nationalist response to military occupation by a culturally alien democratic

140
power. It’s a response to boots and tanks on the ground – never to bombs
dropped from the air. It’s a response to contamination of the sacred
homeland. (Imagine a fist punched into a beehive, and left in for a long time.)
Most military occupations don’t lead to suicide bombings. There has to be an
ideology in place that can rally young men to martyr themselves for a greater
cause. The ideology can be secular (as was the case with the Marxist-Leninist
Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka) or it can be religious (as was the case with the
Shiite Muslims who first demonstrated that suicide bombing works, driving
the United States out of Lebanon in 1983). Anything that binds people
together into a moral matrix that glorifies the in-group while at the same time
demonizing another group can lead to moralistic killing, and many religions
are well suited for that task. Religion is therefore often an accessory to
atrocity, rather than the driving force of the atrocity.342
According to Haidt, unjustified prejudices and intolerances – like those manifested
in suicide bombings – are not the unique products of religion per se, but instead seem to be
the products of ideologies that “bind people together into a moral matrix that glorifies the
in-group while at the same time demonizing another group.” While these ideologies can be
either secular or religious, what serves as the primary “driving force of the atrocity” is
being deeply embedded within the above sort of moral matrix that glorifies the in-group
and demonizes the out-group. Thus, the underlying feature that seems to drive unjustified
prejudice and intolerance is not, at least in principle, unique to religious conscience beliefs.
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Second, it seems like we should doubt that unjustifiably prejudiced and intolerant
ideologies are, in practice, uniquely religious – which seems to be the idea that really does
the distinguishing work for Nehushtan. To see why we should doubt religion’s unique inpractice-link to unjustified prejudice and intolerance, just consider some of the following
claims made by the BBC’s war audit in 2004.343 For example, one of the main findings of the
study was:
...that the overwhelming majority of wars and the overwhelming majority of
the victims of such wars cannot be classified primarily according to religious
causes or religious beliefs. There have been horrific examples though where
particular communities have been targeted because of their religious faith,
and these atrocities have been perpetrated by the three most vicious and
blood-thirsty regimes ever to hold power: Stalin’s Russia, Mao’s China and
Hitler’s Germany.344
Moreover:
The discussion of god-invoking, militantly religious states in connection with
a propensity for war raises the question of whether atheistic or secular
states, such as China, are less prone to war or large scale violence. The
information…on death tolls from major wars is a fairly strong indication that
atheism is not by itself any indicator in this direction. Atheist governments in
the USSR, China and Russia were in fact the biggest perpetrators of mass
violence that the world has ever seen, with both governments individually
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responsible for many more deaths than the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler. The
presence of the millenarian ideology of Communism (like Nazism) gave the
rulers the justification for mass murder, in much the same way that religion
had been used by other rulers before them the world over to justify war. The
common thread here linking the disposition to war of religious and atheistic
states is absolutism: the more absolutist the state, the more likely it is to go
to war. Thus we can conclude that a genuinely secular (atheistic) state may
be less inclined to go to war than a state in which religion is very prominent,
only as long as the secular state is one which is not pursuing a millenarian or
totalitarian ideology (such as Communism or Nazism) and as long as the
state is one in which pluralism and tolerance of diversity are the norm.345
The main point here is simple: it seems like we can be reasonably skeptical that religion
boasts of a unique in-practice-link to unjustified prejudice and intolerance. Given the above
claims, perhaps a good case can be made that nonreligious ideologies and beliefs – which
include nonreligious conscience beliefs – are, in practice, similarly unjustifiably prejudiced
and intolerant. At the very least, the modest claim is sufficient: we should doubt that
religious ideologies and beliefs possess a uniquely strong in practice tie to unjustified
prejudice and intolerance – especially in a way that warrants altogether different treatment
before the law.
If these claims are right, then we have good reason to instead accept an antiintolerance approach over Nehushtan’s exclusively anti-religious approach when we are
under the assumption of his first premise. If the anti-intolerance approach is adopted, then
345

Greg Austin, Todd Kranock, and Thom Oommen (2004), 35-36

143
we have no reason to treat religious conscientious objectors with special, negative
treatment. The only kind of conscience belief that might receive special, negative treatment
before the law would be conscience beliefs based on unjustifiably intolerant values –
regardless of their religiosity.
C. A Remaining Problem for Content Non-Neutral Approaches
In this last section, I raise a lingering concern that applies to all content non-neutral
approaches. The concern is that, even when we grant the content non-neutralist that the
unjustifiably intolerant content of one’s conscience constitutes a weighty and relevant
factor in deciding whether or not to grant an exemption, just how weighty and relevant that
reason is or should be remains unhelpfully unclear – especially when considered amongst
competing reasons for granting or not granting an exemption.
For example, Nehushtan admits that the unjustifiably prejudiced and intolerant
content of a conscience as a reason “is not necessarily compelling,” yet ought to be
understood as a “relevant, presumably weighty justification that should be included within
the balance of reasons.”346 If this is true, then how strong – or for that matter, how helpful –
is the content non-neutral conclusion of either approach described above? The contentbased reason for withholding an exemption may be relevant and weighty, but how relevant
and how weighty? Other reasons included within the balance of reasons could very well be
like legitimate governmental interests in a liberal society: not necessarily equally weighty
or equally important.347 So, if the reason isn’t necessarily compelling and is categorized as
346
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just one reason among many within the balance of reasons, then it can end up being
marginally relevant and weighty. In the end, then, how helpful and how much does the antireligious or anti-intolerance approach really accomplish if content-based reasons are
marginally relevant and weighty within the balance of reasons?
Nehushtan’s reply to the concern about the weight of the content-based reason will
vary according to whether one adopts what he calls “the narrow thesis” or “the broad
thesis.” Concerning the narrow thesis, he writes:
According to what I shall call ‘the narrow thesis’, if claims for religiousconscientious exemptions are based directly on intolerant values, beliefs and
conscience, or on values that utterly undermine the rationales for tolerance,
the state has a strong, normally prevailing reason not to grant the exemption.
This view does not accord any weight to the fact that the conscientious
objection is based on religious beliefs. It also does not take a stand against
religion as such. Nevertheless, even within the narrow thesis, it is important
to acknowledge the existence of the links between certain religions and
intolerance. These links should lead authorities to apply a cautious, perhaps
suspicious attitude towards religious requests for conscientious exemptions,
even though the decision would have to be made mainly on a case-by-case
basis, that is, according to the content of the values that ground each and
every conscientious objection, be it religious or not.348
are not necessarily equally weighty or equally important. No principle prevents a liberal-democratic state
from setting a hierarchy of values or rights or giving a priori priority to certain rights over others.” (148-49)
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From this paragraph, we can note a few things. First, the content-based reason is
considered “normally prevailing” when the conscience belief in question is “based directly
on intolerant values” – or based directly “on values that utterly undermine the rationales
for tolerance.” Unfortunately, there is no further discussion about the kinds of reasons that
might count against this otherwise “normally prevailing,” content-based reason. Given the
above description, it seems clear that adopting “the narrow thesis” implies the antiintolerance approach over the anti-religious approach. Under the narrow thesis, what
matters is whether the conscience belief in question is based on unjustified intolerant
values – regardless of its religiosity – such that each request for an exemption must be
made “on a case-by-case basis.” Moreover, Nehushtan thinks that, given the strong link
between religious beliefs, prejudice, and intolerance, authorities should “apply a cautious,
perhaps suspicious attitude towards religious requests for conscientious exemptions.” That
is, he argues that, under the narrow thesis, we should treat all conscientious objectors the
same before the law in the sense that they must all be ran through the same legal
mechanism to determine the permissibility of granting an exemption. But when a religious
objector comes along, authorities should be comparatively more suspicious. If I am right
that we should be skeptical that religious conscience beliefs possess a uniquely strong tie to
unjustified prejudice and intolerance, then his conclusion here would be unreasonably
discriminatory against religious believers.
The second part of Nehushtan’s answer to the question about the weight of the
content-based reason concerns what he calls “the broad thesis.” Though Nehushtan does
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not “argue which of these two theses is preferable,” he admittedly tends “to favor the broad
rather than the narrow thesis.”349 Concerning to the broad thesis, Nehustan writes:
According to what I shall call ‘the broad thesis’, the state has a good reason,
although not necessarily a prevailing one, not to grant religious conscientious
exemptions, even in cases where the claims to be granted exemptions are not
based directly on intolerant values, beliefs or conscience. The state may have
such a reason because of the special links between certain religions and
intolerance. The stronger the link regarding a certain religion, the stronger is
the reason not to grant religious conscientious exemptions to its adherents.
The broad thesis assumes that the tolerant-liberal state has a right both to
strengthen its liberal, secular nature and to discourage its citizens from
choosing a religious way of life. The broad thesis suggests that granting
conscientious exemptions to religious objectors who act upon a conscience
that is not intolerant may still support, even if indirectly institutions or
practices of that religion that are intolerant.350
We should note a few things about adopting the broad thesis as well. First, the old
problem about how relevant and weighty the content-based reason is within the balance of
reasons returns – showing again that Nehusthan’s claims about this content-based reason
aren’t that helpful. In fact, this particular problem may be worse under the broad thesis
insofar as the reason can be considered relevant “even in cases where the claims to be
granted exemptions are not based directly on intolerant values.” Unfortunately, the
349
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relevance and weight of the content-based reason is already ambiguous. But under the
broad thesis, whether or not the particular conscience belief actually violates contentbased concerns would be uniquely and additionally ambiguous. After all, the content-based
reason would now be considered relevant even in cases where the claim in question is
based even indirectly on intolerant values – whatever that might look like. Lastly, if I am
right that we should doubt that religious conscience beliefs possess a uniquely strong tie to
prejudice and intolerance, then the state would seemingly have reason not to grant any sort
of conscientious exemption in cases where the claims in question are based even indirectly
on intolerant values. Such a conclusion, taken at face value, seems overreaching.
Sadly, Nehushtan never quite answers whether the content-based reason “should be
a uniquely strong reason” and even admits that this “is a question yet to be resolved.”351
While he thinks that there is nevertheless “a strong case” for regarding the content-based
reason as “a relevant reason,” the “question yet to be answered” remains: should the
content-based reason merely be “a relevant factor to be considered” or should it be “a
relatively weighty reason?”352 This is a problem for both anti-religious and anti-intolerance
approaches. Nehushtan notes that both the narrow and broad theses “entail an evaluative,
normative judgment which identifies either the intolerant content of a person’s religious
conscience, the intolerant nature of a certain religion, or the intolerant practice of that
religion.”353 And if I am right that we ought to adopt an anti-intolerance approach over an
anti-religious approach under the assumption of Nehushtan’s first premise, then either
351
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thesis would instead entail an evaluative, normative judgment which identifies either the
intolerant content of a person’s conscience, the intolerant nature of a certain ideology, or
the intolerant practice of that ideology. Yet, the problem about the relevance and
weightiness of content-based reasons would show up here too: just how relevant or how
weighty should content-based reasons be if we discover unjustifiably intolerant content in
a person’s conscience belief, practice, or ideology?
V. Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided further support for my central claim – namely, that
because religious conscience beliefs are sufficiently similar to other conscience beliefs,
there is no good reason to treat them differently before the law. In particular, I narrowed in
on three further, possibly delineating features of the religious conscience that theorists
take to be legally relevant. First, I investigated whether religious conscience beliefs are
more central to our identity – and relatedly, whether they are more central to our moral
integrity. Ultimately, I argued that both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs are
sufficiently central to our identity and moral integrity such that there is no obvious reason
to grant preferential legal treatment to one over the other. Second, I investigated whether
religious conscience beliefs are more primordial, unchosen, or non-voluntary. I claimed
that granting legal exemptions on the grounds that the belief or practice in question is
primordial or non-voluntary is problematic for at least three reasons. First, I argued that
non-voluntariness should not be classified as a necessary condition for obtaining a legal
exemption. Second, I argued that non-voluntariness should not be understood as a
sufficient condition for obtaining a legal exemption either. And third, I argued that, even if
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we grant non-voluntariness as a sufficient condition, it should not be understood as the
only sufficient condition for obtaining a legal exemption.
As I ended the chapter, I investigated whether religious conscience beliefs are
uniquely linked to unjustified intolerance and prejudice such that differential treatment
before the law is warranted. I argued that both religious and nonreligious conscience
beliefs plausibly have similar propensities for unjustified prejudice and intolerance such
that unequal treatment before the law is, in fact, unwarranted. First, I argued that
unjustified prejudice and intolerance are similarly correlated to religious and nonreligious
conscience beliefs insofar as the driving force behind the prejudice and intolerance is, at
least in principle, shared by both kinds of conscience. Second, I argued that we should
doubt that religious conscience beliefs enjoy a uniquely strong in-practice-link to
unjustified prejudice and intolerance. If these claims are right, then I argued that we should
accept the anti-intolerance approach over an exclusively anti-religious approach under the
assumption of Nehushtan’s first premise. And when the anti-intolerance approach is
adopted, we have no reason to treat religious conscientious objectors with special, negative
treatment. Nevertheless, I concluded by highlighting a further problem for both the antireligious approach and the anti-intolerance approach: just how relevant or how weighty
should content-based reasons be in the exemption calculus if we discover unjustifiably
intolerant content in a person’s conscience belief, practice, or ideology?

150
CHAPTER 5: OBJECTIONS TO THE EGALITARIAN RESPONSE
A strategy of mandatory religious exemptions…puts religionists and secularists at war with
one another, with the former claiming a right to be free from laws that the latter must obey.
By contrast, a strategy for protecting religion under broader umbrellas of rights and
immunities makes religionists and secularists into partners in developing a workable theory
of the limited state.
– Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People, p. 180
I. Introduction
Having argued for the Egalitarian Response, in the last chapter I address several
lurking objections to this position. In the first section, I address the multifaceted critique of
the Egalitarian Response advanced by Kathleen Brady. In particular, I address her claims
that: religious conscience beliefs should enjoy special legal treatment because they enjoy a
distinct relationship with the divine; that accepting the Egalitarian Response results in
weaker protections for both religious and secular conscience beliefs; and that accepting the
Egalitarian Response limits liberty more broadly and religious liberty in particular. In the
second section, I address the Feasibility Objection which worries that the implications of
accepting this response may be pragmatically or legally unworkable – possibly leading to
something like legal anarchy. There, I discuss responses to this objection raised by Douglas
Laycock and Nadia Sawicki. In the final section, I offer two responses to the
Underinclusiveness Objection as raised by Simon May – which just claims that there is no
principled moral reason to grant legal accommodations to conscience beliefs that are not
equally good reason to grant legal accommodations to non-moral projects.
II. Kathleen Brady’s Objections
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In her book The Distinctiveness of Religion in American Law, Kathleen Brady
advances a multifaceted critique of the Egalitarian Response to the original specialness
question. In this section, I will detail her most salient objections and respond to them in
turn.
A. Religion’s Distinctive Relationship with the Divine
Contrary to the Egalitarian Response, Brady contends that “religious beliefs and
practices are distinctive” and that “the distinctive character of religious belief and practice
has implications for the relationship between religion and government.”354 Concerning the
basis of their distinctiveness, she writes:
Unlike secular commitments, [religious beliefs and practices] involve the
relationship of persons with the divine. Humans have the ability to reflect on
their existence and the larger world of which they are a part, and as they do
so, they confront the ground or source of all that is as a question and concern.
We are all oriented to the divine. For the religious person, however, this
orientation has become a relationship. The divine is not just a question or
concern. The divine is present to them as something good and trustworthy,
and the religious person seeks union or communion with the divine as
humanity’s highest end. Salvation or liberation or fulfillment inheres in this
connection, and through union or communion with the divine, humanity’s
deepest existential threats are overcome. Death is overcome as human
finitude is taken up into the infinite. So are the threats of meaninglessness
and guilt. In the divine, the religious believer understands himself and the
354
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world as they really are and should be. Life takes on meaning and is given
purpose. The believer shares in what is eternal, absolute, and perfect. For the
believer, all of life is lived in light of this relationship, and it reaches deep into
the many facets of human thought and experience.355
According to Brady, what distinguishes religious beliefs and practices from their
secular counterparts is roughly the following: religious beliefs and practices involve
seeking union or communion with the divine – which is humanity’s highest end and the
ground or source of all that is. Beyond this, the divine is also described as being good,
trustworthy, eternal, absolute, perfect, able to bring salvation, liberation, or fulfilment
when united with, and able to overcome humanity’s deepest existential threats like
meaninglessness, purposelessness, and guilt. Moreover, when united with the divine, the
religious believer “understands himself and the world as they really are and should be” and
their whole life is “lived in light of this relationship.”
Moreover, Brady argues that religious and secular convictions are further
differentiated insofar as they could never be “functional equivalents or fully analogous
even when the latter take the form of moral commitments that are deeply held, central to
personal identity, or meaning-giving.”356 In other words, Brady would not agree that
religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs can be functional equivalents in the way that
they were in Seeger and Welsh for example. We should note, however, that being functional
equivalents and being fully analogous are different. As was decided in Seeger and Welsh, it
seems like religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs can be functional equivalents while
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only being sufficiently analogous to one another. The different modes of conscience could,
for example, be differently insulated from certain kinds of evidence – rendering them not
fully analogous – yet sufficiently similar such that they would qualify as functional
equivalents before the law. What’s important for our present purposes is not necessarily
whether or not religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs can be equally analogous but
whether they are sufficiently functionally equivalent for purposes of determining their
comparative legal treatment. As emphasized above, Brady’s central reason for believing in
their functional inequality is that “religious beliefs and practices, unlike secular ones, are
always inseparable from the believer’s encounter with the divine.”357
So, the connectedness – the union or communion – that religious beliefs have with
the divine seems to be the central feature that Brady takes as distinguishing religious
conscience from secular conscience before the law. After all, religion in general is
“different” insofar as the object of religious belief is, in some sense, the divine – “the source
and ground of all that is.”358 While it’s true that “religious belief involves moral conviction
and commitment” in the same way that secular belief does, Brady thinks that religious
belief involves “more than that” – indeed, it involves the very “source of obligation.”359 So,
Brady’s first reason for not adopting the Egalitarian Response is that religious conscience
beliefs uniquely possess the distinctive feature of union with the divine that justifies
affording them special legal treatment.
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In response to Brady’s first objection, we can ask a few questions. First, while it
seems plausible to understand union with the divine as a sufficient condition for ‘religion,’
is it necessary? Second, if it is necessary for a belief system to invoke some concept of the
‘divine’ in order to be counted as a ‘religion,’ is Brady’s concept of the ‘divine’ adequate for
legal purposes? We’ll consider each of these questions in turn.
First, while Brady’s “union with the divine” may be a sufficient condition for
‘religion,’ is it necessary? To answer, let’s consider Confucianism – an Eastern system of
belief that many intuitively count as a ‘religion.’ If it is a religion, and if Brady is right that
religions distinctively seek union or communion with the divine, then we should expect
Confucianism to distinctively seek union or communion with the divine. Interestingly,
religion scholar Stephen Prothero argues that Confucianism actually distinguishes itself
from other world religions by its explicit “lack of interest in the divine.”360 He writes:
[Confucianism’s] adherents speak of an impersonal force called Heaven that
watches over human life and legitimates the authority of rulers, and they
have been known to revere the quasi-divine sage emperors of golden ages
past. But they pay about as much attention to the creator God as your
average atheist, and even less to formal theology. The Analects, which refer
no fewer than eighteen times to an impersonal Heaven, do not once use
personal terms for God popular in pre-Confucian China. Before Confucius,
Chinese thinkers were more likely to speak of Heaven than Earth. After
Confucius it was the other way around. To this day, Confucians are
preoccupied with humans rather than gods, and with life before death rather
360
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than life after it. Their concerns are ethical rather than eschatological,
practical rather than metaphysical.361
Given the explicit lack of interest in a personal creator God, formal theology,362 life
after death, eschatology, and metaphysics, it’s easy to see why, at least at face value,
Confucianism is described as “lacking interest in the divine.” If it’s true that Confucianism
lacks a strong relationship or union with the divine as understood by Brady, then we either
have a counterexample to Brady’s distinguishing feature of religion or else Confucianism
isn’t really a religion after all.
Prothero tries to answer this dilemma by giving us reason to believe that a
necessary feature of all religions is the application of some concept of the ‘divine’ within its
broader system and, subsequently, that Confucianism might be a religion after all:
This [lack of interest in the ‘divine’] might make the Confucian project sound
secular, but it makes more sense to see it as a thisworldly religion – an
attempt to find the sacred hidden in plain sight in the profane or, as the
contemporary Confucian thinker Tu Weiming puts it, “to regard the everyday
human world as profoundly spiritual.” If religion is about the sacred as
opposed to the profane, the spirit as opposed to matter, the Creator as
opposed to the created, Confucianism plainly does not qualify. But perhaps
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what we are to learn from this tradition is not that Confucianism is not a
religion but that not all religious people parse the sacred and the secular the
way Christians do.363
Thus, Prothero seems to think that Confucianism just rejects an “otherworldly”
interpretation of the ‘divine’ and embraces a “thisworldly” interpretation of the ‘divine’
instead. What this tells us is that Confucianism still embraces some concept of the ‘divine’ –
just not a particularly theistic or otherworldly version of it “the way Christians do.”364
Perhaps the example of Confucianism can serve as good evidence that implementing some
notion of the ‘divine’ is necessary for all religions even though they may differ on what the
‘divine’ really amounts to. Put another way, perhaps a necessary condition for all religions
is that they contain this basic sacred-secular divide where what is sacred is understood as
‘divine’ even though where the sacred-secular dividing line falls may differ from religion to
religion. In Christianity for example, the sacred-secular divide seems to fall between the
Augustinian eternal “City of God” and the temporal “City of Man,” but from the Confucian
perspective, the sacred and secular are “forever trespassing upon and interpenetrating
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each other.”365 Both systems of belief can therefore be plausibly understood as ‘religions’
since they similarly rely upon a sacred-secular divide even though they differ on where the
‘divine’ line is drawn.
Up to this point, we have noted that it is plausible to think that when a belief system
posits the existence of the ‘divine’ – i.e., some sacred-secular divide – it can be counted as a
‘religion.’ But this divinity feature also seems necessary for demarcating a religion: after all,
it is difficult to conceive of a religion that fails to posit anything as divine and fails to draw
any sort of sacred-secular divide. Even Confucianism – a belief system that some take to be
just “a philosophy, ethic, or way or life” and not “a religion at all”366 – may posit some basic
concept of the ‘divine’ and sacred-secular divide. So it seems that Brady was right to think
that one of the demarcating features of religion, at least in some sense, involved reference
to the divine or sacred-secular divide. However, even when we think that it is necessary for
a belief system to posit some concept of the ‘divine’ in order to be counted as a ‘religion,’
we must ask the further question: is Brady’s particular concept of the ‘divine’ adequate for
legal purposes?
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To best answer this, we must remember that Brady takes the demarcating of
religious beliefs to be that they involve a “relationship of persons with the divine.” And
again, that the ‘divine’ according to Brady involves the following sorts of features:
– It is the ground or source of all that is as a question and concern and is
eternal, absolute, and perfect.
– All humans are oriented to the divine, but persons who have a
“relationship” with it – i.e., “union or communion with it” – are considered
‘religious.’ For the believer, all of life is lived in light of this relationship to the
divine, and it reaches deep into the many facets of human thought and
experience.
– For those with a relationship with the divine, it is not just a question or
concern, but present to them as something good and trustworthy.
– Union or communion with the divine is humanity’s highest end, and
salvation and liberation inheres this union.
– Additionally, humanity’s deepest existential threats of meaninglessness and
guilt are overcome with meaning and purpose through union or communion
with the divine.
– Through union or communion with the divine, the religious believer
understands himself and the world as they really are and should be.
Given the above, I doubt that Brady’s concept of the ‘divine’ is adequate for legal
purposes because Brady seemingly understands the ‘divine’ as narrowly theistic – and even
vaguely Christian. Perhaps most importantly, not every religion takes the divine to be as
personal, relatable, or communal as Brady does. Additionally, Brady’s account of the divine
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sounds overly theistic in that it seemingly relies on the “notion of a transcendent Creator
calling the shots from on high” insofar as the divine is described as eternal, absolute,
perfect, and the source and ground of all that is. Unfortunately, this notion of a
transcendent Creator is something that is as foreign to the Eastern religion of Confucianism
“as Confucianism is to most Western readers.”367 Interestingly, Prothero notes that “the
closest Confucians get to Western notions of a transcendent and ‘wholly other’ God is the
notion of Heaven (tian), which, while impersonal, nonetheless seems to have a will.”368
If it’s true that Brady takes ‘divine’ to roughly mean theistic God, then her concept of
‘divine’ will be clearly underinclusive for purposes of the law. This underinclusive notion of
‘divine’ would, for example, likely not recognize Confucianism as a religion since its concept
of the ‘divine’ is non-theistic. If Brady understood ‘divine’ to mean something that included
theism as well as other ways of parsing out the sacred-secular divide (e.g., pantheism), then
her subsequent definition of ‘religion’ would likely better represent what religion actually
is and would be more appropriate for legal purposes. While Brady is probably right that
‘religion’ necessarily invokes some notion of the ‘divine,’ she is nevertheless wrong if she
understands the ‘divine’ as basically theistic – or even vaguely Christian.
Furthermore, if Brady’s concept of the ‘divine’ is, in fact, narrowly theistic, then
Brady’s argument for the distinctiveness of the religious conscience would be predicated
upon a metaethical assumption that, if false, would largely undermine her position. In other
words, if Brady’s moral ontology is predicated upon the truthfulness of theism insofar as
she understands the divine to be the “source of obligation” – indeed, the very “ground or
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source of all that is as a question and concern” – then her argument for the distinctiveness
of religious conscience will fall apart is these assumptions turn out to be wrong. If it turns
out that theism is false – or that her particular metaethical assumption about the divine’s
relationship to moral ontology is false – then her whole account would be largely, if not
entirely, undermined.
Moreover, even if we suppose that her metaethical assumptions are true, then it’s
still not clear that nonreligious conscientious objectors should be treated differently before
the law. Even if we grant that a nonreligious conscientious objection is predicated on a
faulty metaethical view, specifically a faulty moral ontology, this does not seem to imply
that we should treat their conscientious objection altogether differently before the law. The
nonreligious conscientious objection would, if Brady’s assumptions are granted, still be
drawing on the divine in at least some, indirect way because they are citing a moral
obligation as the grounds for their requested exemption. The only difference between the
nonreligious conscientious objector and the religious conscientious objector would be that
the latter knows and acknowledges the true source of obligation whereas the former would
fail to know and acknowledge the true source of obligation.
At best, withholding legal privileges in the form of exemptions from conscientious
objectors drawing from the incorrect metaethics would be intolerant, failing to uphold the
“skepticism and humility that we owe one another as compatriots in a pluralistic
society.”369 After all, tolerance requires, as Brian Leiter argues, not merely being indifferent
toward some group, but actively putting up with the perceivably wrong, mistaken, or
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undesirable beliefs and actions of that group.370 Thus, a tolerant attitude toward
conscientious objectors would seemingly allow them the opportunity to be wrong by
permitting a legal exemption in some cases. Otherwise, we may run the risk of a kind of
“totalization of morality” on the part of the government.371 Not only so, but we should also
remember that every conscientious objection – drawing from the true metaethics or not –
requires a degree of tolerance insofar as every conscientious objection is requesting an
exemption from a law that is otherwise taken to be correct or justified. As Yossi Nehustan
notes, the “very fact that a conscientious exemption is granted from a legal rule
presupposes that the state does not share the conscientious objector’s values or his way of
balancing them.”372 In fact, the state “thinks that it would be unbearable and indeed
intolerable if everyone shared the objector’s kind of conscience and reasoning; otherwise,
the exemption would be the general rule rather than an exemption from it.”373 So, tolerance
is required to grant any legal exemption to any kind of conscientious objector – even in
cases when the law is wrong and the conscientious objector is right.
B. Weaker Protections for Religious Belief
Brady also contends that perhaps the “biggest danger with equalizing the treatment
of religious and nonreligious conscience” involves collapsing the distinction between
religious and nonreligious belief.374 She argues that by undermining the distinctiveness of
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religious beliefs and collapsing their distinction from nonreligious beliefs, we end up
forfeiting “the most compelling reasons for protecting both religious and secular
convictions.”375 To see why she thinks that adopting the Egalitarian Response will lead to
weaker protections for religious beliefs in particular, consider the following:
…as we collapse the distinction between religious and nonreligious belief,
religion begins to disappear. We no longer see it for what it is, and it is
replaced by the analogous category, whether it is deep-seated convictions
about right and wrong, fundamental choices about the meaning and direction
of one’s life, central components of personal identity, or something else. For
some, religion collapses even further and becomes, just like secular
commitments seem, merely an interest, an exercise in autonomy, a
preference, or a feeling. When religious conviction becomes just an interest, a
preference, or a choice, it often receives very little protection beyond
protection against discrimination based on the content of the choice. As
Brian Leiter concludes, no claims of conscience should receive exemptions
from burdens on others. Even when religion is somewhat more than that, it is
not what it really is. It is not about a relationship with the divine. It is not
about the effort of persons to connect with the ground and source of all that
is and, indeed, to share in the eternal. Religion becomes morality, but religion
is more than that. It is about the source of morality and everything else. It is
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not just about right and wrong, meaning and identity. It is about what
grounds and informs all of these. 376
So, Brady’s second reason for not adopting the Egalitarian Response seems to be the
following: accepting the Egalitarian Response would inevitably lead to weaker protections
for religious beliefs – including religious conscience beliefs. How does she reach this
conclusion? She begins by arguing that, by accepting the Egalitarian Response, we end up
collapsing the distinction between religious and nonreligious belief. And when we collapse
the distinction between them, ‘religion’ so understood will disappear and be replaced by an
analogous category. And when ‘religion’ so understood begins to disappear and be replaced
by an analogous category, the legal protections for religious beliefs are undermined
because the analogous category, it is argued, would fail to possess features sufficient for the
strong sort of legal protections once enjoyed by religion.
In response to Brady here, we can say a few things. First, I think Brady is right to
think that religious beliefs are not simply deep-seated convictions about right and wrong,
fundamental choices about the meaning and direction of one’s life, of the central
components of personal identity. Of course, religious beliefs involve ontological and
epistemological beliefs about what’s real and knowable as well, and so involve further
dimensions than those listed above. Second, we should not think that secular moral beliefs
and commitments, which include secular conscience beliefs, are simply exercises in
autonomy, preferences, or mere choices. Both religious and secular conscience beliefs can,
in principle, be non-voluntarily formed and upheld as well as voluntarily formed and
upheld. Not only so, but both religious and secular conscience beliefs are, in practice,
376
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similarly formed and upheld as well – involving mixed elements of voluntariness and nonvoluntariness. We should, therefore, be careful not to see one kind of conscience belief as
largely different in nature from the other.
Third, Brady worries that, if religious convictions were to become just an interest, a
preference, or a choice, it may often receive “very little protection beyond protection
against discrimination based on the content of the choice.” Elsewhere, I have argued that
the role that choices plays in conscience beliefs – i.e., whether they were voluntarily formed
and upheld or not – should not affect the permissibility of granting a legal exemption. More
specifically, I argued that non-voluntariness should not be classified as a necessary or
sufficient condition for granting a legal exemption. So, not only do I doubt that secular
convictions are more of a mere interest, preference, or choice when compared to religious
convictions, I also doubt that they should be treated with very little legal protection for
being voluntarily formed and upheld.
Fourth, it seems like we can similarly afford special legal treatment to secular
conscience beliefs in a way that would not involve replacing the category of ‘religion’ with
another category. We could, for example, jointly afford strong legal protections for the
Freedom of Religion and the Freedom of Conscience. As Kevin Vallier states, we could
“upgrade respect for nonreligious comprehensive and moral belief to the level presently
extended to religious belief” in order to grant freedom of conscience the same legal status
now enjoyed by religious freedom.377 Though these two freedoms overlap conceptually,
they are not the same and do not pick out the same concept overall – so one, conjoining
legal category would likely be underinclusive. Disentangling the Freedom of Religion and
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the Freedom of Conscience actually helps us to see that we can have good reasons to afford
special legal treatment to both religious and conscience beliefs and that we can have good
reasons to adopt the Egalitarian Response at the same time. While the Egalitarian Response
tells us that religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs should be treated equally before
the law, this is separate from how it is that we think religious and conscience beliefs should
both be treated more generally. Determining how they both ought to be treated is a
separate question from determining whether we think they should be treated equally. So,
contrary to Brady, I think it is possible to believe that religious conscience beliefs in
particular should not receive comparatively special legal treatment over and above their
nonreligious counterparts while at the same time believe that religious beliefs more
broadly, like conscience beliefs, should be granted a basically special legal status.
Lastly, I want to point out that, even if some analogous category did replace religion
in the way that Brady fears, the features of that analogous category would likely be
sufficient to warrant a basically legal status for that category anyway. Following Brady, this
new, analogous legal category would probably contain deep-seated convictions about right
and wrong, fundamental choices about the meaning and direction of one’s life, and the
central components of personal identity. Or, to put it differently, this category would
probably include basic “core or meaning-giving beliefs and commitments.”378 But consider
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this: if a legal category constituted by deep-seated convictions about right and wrong,
fundamental choices about the meaning and direction of one’s life, and the central
components of personal identity – i.e., core or meaning-giving beliefs and commitments –
isn’t worthy of a basically special legal status, then what sort of category is? As such, I think
that if some analogous category did replace religion in the way that Brady fears – though I
don’t think that it should for conceptual reasons – the features of that analogous category
would likely be sufficient to warrant a basically legal status for that category anyway.
C. Weaker Protections for Secular Conscience
While it is clear that Brady affirms the distinctiveness of religious conscience beliefs,
she nevertheless thinks that this position does not necessarily imply “that we should not
care about secular convictions.”379 Interestingly, she argues that “the more we appreciate
the distinctiveness of religion, the more we will appreciate the worth of secular
conscience.”380 Relatedly, she argues that “the stronger foundation for protecting secular
convictions is not equity norms, but rather the unique attributes of religion.”381 She writes:
…understanding religion’s uniqueness allows us to see strong reasons for
protecting secular conscience that are not available to those who view
religious and secular conscience as functional equivalents. Contemporary
judgment, and to conduct their life – in short, to constitute a moral identity for themselves. Core beliefs and
commitments, which we will also call ‘convictions of conscience’, include both deeply held religious and
secular beliefs and are distinguished from the legitimate but less fundamental ‘preferences’ we display as
individuals.” (13)
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demands for equal treatment reflect a failure to understand the differences
between religious and nonreligious convictions, but they also reflect the
intuition that secular moral commitments are also worthy of respect and
protection. This intuition is correct, but we can see this most clearly when we
retain an appreciation for the uniqueness of religious claims. Collapsing the
distinction between religious and secular conscience obscures the full worth
of secular commitments and with it some of our most compelling reasons for
protecting them.382
Brady’s idea here seems to be as follows: as appreciation for the distinctiveness of
religion increases, appreciation for the worth of secular conscience also increases. That is,
Brady argues that the distinctiveness of religion and the worth of secular conscience are
directly proportional. Not only so, but she thinks that we possess “strong reasons” – indeed
what she labels as the “most compelling reasons” – for protecting secular conscience that
are unavailable to us unless we affirm the distinctiveness of religious conscience. She
worries that, if we end up collapsing the strong distinction between religious and secular
conscience, then we’ll end up obscuring the “full worth” of secular conscience beliefs and
forfeiting the “most compelling reasons for protecting them.”
So what exactly are these strong and most compelling reasons for protecting the full
worth of secular conscience beliefs that we seem to lose when we deny the distinctiveness
of religion? To understand Brady on this point, consider the following:
Indeed, when religion disappears, the full worth of secular conscience does
too, and secular commitments are no longer understood as what they can
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also be. Secular moral commitments and religious convictions are not
equivalents. They are not fully analogous. However, secular conscience and
religious conscience are related. Religious conscience engages the divine
directly. For the nonbeliever, the divine is rarely completely absent, but it is
unseen and unacknowledged. It is presumed but not recognized. It is implied,
but not knowingly. This divine referent gives secular moral commitment a
special dignity as well. They are not mere interests or preferences or
exercises of autonomy. They are judgments about right and wrong and
human flourishing, and they are also more than that. In secular conscience,
the divine is intimated, and what is sought by the believer is embraced
indirectly.383
And here:
The relationship between religious and secular conscience can be seen most
easily when secular commitments take the form of judgments about right
and wrong, what is required or forbidden, that make demands on individuals
that the individual experiences as transcending self-interest and personal
preference…For the nonbeliever who experiences these demands, the
judgment that a particular course of action is right or wrong, and right or
wrong in such a way that they have no choice but to follow, implies some
foundation for right and wrong. It implies that there is some order to the
world and human relationship that we must respect and follow. It also
presumes the fact that humans are moral agents who have been made with
383
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the capacity to understand the concepts of right and wrong and to desire
what is good, to seek it, and to embrace it when it is found. The exercise of
human moral agency refers, if only implicitly, to the divine. It implies a moral
order and a ground to this order, and it implies a ground that invites – indeed
requires that we act not as automatons or by instinct, but as persons who are
responsible for our actions. We must make moral choices, and when we do,
we do not create right and wrong. We discern it, and what we discern we
must follow. We have been created for moral freedom, but it is a freedom
that discovers and responds rather than makes and creates.384
In sum, Brady contends that the secular moral conscience, though not engaging the
divine directly, possesses a special dignity – i.e., is afforded full worth and strong and
compelling reasons for legal protection – insofar as its judgements about right and wrong
and human flourishing unknowingly refer back to and intimate the divine.385 She is, at the
very least, clear about holding this position: “the divine is implicit even in secular moral
reasoning as the ground of this reasoning and of human freedom itself, and this implicit
reference to the divine gives secular conscience a weight and significance that requires
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respect from the state.”386 This position seems misguided for a few reasons. First, as was
noted above, Brady’s position makes strong metaethical assumptions involving theism that,
if false, would largely if not totally undermine her position. We should note, too, that she
seems to go even further with these assumptions insofar as she takes things like human
moral agency and the broader moral order to refer, if only implicitly, to the divine as
well.387
Second, I think there are ways of affording a sufficient amount of worth or dignity to
secular conscience beliefs other than having them unknowingly reference and intimate the
divine. I actually think that Brady makes such an argument. For example, Brady seems to
imply that the value of secular conscience beliefs is at least partly derived from their being
obligatory in nature – i.e., not a mere interest or preference or exercise of autonomy.
Secular conscience beliefs can likewise be beliefs about what is required or forbidden, and
can make demands on individuals that they experiences as transcending self-interest and
personal preference such that they are compelled to follow them. If this is true, then my
contention is that these beliefs can derive a sufficient amount of worth or dignity from
being obligatory in nature without unnecessarily or superfluously invoking a divinereferring moral ontology. In fact, the obligatoriness feature may be accessible to conscience
beliefs through some other, non-theistic moral ontology. If this is right, then Brady still
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needs to explain: (a) why having a divine referent makes a conscience belief attain its full
worth and dignity; (b) why the obligatoriness of a conscience belief fails to afford that
belief with at least a sufficient amount of worth or dignity in the context of a legal
exemption; and (c) why referencing the proper metaethics justifies affording special legal
treatment to some conscience belief – and vice versa.
D. The Objection from Religious Liberty
The last objection from Brady contends that accepting the Egalitarian Response will
limit liberty more broadly and religious liberty in particular. Brady contends that “equal
treatment” of religious and secular conscience “has often meant” only modest protections
for conscience overall, for many people who embrace the Egalitarian Response “have
rejected a right to exemption altogether.”388 This is true of Brian Leiter, for example, who
embraces both the Egalitarian Response and a version of the No Exemptions Approach.389
In short, Brady’s argument is that, by accepting the Egalitarian Response and extending
possible accommodations to secular conscience, liberty overall, and religious liberty by
extension, will likely be thwarted in order to protect against the possible overuse and
abuse of exemptions. The relationship between religious liberty and egalitarianism for
conscience, then, is believed to be inversely proportional: as egalitarianism for conscience
increases, religious liberty decreases. Brady writes:
Indeed, as I have shown, when we collapse the distinction between religious
and secular conscience, equality usually comes at the expense of liberty. It
does so because a robust right of exemptions like the one I defend in this
388
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book cannot feasibly be extended to all secular moral commitments or even
just those that are strongly held or deeply important to individuals. Equality
between religious and secular conscience would mean trading a strong right
of religious exemption for weaker protection overall.390
In response to Brady, we can simply argue that the inversely proportional
relationship that she is worried about need not and might not exist even if we accept the
Egalitarian Response. That is, it seems possible to accept the Egalitarian Response while at
the same time accepting a robust right to legal exemptions for both kinds of conscience. An
increase in equality need not imply a decrease in liberty. While the trend in the literature is
to accept the Egalitarian Response in conjunction with the sort of Leiter No Exemptions
Approach, we can nevertheless hold a logically possible, legally workable, and perhaps
morally required alternate view: the Egalitarian Response in conjunction with a sort of
Robust Exemptions Approach. This alternate view would simultaneously grant equality to
nonreligious conscientious objectors while continuing to uphold and protect religious and
conscience liberties through robust legal exemptions. It’s important to note, however, that
we would still have to answer the more central worry underlying this objection: what we
can call the worry about feasibility. The Feasibility Objection is what we will turn to next in
order to explain how the views I have expressed above are legally workable if adopted.
III. The Feasibility Objection
Even if the Egalitarian Response is principally justified, a relevant question remains:
are the implications of this paradigm pragmatically or legally unworkable? That is, would
this paradigm lead to too many exemptions or worse – something like legal anarchy? As
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Brady notes “already scholars worry about the chaotic potential of a right to exemption for
religious conscience,” so she questions whether “expanding the right to cover nonreligious
conscience would exacerbate this problem.”391 Similarly, Frederick Gedicks worries that
“[s]uch an expansion of the reach of exemptions…threatens to make them unworkable by
leaving too few people subject to the law.”392 Extending the reach of exemptions may
“seriously undermine the observance, and thus the effectiveness, of law.”393 There may not
be many accommodations for secular conscience now, but if equal protections are codified
into law, we can probably expect use and abuse of exemptions to increase. And in order to
protect against this, many have, as Brady notes, rejected a right to exemption altogether.
A. Laycock’s Response
Douglas Laycock holds a unique position within this debate insofar as he accepts the
Egalitarian Response yet denies that there is a feasibility problem. On the one hand,
Laycock straightforwardly claims that “[w]e should protect the moral commitments of
religious believers, and we should also protect the moral commitments of nonbelievers
when those commitments are held with religious intensity.”394 On the other hand, he seems
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to think that, even when we afford robust and equal protections to religious and secular
conscientious objectors alike, there simply “would not be many” conflicts involving viable
claims of secular conscience – thus ameliorating the worry about feasibility.395 So, Laycock
responds to the Feasibility Objection by rhetorically asking: what’s the problem?
How could Laycock think that feasibility concerns are a non-problem? At base,
Laycock argues that the Feasibility Objection falls flat because he thinks that nonbelievers
typically don’t hold many intense moral commitments – that is, obligations delivered from
conscience “that transcend his self-interest and his personal preferences and which he
experiences as so strong that he has no choice but to comply”396 – that are actually at odds
with the dominant morality reflected in governmental policy anyway. He elaborates:
Nonbelievers have many moral commitments, and they hold some of those
commitments with religious intensity. But they do not hold many intense
moral commitments that are at odds with the dominant morality reflected in
government policy. Nonbelievers tend to have a modern sensibility. They do
not draw their morality from ancient books written in a radically different
culture that lived with radically different technology and had a radically
different understanding of the world; they do not obey an omnipotent,
omniscient God whose commands may be beyond human understanding. On
the whole, nonbelievers take their morality from the same modern milieu

protect those moral obligations of nontheists that are functionally equivalent to the protected moral
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that drives democratic decision making and government regulation. It is no
accident that military service is the only prominent example where serious
claims of nontheistic conscientious objection have been litigated.397
Though nonbelievers hold many moral commitments, and some of which with
religious intensity, Laycock claims that nonbelievers nonetheless fail to hold many moral
commitments that are odds with the “dominant morality reflected in government policy.”
This “modern sensibility” of nonbelievers is reflected in the fact that their morality is
largely derived from the same backdrop of moral beliefs and values that drive democratic
decision making and government regulation – not ancient books or an omnipotent,
omniscient God. In other words, he thinks that the consciences of most nonbelievers
seemingly draw upon and apply the values of the dominant morality more often and to a
greater degree than religious consciences. Religious consciences, on the other hand, mostly
draw upon and apply the values of the morality found in ancient, religious texts. Since the
consciences of the nonreligious fail to deviate much from the dominant morality, Laycock
remarks that it’s no surprise, then, that the “only prominent example where serious claims
of nontheistic conscientious objection have been litigated” involve military conscription.
“No doubt cases would arise that do not involve military service,” writes Laycock, “but
there would not be many.”398
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Laycock’s central claims here are, of course, empirical. Unfortunately, Laycock offers
no evidence in support of these claims. Are we nevertheless justified in believing these
claims? Not only so, but if Laycock’s empirical claims are warranted, then should this
ameliorate the worries undergirding the Feasibility Objection overall?
In support of Laycock’s empirical claims, we can somewhat surprisingly turn to
Brian Leiter. Leiter similarly argues that requests for legal accommodations by
nonbelievers are just simply uncommon, and that “litigated cases overwhelmingly involve
claims of religious conscience.”399 In fact, Leiter goes as far as to say that, “while it is
arguable in a few cases that atheists or agnostics brought challenges to neutral, generally
applicable laws for burdening their ‘religious practice,’ it appears as if there is no clear
instance of an atheist or agnostic challenging ‘valid and neutral laws of general
applicability.’”400 In other words, Leiter claims that there are no clear cases in US

in an animal research lab, he is unlikely to be asked to violate his conscience. And if he seeks conscientious
objector protection for illegal acts of protest-- vandalism, destruction of labs, theft of lab animals, assaults on
researchers-- he will lose on compelling interest grounds, just as a religious objector would. No conscientious
objector, religious or secular, gets to impose his views on others or attack the persons or property of those
who disagree with him.” (171-72)
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jurisprudence401 where an atheist or agnostic has challenged valid and neutral laws of
general applicability. Such a conclusion should not be lightly noted. Perhaps Leiter’s finding
is due to the fact that nonreligious claims of conscience have few, explicit legal protections,
and so we should expect that this number is low. But this is a bad explanation, for the
nonreligious need not have legal protections already in place in order to challenge valid
and neutral laws of general applicability – e.g., Welsh and arguably Seeger. In fact, it seems
as though the absence of explicit legal protections would motivate more challenges from
atheists and agnostics.402 The worry undergirding the Feasibility Objection about an
increased number of claimants seems similarly misguided: if the nonreligious are not
challenging valid and neutral laws of general applicability now, why think that this number
will increase to an unfeasible level once protections are codified?
Nevertheless, justifying the counterfactual claim that the use and abuse of legal
exemptions might increase to unfeasible levels if expanded to protect nonreligious
conscientious objectors is really hard to do – and especially hard when the current litigated
cases “overwhelmingly involve claims of religious conscience” and there is “no clear
401
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instance of an atheist or agnostic challenging ‘valid and neutral laws of general
applicability.’” Perhaps this will change if we adopt the Egalitarian Response, but perhaps
not for the reasons that Laycock cites. After all, if nonreligious objections to valid and
neutral laws of general applicability are overwhelmingly absent now, what makes us think
they will increase to the point of unfeasibility in the future? Moreover, withholding equal
liberty and legal protections to nonreligious conscientious objectors because of an
unjustified counterfactual claim seems like bad policy in general. The existing positive
reasons for extending equal liberty and legal protections to secular conscientious objectors
simply seem stronger than the weaker, negative, counterfactual reasons we have for
withholding equal liberty and legal protections.
We started this section by highlighting the fact that scholars already “worry about
the chaotic potential of a right to exemption for religious conscience” and wonder whether
“expanding the right to cover nonreligious conscience would exacerbate this problem.”403
As a result of these worries, many have rejected a right to exemption altogether. However, I
agree with Laycock that this line of thinking “leads to the worst of all possible worlds – the
equality of universal suppression.”404 Unfortunately, the trend in the scholarship is to see
equality and liberty as inversely proportional: as equality increases, liberty decreases. This
trend is exemplified in Leiter, for example, who simultaneously adopts the Egalitarian
Response in addition to a No Exemptions Approach. I think we can – and should – do better
than that and offer equality without drastic costs to liberty. We can, I think, offer equal legal
protections for all forms of conscience without concerns of unworkability or legal anarchy.
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B. Sawicki’s Response
Nadia Sawicki offers an altogether different sort of response to concerns of
feasibility, arguing that we may have strong pragmatic reasons not to withhold
accommodations to religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs. More specifically, she
worries that the pragmatic implications of failing to adopt the Egalitarian Response and
adequately protect conscience beliefs may be unworkable. Sawicki notes that “we begin to
understand the pragmatic argument for legal accommodation of conscience” when we
“accept that an individual may be driven to act in accordance with her strong conscientious
beliefs regardless of the consequences.”405 As such, the basis of her argument for
accommodating conscience beliefs maintains “that a civil society is unlikely to function
effectively if it chooses to punish conscientious objectors.” She writes:
Punishment in a civil society can serve many purposes, among them
retribution, deterrence, and reform. However, punishing a person for acting
in accordance with her conscience rarely serves these purposes effectively.
First, because it is impossible to coerce belief against someone's wishes,
punishment of conduct motivated by conscientious belief is unlikely to result
in reform or rehabilitation. On a similar note, the threat of punishment is
unlikely to deter those acting on the basis of conscientious conviction. That
being said, some conscientious objectors (those who are more are
susceptible to the threat of punishment, perhaps because their moral
commitments are not as firm) may be swayed by the threat of legal penalty,
and may choose to comply with the law despite their conscience's voice to
405
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the contrary. What is the likely result for these persons, we might ask?
“Deterrence of those who lack the will to act on their convictions exacts a
terrible price. Their feeling that they have yielded to compulsion and violated
their most deeply held beliefs and principles may involve profound
resentment and loss of self-respect.” Finally, when it comes to retribution,
many believe that the retributive purposes of punishment are poorly served
by punishing individuals who act on the basis of moral compulsion rather
than self-interest or impulsiveness.406
Overall, Sawicki’s pragmatic argument for accommodating conscience beliefs
recognizes the punishment concerns raised above and responds accordingly. Of course, the
original Feasibility Objection still lurks insofar as “granting conscience-based exemptions
from legal obligations as a matter of course may wreak havoc on the state's ability to
maintain order.”407 But her point is that “the same can be said of a state that rejects claims
of conscience altogether.”408 Because a society cannot adopt laws that perfectly align with
all of its citizens’ beliefs, Sawicki contends that a “society must order itself in such a way as
to mediate between the interests of social order and the interests of citizens who might feel
disenfranchised by laws that violate their conscientious beliefs.”409 And perhaps the only
pragmatic and workable way to accomplish this, according to Sawicki, is to offer adequate
legal accommodations for religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs.
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IV. The Underinclusiveness Objection
The third and last objection raised against the Egalitarian Response can be
understood as the Problem of Underinclusivity. In short, this objection maintains that the
Egalitarian Response may not be egalitarian enough: perhaps other sorts of beliefs, desires,
motivations, concerns, projects, etc. should also enjoy an equal legal status with religious
and nonreligious conscience beliefs. Perhaps the most salient proponent of this objection is
Simon May. In his article “Exemptions for Conscience,” he argues that there “is nothing
special about moral conscience that would justify granting an exemption…that is not
shared by a variety of non-moral desires, motivations, concerns, or projects.”410 In other
words, he believes there is “no principled moral reason for a defeasible entitlement to
moral conscience-based exemptions that is not an equally good reason for a defeasible
entitlement to non-moral project-based exemptions.”411 The heart of this objection is that
the Egalitarian Response, in order to be truly egalitarian, must also extend legal
exemptions to non-moral projects in addition to religious and secular conscientious
objections. Hence, the Egalitarian Response may not be egalitarian enough.
A. The Moral Conscience Principle and the Unfairness Objection
As noted above, May is responding to the view that volitional conflicts involving
conscience beliefs – religious or otherwise – warrant special legal accommodations because
these individuals uniquely believe that “it would be wrong for her to do as the regulation
requires and therefore wishes not to comply.”412 Thus, a conflict of conscience would
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therefore be a subset of volitional conflicts more broadly insofar as the conscientious
objector would not merely wish not to perform the required action; they also believe that it
would be wrong to perform the required action. If we accept that the conflict between “the
demands of a law and the demands of a person’s sincere moral conscience constitute a
special type of volitional conflict” – indeed, one that’s importantly distinct from merely
frustrating one’s will in other ways – then we would accept what May calls the “Moral
Conscience principle.”413 This principle just claims that "a conflict between the demands of
a law and the demands of an individual’s sincere moral conscience, whether religious or
secular in content, provides [them] with a defeasible moral entitlement to an
exemption.”414
In response to the Moral Conscience principle, May levies the Unfairness Objection.
To understand and illustrate the objection, he has us consider three hypothetical young
friends who do not wish to serve in the military:
Angelica believes that it would be morally wrong for her to enlist because
that would be inconsistent with her religion’s strict pacifist views. She would
prefer to spend the two years preparing for the missionary work that her
community requires of its young adults. Unlike Angelica, Biko has no
religious beliefs. His opposition to military service is based in his belief that
the war is unjust. He sympathizes with the political ideals espoused by the
rebels and strongly identifies with the now-defunct radical organization from
which the separatist movement emerged and with which his family is closely
413
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associated. He believes that it would be morally wrong for him to enlist as
this would imply a lack of solidarity with the revolutionaries of the past and a
craven betrayal of his family’s radical tradition. In contrast to his friends,
Chester does not believe that it would be morally wrong to enlist. Instead, he
wishes not to serve in the military because it would interfere with his
development as a chess grandmaster. Already one of the best chess players in
the country, Chester cannot afford to lose two years of play at his age if he is
to stay competitive with other leading players around the world and have
any chance of becoming world champion.415
May adds that, since none of them fulfill the requirements for any category of nonvolitional exemption, “the law requires that they either enlist or face three years of
confinement in a minimum-security detention camp.”416 As you might expect, all three
“prefer to spend three years in detention to two years in the military, since they would then
be able to dedicate themselves to their respective studies— Angelica and Chester would
even be allowed out on furlough for important missionary activities and chess
tournaments.”417 Desiring to remain free rather than be jailed, all three friends end up
petitioning for exemptions.
Overall, the Unfairness Objection raised against the Moral Conscience principle just
argues that there is “no principled moral difference between the claims of Angelica and
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Biko, on the one hand, and Chester on the other.”418 In order to maintain the Moral
Conscience principle against the Unfairness Objection, May argues that we must “explain
what it is that makes a person’s conscientious commitments different from her various
non-moral projects”419 – and we should add: that differentiates conscientious commitments
in way that warrants special legal treatment.
Is there some other noteworthy feature that might differentiate a person’s
conscientious commitments from their non-moral projects in a way that warrants special
legal treatment? May has us consider four potentially distinguishing features. First, he
considers that a person’s moral conscience may uniquely warrant accommodation in that
“it imposes categorical demands.”420 In response, May argues that Chester’s ambition to
become world champion also “imposes categorical demands on his life, demands that he
experiences as volitional necessities on a par with his moral beliefs.”421 Second, May
considers whether a person’s moral conscience uniquely warrants accommodations insofar
as it “engages her capacity to reflect on the ultimate meaning of life.”422 May contends that
Chester’s love for chess can similarly engage his capacity to reflect on the ultimate meaning
of life. After all, “chess is not just a game for Chester,” for he understands it as a “most vivid
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manifestation of the awesome beauty of the mathematical universe” and a “profound
philosophical lesson in the significance of free will and the spark of genius.”423
Third, May wonders whether one’s “intense desire to act morally” might
differentiate the conscientious objector from the non-moral plan objector.424 May claims
that Chester’s desire to play chess at the highest levels is arguably “as intensely felt as the
desires of his friends – indeed, they are far more likely to waiver in their opposition to
conscription than he is in his.”425 Lastly, May has us consider whether a person’s moral
conscience warrants special legal accommodations insofar as “moral commitments are
central to her identity.”426 He quickly disperses of this possibly distinguishing feature by
pointing out that “Chester’s ambition to be world champion is no less central to his selfconception” than his friend’s moral principles are to theirs.427 Thus, as May points out,
“each of the four responses to the Unfairness Objection fails for the same reason: each
identifies a feature of conscientious convictions that has some plausible moral significance
but that is shared by some non-moral projects.”428
If the Unfairness Objection holds, then why not just accept that Angelica, Biko, and
Chester are all entitled to a defeasible legal exemption? May is leery about accepting this
conclusion because he does not “believe the position is likely to prove tenable.”429 In other
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words, May seems to be worried that accepting the Unfairness Objection – and
consequently rejecting the Moral Conscience principle – may lead to greater feasibility
concerns than what was faced when simply accepting the Egalitarian Response. After all,
“no coherent defence of volitional exemptions can tolerate just any desire not to comply
with a law.”430
B. The Moral Integrity Response
In trying to further stave off the Unfairness Objection, May considers a fifth and final
response – what he calls the Moral Integrity Response:
(1) An individual has a significant interest in preserving her moral
integrity.431 Thus:
(2) An individual has a defeasible entitlement that the state not require her
to compromise her moral integrity.
(3) An individual’s legal obligation to act contrary to her moral conscience
requires her to compromise her moral integrity. Thus:
(4) An individual has a defeasible entitlement that the state not legally
obligate her to act contrary to her moral conscience.432
In general, the Moral Integrity Response “promises to explain why conscientious
objection is special by identifying a distinctively moral interest of individuals” – namely,
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protecting their moral integrity.433 Unfortunately, May contends that this last line of
defense also fails. First, he argues that “the threat to moral integrity is not exclusive to
cases of conscientious objection” – which means that moral integrity cannot therefore be
the reason that conscientious objections are special.434 If we accept the Moral Conscience
principle, and furthermore think that the justification for granting special legal
accommodations to conscience beliefs is protecting moral integrity, then it turns out we
might have to protect more than conscience beliefs. After all, non-moral projects may
sometimes involve moral integrity as well – e.g., May’s case involving Chesleigh below.
Second, May contends that, “when a person’s moral integrity is imperiled by the frustration
of her non-moral projects, it has no weight as a reason for granting a volitional exemption”
under the Moral Conscience principle because it fails to be imperiled as a result of a
conscientious objection as such.435 So, we may unjustifiably exclude cases of imperiled
moral integrity when we accept the Moral Conscience principle because these cases of
imperiled moral integrity do not seemingly involve conscientious objections per se. As a
result of these charges, May thinks that the Moral Integrity Response fails to explain why
conscientious objections to the law require special treatment.
To illustrate these claims, May has us consider the case of a fourth friend named
Chesleigh:
Like Chester, she is one of the country’s best chess players and wishes to
compete at an international level. She also has no distinctly moral objection
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to the antisecessionist war, but regards conscription as a severe impediment
to her development as a grandmaster. Like Chester, she would prefer to
spend three years in detention honing her skills. Chesleigh differs from
Chester in that she has an additional motivation behind her chess ambitions.
Whereas Chester is driven solely by his reverence for the aesthetic beauty of
the game, Chesleigh also has an instrumental motive. She wants to play in
international tournaments, not only for the sake of winning in itself, but also
so that she can win as much prize money as possible. But Chesleigh does not
want to win this money for purely selfish reasons. Instead, she feels obligated
to earn enough money to repay her elderly grandparents for the many
financial sacrifices they incurred supporting her chess career from an early
age. When it became clear that she was especially talented, they spent the
bulk of their retirement savings on her development. Because Chesleigh has
the potential to compete at an elite level, she believes that her moral integrity
demands that she help her grandparents enjoy the retirement they deserve
before it is too late. If there were some other way to repay her debt—perhaps
if she won the lottery—she would be less opposed to military service.
Nevertheless, she would still opt for the detention camp for just the same
reasons that Chester would.436
The case of Chesleigh nicely illustrates the dilemma for the Moral Conscience
principle described above: either this principle “includes Chesleigh within the scope of
those entitled to an exemption (because her moral integrity is threatened) or it does not
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(because she has no conscientious objection to military service as such).”437 By adopting
the first horn of the dilemma, the Moral Conscience principle is threatened with
implausibility – for once “an individual’s success or failure in realizing her non-moral
projects is assigned to her individual sphere of responsibility, it does not seem to matter
very much whether this success or failure has further consequences for her interest in
leading a virtuous life.”438 Not only so, but adopting the first horn would give Chester
strong grounds to complain of unfairness. After all, Chesleigh’s case “is only a slight
variation of his—the sole difference is a threat to her moral integrity that makes no
practical difference to her refusal to serve in the military.”439 Additionally, we might also
worry that adopting this first horn may lead to even further feasibility problems: granting
defeasible legal entitlements to non-moral projects that imperil moral integrity could lead
to too many exemptions overall.
Adopting the second horn is problematic as well. As May notes, the “threat to moral
integrity created by a law is no longer a distinctive feature of conscientious objection since
it can also arise in cases where the law frustrates an individual’s non-moral projects.”440 So,
this means that, by trying to uphold the initial thrust of the Moral Conscience principle, we
may end up undermining the Moral Integrity Response. That is, in denying
accommodations to non-moral projects on the grounds that they are insufficiently
conscientious in nature, we end up denying relevant threats to moral integrity. In terms of
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moral integrity, Chesleigh’s case is not that different from Angelica’s or Biko’s. In fact, there
seems to be “no reason why she cannot regard her moral obligation to repay her
grandparents as no less stringent than they take their respective obligations to be.”441 Thus,
if moral integrity is doing the justificatory work in granting defeasible entitlements to legal
accommodations, then why treat Chesleigh differently from Angelica and Biko? May writes:
The implications of the second horn for the moral integrity response may
seem relatively insignificant if cases such as Chesleigh were very rare. The
Moral Conscience principle might be adequately supported by a
consideration that, in actual practice, arises only in cases of conscientious
objection. But I do not think this observation bears out. Most people lead
complicated lives in which their moral values and non-moral projects overlap
and interconnect in intricate ways. It is often impossible to disentangle these
commitments and show that only a person’s non-moral interests are
threatened by a legal obligation. In these cases, when the state makes it
harder for people to live as they would prefer, it thereby makes it harder for
them to live up to their moral ideals.442
C. Twofold Response to May
In response to May, I argue two things. First, I argue that May is too hasty in his
analysis of the four potentially distinguishing features of conscience. As a result, I think that
May fails to see that volitional necessities and the categorical demands of conscience are
not the same, that conscience is not the capacity that “reflect[s] on the ultimate meaning of
441
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life,” and that moral commitments are dissimilarly central to one’s moral identity when
compared to non-moral projects. Second, I argue that May’s dilemma for the Moral
Conscience principle can be unraveled when we introduce Sorabji’s definition of conscience
beliefs. As a result of May’s dilemma failing, I contend that the Moral Integrity Response can
be vindicated.
As noted above, I think May is too hasty in his analysis of the four potentially
distinguishing features of conscience – and this causes him to overlook important
differences between conscience and non-moral projects. First, May considers whether a
person’s moral conscience is unique in that “it imposes categorical demands,” only to
conclude that Chester’s ambitions similarly impose categorical demands on his life –
“demands that he experiences as volitional necessities on a par with his moral beliefs.”443
Unfortunately, May fails to realize that volitional necessities and the categorical demands of
conscience are distinct.
As noted in a previous chapter, the first major difference between volitional
necessities and the categorical demands of conscience is that desire and duty are largely
separable within the latter but not so separable within the former. Since conscience beliefs
are perceived obligations, we can understand them as categorical demands that someone
believes they must perform. However, conscience beliefs differ from volitional necessities
in that the demands of the former must be satisfied even if the individual does not desire or
“care” about performing the demand at all. Whereas conscience places categorical
requirements on individuals independent of their desires, volitional necessities are just
desires all the way down.
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Moreover, because volitional necessities “can arise from anything at all that a
person cares about,” it is possible for the object of the volitional necessity to be amoral or
value-neutral.444 Another relevant difference thus arises: whereas the categorical demands
of conscience cannot be value neutral, the demands of volitional necessities “need not have
any connection to…value.”445 This second difference between the categorical demands of
conscience and the volitional necessities of non-moral projects is important for the current
discussion of moral integrity: if a volitional necessity is thwarted by law, it does not
necessarily involve an imperilment to moral integrity because it is possible that no moral
values were involved. But when a categorical demand of conscience is thwarted by law, it
necessarily involves an imperilment to moral integrity because moral values must always
be involved. Insofar as the categorical demands of conscience require that individuals do
things that they otherwise might not want to do and necessarily involve imperilments to
moral integrity, they are different from the volitional necessities of non-moral projects and
perhaps deserve differential treatment before the law as a result.
Moving forward, I also think that May is wrong to think – alongside Martha
Nussbaum446 – that conscience is the capacity that “reflect[s] on the ultimate meaning of
life.” As noted in an earlier chapter, this view of conscience is misguided for several
reasons. First, this view is, historically speaking, overinclusive: it attributes to conscience
not only beliefs about what actions or attitudes had been in the past, or would be in the
future, wrong or not wrong for us to adopt or not adopt in a particular situation, but also
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beliefs about what is or is not broadly meaningful to an individual. Second, this view seems
to reverse the role of conscience as the applier (and not supplier) of our values: conscience
now seems to be the capacity that primarily supplies our values – or something like our
answers to these questions of ultimate meaning. Additionally, this view of conscience
seems much friendlier than conscience’s historical roles as the creator of categorical
demands, judger, accuser, acquitter, and so on. Lastly, the historical notion of conscience
produces more than just “emotions of longing” connected to a search for ultimate meaning,
and includes emotions like guilt, remorse, pride, joy, and relief. Thus, I think May
mistakenly attributes this feature to conscience in his analysis of potentially distinguishing
features of conscience.
Lastly, I think May fails to see that moral commitments are dissimilarly central to
one’s moral identity when compared to non-moral projects. It is plausible that “Chester’s
ambition to be world champion is no less central to his self-conception” or identity than his
friend’s moral principles are to theirs.447 But I take his friend’s moral principles to be
nevertheless more central to their moral identity than Chester’s ambitions to be a world
champion chess-player. Angelica and Biko’s conscience beliefs at least partly constitute
their moral identity – for it seems difficult to articulate someone’s moral identity without
ever referencing what they believe to be morally wrong to do or not do. Chester’s nonmoral project, however, probably doesn’t have much to do, if anything, with his moral
identity – especially when we consider that the object of his volitional necessities seems to
be value-neutral. This distinction is likely important only insofar as considerations of one’s
moral identity – which includes considerations of one’s moral integrity – may carry more
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weight than considerations of one’s overall identity in legal accommodations cases. In other
words, this distinction will make a difference only insofar as the law is disproportionately
concerned with imperiling a citizen’s moral identity than a citizen’s value-neutral identity.
Second, I think May’s dilemma for the Moral Conscience principle is ultimately
unsuccessful. In particular, I think this dilemma can be unraveled when we introduce
Sorabji’s definition of conscience beliefs. Remember that Sorabji contends that conscience
beliefs are beliefs “about what actions or attitudes had been in the past, or would be in the
future, wrong or not wrong for him to adopt or not adopt in a particular situation.” 448 So, if
this is true, then Chesleigh’s belief that she must “earn enough money to repay her elderly
grandparents for the many financial sacrifices they incurred supporting her chess career
from an early age” is plausibly a conscience belief. That is, Chesleigh’s belief that she must
earn enough money to repay her grandparents is a belief about what actions she must
perform in the future – and would be wrong of her to not perform. Thus, while it’s true that
Chesleigh “has no distinctly moral objection to the antisecessionist war” per se, she
nevertheless holds a conscience belief that indirectly grounds her conscientious objection.
How might this point unravel May’s dilemma? Remember that May’s dilemma is for
supporters of the Moral Conscience principle: this principle either includes Chesleigh
within the scope of those entitled to an exemption because her moral integrity is
threatened or it does not because she has no conscientious objection to military service as
such. My response is that Moral Conscience principle would, in fact, include Chesleigh
within the scope of those entitled to an exemption because she possesses a conscientious
objection – just not to military service as such. Of course, merely advancing a conscientious
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objection and advancing a conscientious objection worthy of accommodations is different.
Though Chesleigh may possess a conscience belief and advance a conscientious objection –
and would thus be, at the very least, granted the defeasible entitlement to legal
accommodations under the Moral Conscience principle – her bid for accommodations may
nevertheless fail. In fact, her conscience claim may fail to warrant a legal accommodation
because it is, as May points out, “not a conscientious objection to military service as such.”
The broader point here is that, in cases where someone’s moral integrity is
threatened, there is likely some conscience belief that is being imperiled. Most basically,
this is because imperilments to moral integrity usually involve asking individuals to do or
not do what they otherwise believe would be wrong or not wrong for them in a given
situation. Unfortunately, May argues in the other direction, claiming that threats to moral
integrity are not exclusive to cases of conscientious objection. But if the example of his
claim is Chesleigh’s case, then he has not given us good reason to believe his claim: after all,
we’ve shown that Chesleigh’s threat to moral integrity involved a conscience belief – just
not one against military service as such. Interestingly, we should also note that Chester’s
case seemingly involves no threat to moral integrity because his case involves no
conscience beliefs concerning what is morally required or forbidden – only beliefs about
what is morally permissible. Overall then, this means that May’s second objection to the
Moral Integrity Response also fails: when a person’s moral integrity is imperiled by the
frustration of her non-moral projects, it is likely because some nearby conscience belief is
similarly imperiled. If this is true, then that individual would, like Chesleigh, be granted a
defeasible entitlement to legal accommodations under the Moral Conscience principle. Yet,
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as noted above, merely possessing a defeasible entitlement does not guarantee legal
accommodations; a bid for accommodations may still fail for a number of good reasons.
If May’s dilemma against the Moral Conscience principle is unsuccessful, and moral
integrity can be redeemed as the reason that conscientious objections are special, then the
Moral Integrity Response is vindicated and the Unfairness Objection seemingly answered. I
should also note that May’s Moral Integrity Response, if sound, helps to inform a response
to how a state should determine whether to grant exemptions when permitted in general.
In particular, the Moral Integrity Response would ground defeasible entitlements that the
state not legally obligate individuals to act contrary to her moral conscience – religious or
otherwise. Such a conclusion provides cursory support for the claim that the state has good
reasons to grant a defeasible positive special legal status to all conscience beliefs. When we
this claim with the Egalitarian Response, we get the following conclusion: the state
therefore has good reasons to grant a defeasible positive special legal status to all
conscience beliefs – religious or otherwise.
V. Conclusion
In this final chapter, I addressed several objections to the Egalitarian Response. In
the first section, I addressed the multifaceted critique as advanced by Kathleen Brady. In
particular, I addressed her claims that: religious conscience beliefs should enjoy special
legal treatment on the grounds that they enjoy a distinct relationship with the divine; that
accepting the Egalitarian Response will result for weaker protections for both religious and
secular conscience beliefs; and that limit liberty more broadly and religious liberty in
particular. In the second section, I addressed the Feasibility Objection and discussed
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responses raised by Douglas Laycock and Nadia Sawicki. In the final section, I offered two
responses to the Underinclusiveness Objection as raised by Simon May.
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Religion is often singled out for special legal treatment in Western societies. This is
certainly true in the United States where religion enjoys a special place in the First
Amendment to the Constitution via the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Through
Free Exercise guarantees, for example, the Supreme Court held in Wisconsin v. Yoder that
Amish children were entitled to an exemption from compulsory school attendance laws
after the eighth grade, emphasizing that this was a uniquely religious exemption that did
not apply to everyone. Moreover, those conscientiously objecting to contemporary
vaccination laws may find themselves with varying protections depending on which US
state they live in. For example, if both an Atheist and a Christian conscientiously object to
the mandatory vaccine laws in New York, a legal exemption may be granted to the Christian
but not the Atheist under New York’s current legal framework.
These cases and many like it raise an important question: what, if anything, is
“special” about religious conscience beliefs that justifies their special legal treatment? In this
dissertation, I argue that, because religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs are
sufficiently similar in nature, there is no reason to treat them differently before the law. In
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this way, I offer an Egalitarian Response to the question about religion’s legal specialness.
In the first chapter, I highlight a few historical discussions concerning religion’s
specialness. In the second chapter, I develop and defend a broad account of ‘conscience’
against competing notions in order to navigate questions concerning the comparative
features of religious and nonreligious conscience more effectively. In the third and fourth
chapters, I analyze several possibly demarcating features of religious conscience beliefs
taken to be legally relevant by theorists in the field. At the end of these chapters I conclude
that, when compared to the nonreligious conscience, the religious conscience fails to
possess sufficiently differentiating features so that comparative special legal treatment is
warranted. In the fifth and final chapter, I field lurking objections to the Egalitarian
Response.
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